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Introduction
The relative economic, infrastructural and administrative poverty of
many rural communities in the black homeland~ of South Africa
reflects their position of political and economic dependency in
relation to their wider setting - the South African state and
economy. Unable to influence the political machinery of either their
homeland governments or that of South Africa, and unable to
establish economic independence, they have little control over the
conditions of their everyday life and subsistence. Their situation is
aggravated by the fact that the homeland governments, to whom
they look for services and assistance, are themselves dependent upon
the South African Gov.ernment for a substantial portion of their
budgets, as well as for much of their administrative capacity. The
poverty of these communities is thus duplicated at the level of
their governments. In most of these homeland rural communities
constraints on their chances of improving their circumstances far
outweigh opportunities.
This monograph considers the circumstances of a rural Ciskei
community, and the prospects for their improvement. It results from
a co-operative research venture between the Agricultural and Rural
Deveropmeiu Research Institute (ARDRI) at the University of Fort
Hare and the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at
Rhodes University. In 1981 ARDRI approached ISER and asked it to-
undertake a socio-economic survey in the Amatola Basin area of
Ciskei near Alice. ARDRI was involved in the planning and
implementation of a rural development programme in the Amatola
Basin, and the socio-economic survey was to form part of the initial
information-gathering process of the ov~rall project.
As a result of the socio-economic survey conducted in mid-1981, it
became clear that further research would be necessary.
Problems and practices relating to cultivation would have to be
investigated as the Amatola Basin community was. unable to
feed itself, and because agricultural improvement was a key
objective of the overall ARDRI project. Unless the constraints
operating in agriculture were understood and counteracted, the
ARDRI project could not succeed in its stated objective.
The prominence of children in the demographic profile of the
Amatola Basin required a focus on two major avenues for the
improvement of children's life-chances in both the short- and
fong-term, viz.,. the provision of health services and education.
As the improvement of people's circumstances depends upon the
efficient management and delivery of services, it was necessary
to examine the organization and quality of local government
institutions.
The researchers' involvement in the Amatola Basin flowed
directly from the ARDRI project. This project was an
intervention in the life of the Amatola Basin. As such, it could
constitute either a valuable opportunity or a serious constraint
upon the inhabitants' attempts to improve their situation. It
was felt that the ARDRI initiative should accordingly be
examined in that light.
The presertt socio-economic situation in the Amatola Basin
could not be understood without taking account of the way in
which it had developed and of the community's relationship to
the wider South African society. This suggested the importance
of making a study of the community's history.
Further field research was conducted in 1981 and 1982.
The overalI organization of this monograph is thus based on two sets
of interrelated assumptions, viz.
that the Amatola Basin's relationship of dependency on the
wider South African society is largely responsible for both the
low level of opportunity and the wide range of effective
constraints on the development of a stronger local economy and
infrastructure, and of effective administration. This relationship
of dependency is part of an on-going historical process and
appears to have been cumulative; and
that the fields selected for more detailed study, VIZ.
education, health, cultiv~tion, local government and externally-
initiated development projects constitute perhaps the key areas
in which people's chances of improvement historically have
been and are currently being held back.
With these two assumptions operating as broad guidelines, the
authors have each pursued their own research, having freedom to
cast their findings in comparative and interpretative contexts of
their own choice. While ideas and data have been shared, the
authors each accept responsibility for the content of their own
chapters.
After this introduction, the setting of the study is given in a
chapter on the physical lqcation of the Amatola Basin, its
infrastructure and the socio-economic status of its inhabitants. The
development of this setting is then placed in historical context in a
chapter tracing' the history of the Amatola Basin community from
its establishment in the 1850s. Four thematic studies follow,
considering the areas of education, local government, cultivation and
the state of health and delivery of health services. The implementa-
tion of the ARDRI development project and its impact upon the
above aspects of life in the Amatola Basin are then analyzed.
The conclusion, written jointly by the editors, assesses problems of
and prospects for rural development in the black homelands of South
Africa by analyzing issues raised in previous chapters.
Footmte
The tenn llhareland'l is used throughout this rronographto refer to the ten
rnl itical and gEDJraphical units created by the South African CDvemrent
with t;he expressed intention of catering for the rnlitical rights and
aspirations of black people in South Africa, in terms of the policy known
as IIseparate developrmtll. The Ciskei is one such hareland. These
rnl itical and ~raphical units have also been referred to by people of
various political persuasions as IIso-called hare IandsII, IIBantustansll,
Ilself-CDveming States II, IINative ReservesII, 'tabour ReservesII and.
"National and Independent States". Each tenn carries its own ideological
load, and the legal, political and rroral status of these units is a matter
of TlUchheated argurent. The use of the tenn "hareland" in this rronograph
should not be taken to irrply ipso factn support of the rnlicy of separate
developrent, in terms of which hareland units were brought into being. In
Chapter Two; the terms llreserves" and "reserve areas" have been used, as
that chapter deals with the period up to 1950, during which tirre those
terms were in current usage.
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1 The Amatola Basin: Its Location and its
Residents -S.B. Bekker
I The Ciskei
The Ciskei is one of the ten homelands created by the South African
Government. It is the fourth to accept independence from that
government (in 1981). As a result of this recent and controversial
political birth, both its area of jurisdiction and its community of
citizens remain contentious concepts.1 In this book, the Ciskei is
understood to refer to the region that includes both the territory
presently under the jurisdiction of the Ciskei Government as well as
the South African Government's land consolidation proposals as
described in the 1980 Ciskei Commission Report.2 This region is one
single block of land covering some 800 000 hectares.
Ciskeian citizens, who are all Xhosa-speakers, include a majority who
live permanently outside this region. For the purposes of this book,
only those resident in the Ciskei will be considered. In 1980, resident
Ciskeians amounted to some 660 000 souls.3
Situated on the south-eastern seaboard of Southern Africa, the
Ciskei stretches from a 60km coastal strip for some 160km inland.
From the coastal plain, the surface rises to the Amatola mountain
range north of Alice, and then descends in the direction of the
Black Kei River. Penetrating deep into the interior, the Ciskei is
drained by this river in the north-west and by the Buffalo and Great
Fish Rivers which effectively form its south-eastern and south-
western boundaries, respectively.- The greater part of its surface,
south of the Amatola mountains, is drained by the Keiskamma River,
the water of which is one of the most important natural resources
of a country which lacks any exploitable minerals.
The whole of the Ciskei falls into the summer rainfall region of
South Africa and precIpItation is characterised by sharp heavy
showers and high variability. This, together with widely differing
types of soils and vegetation, has led commentators to conclude that
two per cent of the land can be placed under irrigation, fifteen per
cent under (rain-fed) cultivation, and sixty-six percent under grazing.4 The
1
Map 1: The Amatola Basin in the Ciskei
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agricultural potential of this land, poor though it is, is deemed to be
higher than that of land across the border in South Africa.5
The resident Ciskeian population has increased dramatically. For the
1970-1980 decade, one estimate puts the increase at seventy-six per
cent.6 Three main reasons for this massive increase are apparent.
The first is the high birth rate of resident Ciskeians. In the second
place, a series of land incorporations and excisions have substantially
changed the territory now known as the Ciskei, and thus its
population base. Finally, as a result of the implementation of the
South African Government's policy of population relocation, coupled
with a strategy of rapid urbanisation in the Mdantsane/Zwelitsha
region of the Ciskei, there has been continuous migration over the
last decade of blacks from urban and rural areas in the Border and
the Eastern Cape into this territory.
As a result of this recent increase in population, a growing number
of resident Ciskeians are settled in villages which enjoy access to
neither arable and grazing land ror to services provided by an
urban local authority. These closer settlements which have developed,
particularly in the north-west and close to the conurbation of
Mdantsane and Zwelitsha, comprise an estimated ten per cent of the
total population.7 By employing this type of village as a separate
category, the resident Ciskeian population can be classified as
thirty-six per cent urban, fifty-four per cent rural, and ten per
cent resident in closer settlements.8
With a national budget of R100m in 1980/819 and a gross national
product two-thirds of which is earned outside its borders,lO Ciskei is
demonstrably poor in comparison with, and heavily dependent upon,
its rich and powerful neighbour, South Africa. Situated as it is,
moreover, on the periphery of the Southern African space economy,l 1
its future economic prospects do seem to be linked to the new
Southern African Regional Development Plan which aims to relocate
some industrial and allied economic activities from major metro-
politan areas in South Africa to peripheral regions in the space
economy. Any strategy to improve its economic viability does seem
to require the Ciskei to remain squarely integrated Into the wider
South African economy.
2 The Amatola Basin
a) Geography
As its name implies, the Amatola Basin IS bounded by high ground in
3
Map 2: The Amatola Basin
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the north, east and west. Elongated along its north-south axis and
a little less than 7 000 ha in extent, the surface is steeply sloped,
descending some 500m from the rim of the Basin to the river bed. 1 2
The Amatola River which flows into the Keiskamma River south of
the Basin, drains the surface with the help of some twenty
streams, all of which have been given names by Amatola residents. 1 3
These tributaries of the Amatola River flow intermittently, and
most strongly during the wet summer. months.
Annual rainfall varies within the 750 - 1 OOOmm range. It is
greatest over the high pine plantations in the northern corner and
over the Dohne sourveld in the North Valley. In the central region
and South Valley, the rainfall drops substantially and the vegetation
changes to that of False Thornveld on a markedly eroded surface. 1 4
Situated high on the eastern and western slopes, there remain a
few large areas covered by indigenous mature forest. Soils in the
Basin are considered more fertile than in most other Ciskei regions.l5
Located as it is, imme<;}iately south of the Amatola mountain range,
the Basin is accessible by road from the south, and is some twenty
kilometres from Middledrift, its magisterial centre, and by way of
an eastern pass, at the same distance from the town of Alice.
Railheads closest to the Basin are situated in these two towns. A
third gravel road which winds up the steep north~western reaches
of the Basin, leads to Hogsback. Apart from these three main roads
which lead to the central village of Komkhulu ("The Great Place"),
a number of by-roads have been created through constant use by
motor vehicles. These amount to t racks that are difficult t-o
negotiate at the best of times and which deteriorate considerably
during wet weather. The only form of public transportation in 1981
was a bus service available once a week.
The thirteen villages in the Basin form three clusters which meet
in the central village. The three villages of the North Valley and
five of the six in the South Valley are low-lying and within
reasonable reach of each other. Residents in these villages are
within walking distance of the Amatola River, the major source of
clean water and of the central village of Komkhulu from which
almost all social services available in the Basin are delivered.
Located high on the Basin slopes, the village of Ndlovura in the
South Valley and the three villages of the Highlands find access. to
clean water and to social services much more difficult; access to
dead wood from the indigenous forests, on the other hand, is
easier.
The clinic, the only high school and two of the four trading stores
are situated in Komkhulu which is also the seat of the Gaika-Mbo
Tribal Authority. In addition, the central village in which both Chief
5
Mhlambiso and the agricultural extension officer live, possesses the
only telephone link and generator in the Basin. For the most it
remains a small village of some sixty homesteads and is remarkably
similar to the other twelve Basin villages.
These villages comprise between forty and one hundred homesteads.
A homestead is made up of a number of residential units, a garden
and, most often, a cattle kraal. Residences, which are either
rondavels or rectangular in shape, are built from wattle and daub
and have either thatched or, increasingly, corrugated-iron roofs.
Gardens and kraals are close to these residential units and are
usually fenced off with branches, small sticks and wooden stakes.
Homestead sites are registered under leasehold tenure at the Middle-
drift magistracy. Villagers use pit latrines which are often shared by
residents from a number of homesteads. Eight villages (including
Komkhulu) possess a primary school, six a church, and all have land
set aside for exclusive use as a cemetery. Half of the households in
the Basin hold arable land on a quitrent basis. Their lands typically
lie closer to their villages than does the communal grazing land to
which/they have access.
b) The Community of the Amatola Basin 16
The Mhlambiso hereditary leaders and their followers have been
living in the Amatola Basin for over one hundred years. After the
grant, during the nineteenth century, of some 400 quitrent land
deeds to male heads of households who were followers of the then
Chief Mhlambiso, few outsiders seem to have succeeded in settling in
the Basin by obtaining land rights or, for that matter, residential
rights. Today, those who consider the Amatola Basin their home, or
at least their rural home, are overwhelmingly the progeny of the
families that settled in the Basin five generations back. Only
thirteen households (out of a total of some eight hundred) are
known to have settled in the Basin in living memory.
The stability of this community which is implied by such continuity,
needs qualification. In the first place, the natural increase in
population - and, within a patrilineal community, in male population
in particular - led to the emergence and proliferation of landless
homesteads since it was the custom for young men to establish
separate homesteads for themselves and their new families. As a
result, diminishing access to land and overstocking of cattle became
major reasons for impoverishment and deterioration in household
agricultural production. The second major qualification to this
picture of a stable community arises from this agricultural deteriora-
tion as well as factors rooted in the rapidly industrialising wider
political economy of South Africa. Quite simply it is the extra-
6
ordinarily high incidence of adult migration to South African mines,
cities, and white-owned farms. Though many of the migrants who
today spend the larger part of their adult lives living and working
elsewhere, still consider the Amatola Basin their rural home and
attest to this by remitting a part of their earnings to their families
back home, others leave this home permanently, thereby cutting
their ties with the community in which they were born and bred. In
1981, one homestead in ten stood empty in the Basin, pointing to
whole families that had migrated, many probably never to return.
Based on a comprehensive survey undertaken in 1981, the total
population of the Amatola Basin is in the' region of 5 600 souls. This
figure includes residents as well as migrants whom residents consider
to belong to their households. These migrants prove their ties with
home through regular visits and by remittances in cash and in kind.
As shown in Table 1, demographic growth - of the total population
_ has been uniform over the last eighty years. The number of
households has doubled, a proportion which correlates accurately with
the present incidence of landlessness which stands at fifty-three per
cent. The present resident population of little less than four thousand
persons suggests, moreover, that the increase in people living perma-
nently in the Basin has probably been substantially less than changes
in total population figures indicate. In all probability, there were
proportionately many fewer migrants at the turn of the century and
those who did migrate were less likely to do so as regularly and
over as long periods as is the case today.1 7
Table I: Demographic Changes in the Amatola Basin
18
Date
1981
1959
1937
1925
1901
Number of Households
757 (occupied)
647
399
Total Population
5597
4514
3439
3050
3048
Resident
Population
3830
The people of the Amatola Basin perceive themselves as Amahlubi, a
Mfengu grouping paying allegiance to Chief Mhlambiso. They also
perceive themselves as Xhosa-speakers living in the Ciskei, and as
black people in South Africa. These different social identities
impinge upon them in important, albeit different ways.
7
Continuity of descent from the original landed settlers in the Basin
remains important, particularly with regard to the use of land. By
patrilineal custom transformed into legal regulation, residential sites
and arable land are inherited by direct male descendants.
Households of this community, moreover, have access to communal
grazing land and, if landless, can gain access to arable land through
co-operative arrangements with kin and neighbours.
This continuity of descent does not imply an unchanged social
structure. Households in the Basin are increasingly mother-oriented:
over half the households are effectively headed by women, and the
masculinity rate (males to a hundred females) for adult residents
between the ages Of 20 and 60 is forty-nine. Since many adult women
migrate with their husbands in search of cash-earning work
elsewhere, two-thirds of Basin residents are under twenty years of
age and fully one-half are attending schools in the Basin. Household-
heads, therefore, tend to be elderly, and households themselves
three-generational rather than two-generational. More than half the
female heads are widows.
The fundamental need for an external cash source is shown by the
typical income and consumption patterns of Amatola households.
Only fifteen per cent of incoming cash derives from farming and
other entrepeneurial activities. The rest flows in from migrant
remittances (33%), pensions (26%), and wages earned by residents
(26%). Since almost all remunerated jobs within the Basin are civil
serviCe jobs, these latter items of income derive either directly or
indirectly from external sources. The kinds of food consumed by a
household, including mealiemeal and vegetables, moreover, are more
often bought as processed commodities from local trading stores
than produced by households themselves. Little meat is eaten.
There are three major causes for the structural changes evident in
the community. The first is the dramatic deterioration over the last
century in the productive agricultural capacity of the Amatola
Basin. The second is found in the introduction through missions, and
the subsequent spread, of the Christian religion. The third, the
spread from mining and urban areas, and the ultimate domination
of, the money economy. The consequent need to earn cash in order
to survive, obliges most adult residents to seek jobs in the
Republican area - the economic common area - in which access is
temporary and advancement limited.
Virtually every adult in the Basin claims to be a Christian. The two
largest denominations, Presbyterian and Methodist, both have active
churches in the community as. do four other Protestant denomina-
tions. Though cohabitation is frequent, no example of a polygynous
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marriage was identified during the 1981 survey, a finding in line
with the Christian insistence on monogamy. Not only is the
church's influence on the early educational system evident, but the
growth of a series of village- and Basin- based voluntary associa-
tions owe their origin to the same source. The most common
voluntary associations are burial societies and savings clubs formed
along formal organisational lines. These, together with a number of
other more general social societies, are formed and run by women
who emphasize the Christian institutional basis of these associa-
tions. 17
When they reach the age of 16, all boys and many girls begin to
turn their minds to leaving the Amatola Basin. Through their
parents and other returning migrants, through the radio and their
schools, they have a fair idea of life and employment opportunities
in the cities of South Africa. Most will try their luck in these
cities before the age of 20 as in the Basin itself, there are few
cash-earning jobs: teachers, foresters, clinic staff and agricultural
officers virtually complete the list. The few remunerated positions
in the Tribal Authority are filled by elderly men who have returned
after years as migrants. There are less than 200 paid positions in
the community as a whole.
Since the Amatola Basin is far from the closest CIties of East
London and Port Elizabeth, job-seekers cannot find jobs that allow
them to commute between home and work. They need then to
obtain not only suitable work but accommodation as well. Given the
housing backlog and regulations governing the control of the black'
population in South African cities, it is no surprise that all do not
succeed. Those that do, tend to have substantially higher educa-
tional qualifications than those that fail. Two-thirds of successful
migrants live and work in the Eastern Cape, the majority in its two
cities, others as farm hands on white-owned farms. The rest have
found work in Cape Town or in the metropolitan region of the
Southern Transvaal. One male migrant in six works as a miner.
Though identification with the Amahlubi community in the Amatola
Basin serves, along with family, as a primary local tie, particularly
with regard to cattle and land, it is the Ciskei Government that
decides matters of education, health care, pension payments, and
access to the limited number of jobs near home or in the
commuter cities of Zwelitsha and Mdantsane. Farther afield, with
promises of opportunities and wealth, and threats of violence,
disruption and prosecution, lie the urban black townships, the
economy, and the government of South Africa. To the adults of the
Amatola Basin, this picture is a tested view of the world: to their
children it is the foundation of their hopes and their fears. Insofar
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as It IS a realistic view of their world, it does not suggest that the
residents of the Basin form a peasantry: people who earn their
livelihoods through marketing the product of their labour as
cultivators or stockfarmers. This perhaps is the fundamental reason
why few newcomers have settled in the- isolation of the Amatola
Basin during the past twenty years.
3 Footrotes
1 Daniel J.B. tvtI. (1981);Ciskei Carmission Report (1980), Chapters 8 & 9
2 Ciskei Carrnission Report (1980) p.54f
3 Ibid, p.15
4 Ibid, p.72
5 Ibid, p.73
6 Bekker S.B. et al (1982) p.4
7 Ibid, p.6
8 Ibid, p.6
9 Ciskei Carrnission Report (1980) p.82
10 Bekker S.B. et al (1982) p.8
11 Daniel (19EH)
12 Steyn G.J. (1982) p.30
13 Troll ip J. (1981) -
14 Steyn G.J. (1981), p.4; Mentis M.T. and Trollope W.S.W.(1981) p.8ff.
15 Dupreez C.C. and Botha F.J.P. (1981), p.1
16 Unless otherwise specified, all data used in this section were obtained
frun the follCMing three sources:
Bekker, S.B. et al (1981a); Bekker, S.B. et al (1981b); Bekker, S.B. & de
Wet, C.J. (1982)
17 Wilson M. and ThanpsonL. (eds. 1971), Chapter 2
18 Derived frun data presented in Chapter 2 infra; Dept. of Native Affairs,
Unionof South Africa 1959; and sources quoted in footnote 16 (above)
10
2 History of the Amatola Basin -j. Bowen
1 Introduction
The years 1850-1950 were momentous ones in South African
history. During the early period, the last independent African
chiefdoms were brought under European control and South African
industrialisation began with the discovery of diamonds in 1867,
accelerating rapidly with the discovery of gold in the 1880's. For
black people, this period saw the progressive loss of land, the
breakdown of traditional social, economic and political structures
and the introduction of the migrant labour system. Over the years,
successive governments (after initial deliberate attempts to destroy
the traditional chieftaincy and land tenure systems) introduced
legislation designed to perpetuate, or recreate, these traditional
systems as a means of ruling the vast (black) African population of
South Africa. From the 1930's in particular, attempts were made to
regenerate the reserve areas, threatened with collapse due to soil
erosion, overstocking, overpopulation and a shortage of male labour
for agricultural purposes.
These historical facts are well-known. This chapter is an attempt
to trace the course of events from 1850 to 1950 as they affected one
community - the Mhlambiso Mfengu of the Amatola Basin, bearing
in mind the broader South African context in which they took
place. There are gaps in the archival material, gaps which would
need to be filled through the collecting of oral history in parti-
cular. For example, it is known that females for many years, in
the absence of males who labour in the urban areas, have taken an
increasingly important role in organising agricultural activities as
well as general social activities. The written records are silent on
this fact. Oral evidence would also be extremely valuable in
throwing light on written evidence which is tantalisingly brief: e.g.
regarding feuds over the headmanship. It would also be crucial in
offering a different perspective, that of the inhabitants of the.
Basin themselves, rather than that of the white officials who
administered government policy. One further factor in relation to
the source material needs to be mentioned. The large number of
files relating to Middledrift which have been destroyed is both
regrettable and disturbing. Most of these relate to the period from
1940.
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It is partly as a result of these constraints, which the source
material has imposed, that this chapter is handled thematically and
not as a chronological narrative. It will become clear, however, that
some themes - such as agricultural decline and migrant labour, are
closely interlinked and that the divisions between them are
somewhat artificial and have been adopted merely for the purpose
of exposition. Despite the gaps in the evidence, it has been possible
to reconstruct an historical picture of life in the Basin from the
1850's, a history in which various themes are clearly traceable,
within the limitations of the available source material. The picture
which results, reflects in microcosm what was happening in various
other rural reserve areas in South Africa. Although this is an
historical case study of the Mhlambiso Mfengu of the Amatola
Basin it is also, to some extent, a history of black people in South
Africa.
2 Setting and Early History
In the late 1840 's the region of the Amatola mountains was
described as having "some of the richest and most desirable pasture
land (that) exists ... "1 It was into this vicinity that Mhlambiso
and his people were moved in 1853.
If we consider that. in 1855, Mhlambiso had 182 followers, or
sixty-four heads of families with him, then it is clear that the
Basin offered them a secure and good living, providing both grazing
for their cattle, good fields in which to grow food and sufficient
water for both. By 1937 the size of the Basin had been reduced to
just over 8 000 morgen.2 So in 1866, each family would have had
ac;cess to at least 125 morgen - enough to provide a secure
livelihood far preferable to that which they had previously had and
this must have been seen as equitable reward for the loyalty they
had 'shown to the British government.
Oral history relates that in about 1820 Mhlambiso) the third son of
the Great House of the Hlubi chief Mtimkulu, fled with his
followers from the attacks of Shaka in Natal. They moved to the
Transkei where they were welcomed by Hintsa. During the 1835
Frontier War they, along with other Mfengu groups, were brought
to the Peddie area by the Rev. John Ayliff and they then removed
themselves to the Wittebergen Native Reserve in the Albert (now
Herschel) district. In 1853, Mhlambiso received permission from
Lieutenant-General Cathcart to move with his followers into the
Amatola Basin (part of the area from which the Ngqikas were
removed by the Colonial government following the 1853 Mlanjeni
War), in reward for their loyalty to Britain during this war.3 The
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British established a I~Hge area as a Royal (or Crown) Reserve, and
the newly-placed groups were to serve as a buffer between the
Cape Colony and the Xhosa peoples now pushed back beyond the
Kei. 4
The original recommendation by James Ayliff, the then Superinten-
dent of the Crown Reserve, was to settle Europeans in the more
fertile areas of the Basin, leaving the rugged slopes for the new
black immigrants. 5 Ultimately, however, while in the neighbouring
Keiskammahoek district European settlers were interspersed
amongst black people; Middledrift district - of which the Amatola
Basin became a part - was almost wholly black. The Mfengu were
all clustered in four locations: Zibi IS, Zali IS, Quma's and the Basin
(the latter location was, in area, larger than the other three put
together: 8 000 morgen as opposed to 5 500 morgen). 6 The rem-
ainder of .the district consisted largely of people of Kama IS
Gqunukwebe who submitted to the British, with a few white
traders, missionaries and farmers dispersed amongst them.
The Mfengu in the Basin have remained a fairly homogeneous group
(in spite of the early establishment of mission and recruit ment
links) with no large-scale movement of people into the Basin since
the first settlement.7
3 Administration
a) External (European)
In 1853 black people in the Crown Reserve were placed under a
Superintendent subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of British
Kaffraria. A yearly quitrent of las was levied on each hut. 8
Shortly afterwards (1854), Sir
of the Cape and in 1855
magistrates who would get
administration of justice. 9
George Grey was appointed Governor
he introduced the appointment of
together with the chiefs in the
Traditional chieftainship was thus undermined through the introduc-
tion of chiefs and headmen as paid appointees of the government.
In addition to their judicial duties, magistrates were to "take an
interest in the welfare of the inhabitants of their districts,
encourage industry and agriculture and promote civilisation". 1 0
Civil cases were adjudicated by "native custom", while the Special
Magistrate was to try criminal cases according to European law. In'
1883, however, most magistrates admitted that although it was by
this time illegal, they continued to administer "native law" .11
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In 1855 three divisions were established for the administration of
the Mfengu. in the Crown Reserve, with a Commissioner at
Keiskammahoek and two subordinate superintendents in the other
divisions. Mfengu headmen were appointed at a stipend of £20 per
annum (this stipend was progressively reduced over the years. For
example, by 1890 they were receiving £9). Among other things they
were required to assist in the collection of hut tax.12
The magisterial system continued after the Cape accepted responsi-
bility for British Kaffraria in 1865, and after Union in 1910 the
establishment of Native Affairs Commissioners did not initially
change the administration on the ground as it affected the
day-to-day running of the locations. In fact, the recommendation
from Middledrift in 1927 was that apart from a change in name
from Magistrates to Native Commissioners, no further action
was necessary.13 The Native Affairs Act of 1920 introduced the
first real changes in administration at the local level. In terms of
this Act, Local Councils were established. Middledrift Local Council
was established in 1927 and the Amatola Basin headmen sat on this
Council. However, the Local Council was under the Chairmanship of
the European Native Commissioner and the local inhabitants were
by this time firmly dependent on the whims of the white govern-
ment. They could petition higher authorities, but all important
decision and policy-making were out of their hands and would be
imposed from above. Revenue was collected by means of a local
tax, and when the Ciskeian General Council was set up, a percen-
tage of the Local Council's funds was paid I to I this iGeneral Council} 4
The records show that the activities of the Council were generally
concerned with municipal-type government: the construction and
maintenance of water furrows, bridges and dams, as well as having
responsibility for hospitals, clinics, agricultural schools and for
general education. In 1956 the General Council was abolished by
proclamation and replaced by the various Tribal Authorities.15
In 1927, under the Native Administration Act (No. 38 of 1927),
magistrates with jurisdiction over blacks, were transferred from the
Department ;'of Justice to the Native Affairs Department.16 Magis-
trates were to receive instructions from the Chief Native Commis-
sioners and were to "extend close observation to, and to report
fully upon, the development of the outlook, activities and needs of
the native population and to exhibit a considerate and painstaking
understanding of Native ways of thought and methods of business."17
Until the promulgation of the Black Authorities Act in 1951, with
the consequent official reinstatement of the chieftaincy, the main
instrument of government remained the headman. It was through
the headmen's co-operation that the state maintained control over
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black people and ensured South Africa's cheap labour supply.18
b) The Mhlambiso Headmen
The British Government recognised Mhlambiso as the most senior
Mfengu chief under colonial rule and today the present Mhlambiso
Chief. maintains that he is recognised as the most senior Mfengu
chief in Ciskei; owing allegiance only to Ntatazeli in Natal.
Nevertheless, for most of the period covered by this study, the
various governments recognised the Mhlambisos only in their
capacities as headmen} 9
As headmen, they
"were in some respects to act as policemen in apprehending
offenders and bringing them to justice ... they were to keep
a general supervision over the people. . . they were to be
utilized by the magistrates as advisors in all native matters."2.0
For example} in 1875 the Clerk-in-Charge at Middledrift cited the
following responsibilities of headmen:
"Every headman is responsible for every act committed at his
village on pain of being dismissed. He has to see that all
stock coming to or removing from his' village, is reported to
the Magistrate - to see that every man pay his Hut Tax, and
that no person is allowed to leave the village without having
previously done so . . . Also that all Breaches of Peace be
immediately reported and the offenders brought before the
magistrate . . . Every headman is to be properly dressed and
set a proper example to the people of his village. He is to
use every means to discourage drunkeness. . discourage
heathenish practises. to endeavour in every way to
encourage the people to send their children to school. To
assist persons wishing to hold divine service.. ,,21
Generally, headmen also allotted land in their locations a
practice which gave them considerable power, although this
allotment theoretically was subject to the sanction of the Special
Magistrate. In 1890 the Secretary of Native Affairs ordered a halt
to this allotment of land by headmen.22 (Nevertheless it appears
that they continued to do so as Government officials argued that it
would be impossible to do this task themselves.)2 3
Both the Civil Commissioner in King William's Town and the
Clerk-in-Charge at Middledrift in 1886 were of the opinion that a
reduction in the number of headmen by the Government was not
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Figure 1: Succession of Headmen and Chiefs in Amatola Basin
Mtimkulu
Mhlambiso (Chief and headman until
his death in 1867)
Jacob Mdlankomo -----------------
(exact relationship to
Mhlambiso is unknown)
(Headman 1867 - +-1884)
Ebenezer (Headman +- 1882 - 1914)
I
Died 1922)
I . I
d
, I , I
Jonathan Ba 1 Llewellyn Nmus
(Moved to America) (Headman 1914 - 1916 *** (Headman from
Died 1916) +-1929 to 1966
Cyrus Mqweli
(Chief 1966 to present)
*** Alfred Mabuto
(unrelated to Mhlambiso:
Headman 1917-1929)
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possible, .not only because the "people of one location would not
recognise the authority of the headman of another", but also
because of their usefulness in governing the locations peacefully,
their settling of "garden disputes" and their loyalty to government,
without which control over the "natives" would not have been
possible.24 The consequence of headmen being government-salaried
and appointed officials, especially where decisions were often
dependent on the personality and attitudes of Special Magistrates,
was that differences and divisions could occur between inhabitants,
depending on personal allegiances. Thus, on the death of the original
Chief Mhlambiso in 1867, jacob - a relative of the deceased -
assumed authority "over the whole tribe", but the extent of his
support is not clear. Subsequently, "the clan wishing to have the
eldest son of their old chief as headman", Ebenezer was appointed.
jacob's followers (about one-third of the group) refused to accept
Ebenezer and so two' headmen were recognised. In 1882 it was
decided that Ebenezer should be headman over a portion of the
location until jacob's retirement or death, when he would take over
the headmanship of the whole location. jacob's salary of £18 per
annum was to be split between them.25 jacob and his people then
refused survey of their lands when Ebenezer accepted survey
possibly as a means of asserting their independence.
The dependence of headmen on the government for their posItiOn -
and, in particular, on maintaining cordial relations with Magistrates
whose word was virtually law - is extremely clear from the
records.
Reports of both Ebenezer Mhlambiso and his father were glowing
and give only two instances of clashes between Ebenezer and the
government.
The first was in connection with Ebenezer's desire to move to
Pondoland. (Unfortunately, the records are sparse and do not give
any reasons for this proposed move.) His first application to the
government was made in August 1887. The reply from Cape Town
was that permission would only be granted on the understanding
that the land vacated would immediately revert to government.
(Ebenezer wished to retain his rights in the Basin.) He then asked
permission for himself and seven families to leave, adding that he
was determined to move. The government, however, still insisted
that permission would only be granted if all the inhabitants left.
After the great majority refused to leave, the Civil Commissioner
recom mended that Ebenezer and the seven families be allowed to
go, provided they did so within a specified period and that they
gave a written guarantee that none would ever return to the Basin
or the District. It appears that Ebenezer never left although it
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seems that his son Llewellyn did go to Pondoland since sources
indicate that he later returned from there in anticipation of taking
up the headmanship in about 1916.26
The second instance was Ebenezer's protests to the government over
Hlubi land losses in the Basin (which will l;>e deal t with later).
Apa.rt from these two incidents, relations with government officials
were extremely good. The Mhlambiso headmen ensured that stock
theft and squatting by outsiders was practically non-existent in their
location; they were "trustworthy", "tractable", "vigilant" and
.extremely useful to a government who, without their active
collaboration, would have faced extreme difficulties in governing so
large a district with so few officials.27 When Ebenezer requested
retirement. (for unknown reasons) it was "regretfully" accepted.
Badi, his son, was elected temporarily in 1914 at a stipend of £6
per annum. However, when Badi Mhlambiso died in 1916, problems
arose over the succession. Jonathan, the heir, had gone to America
and Alfred Mabuto was appointed for two years as acting headman
in 1917 until Jonathan could be contacted. If this failed, Llewellyn
Mhlambiso was to take over the headmanship. The Assistant
Magistrate supported Mabuto, who realizing his dependance on
government, had wholeheartedly thrown himself into the tasks
required of him. The enthusiasm with which Mabuto supported the
government with dipping and other measureSZ 8 was probably a factor
in the demand for the installation of Llewellyn Mhlambiso as
headman of the Basin in the years following 1917. Llewellyn,
whom the magistrate admitted he did not know, was nevertheless
reported by him to be insolent and disrespectful and too much under
the influence of his father who now, it was said, had been forced
to retire for insubordination and had "adopted a manner of
superiority" towards Whitfield, the Superintendent of Natives. The
Mhlambiso line was now described as never having produced suitable
headmen and consequently Mabuto was appointed permanent headman
in 1920, despite a vote for Llewellyn at a meeting held to deter-
mine who should gain the position. Inhabitants of the Basin in 1924
were still sending lawyers' letters and petitioning higher authority
(up to the Secretary for Native Affairs). This, however, was
unsuccessful. Maburo remained headman until about 1929. Ninus
Mhlambiso then took over the headmanship. (Mabuto appears to have
suffered from ill-health for several years. He died in 1932.)29 In 1966,
when the new Tribal Authority system became effective in the
Amatola Basin, Ninus retired and was succeeded by his nephew
Cyrus Mqweli Mhlambiso, who then assumed the status of Chief.
The dilem mas faced by headmen are clearly demonstrated in this
example: the need to have the support of one's people and, on the
other hand, the dependence on government for one's position,
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although this position required the carrying out of measures
unpopular with the people. As Moll put it, headmen "had a thin
path to tread between the disfavour of the state and the hatred of
the people".3 0 That dilemma has remained unsolved.
c) Headmen or Chiefs?
The division between chief and headman is a somewhat arbitrary
one, especially for the Mfengu-, whom James Ayliff in 1859 reported
were "in most cases under the control of their legitimate chiefs as
headmen under Government"} 1 Her,ce, despite the position of the
headman being that of a government-salaried and -appointed leader,
the chiefly Mhlambiso line continued as leaders of the Mfengu in
the Basin for over a century.
Sir George Grey's system of subsidizing the chiefs and appointing
paid headmen responsible to Special Magistrates seems thus to have
been slightly differently applied to Mfengu. Du Toit, in the Archives
Year Book for 1954, describes Mfengu headmen as "in a position
analagous to that of Xhosa Counsellors".3 2 Probably, the process of
destroying the power of the Xhosa Chiefs was not seen as necessary
in the case of the Mfengu who had already proven their "loyalty" to
Britain. From letters it is obvious that Mhlambiso's people still
recognised him as a chief of royal blood. In 1890 the surveyors
Murray and Gerhardi in their report on the Basin stated that the
inhabitants' "recognition of a sort of hereditary chieftainship
amongst them will have a tendency to retard any civilising
influences that the magistrate or missionaries may bring to bear
upon the m".33
Moll has documented this overlap between chief and headman in the
Transkei, noting that the headmanship became hereditary, subject to
government veto. He quotes Mears, who in 1947 asserted:
"So deeply ingrained is the love of the people for their own
traditional system of government that the 'headmen' are
commonly regarded as their rulers. The office of headman has
thus come to be regarded as hereditary."34
Moyer, in his thesis on the Mfengu, wrote:
"so long as the chiefs followed government directions, aided in
protecting colonial borders, apprehended cattle thieves, and
pass law violaters . • . (etc.) they retained their offices and
were permitted some independent authority. However, if any
chief asserted his office too forcefully, articulated the needs
and grievances of his followers too vociferously, appeared to be
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urging the continuation of "unacceptable" traditional customs,
or conveyed the impression that he encouraged disaffection and
discontent, the government was prepared to act against him
and, if necessary, deprive him of his office. Co-operative and
submissive chiefs were rewarded, while others saw the
government undermine their authority. by reducing the size of
their land or following. Further, the government created or
supported rival leaders whom they thought would counteract
the influence of "problem" chiefs. Once this was done, the
traditional chiefs frequently abandoned their former posture
and became more co-opetative. The frustration engendered by
government policy caused some chiefs to contemplate rebellion
or removal f rom the colony, but the lack of support they
received from the Mfengu caused them to abandon plans for
such action."3s
In the light of this, the installation of Jacob Mdlankomo and Alfred
Mabuto, and Ebenezer's fracas with the government over moving to
Pondoland become clearer. However, evidence from the Basin
suggests that Moyer does overstate his case when he asserts that
traditional chiefs had already before 1865 lost their authority over
their people, just as Mears' assertion of abstract "love" for
hereditary leaders in 1947 must be questioned. On the one
hand, the government, through. the installation of traditional chiefs
as headmen, certainly perpetuated tribal authority and so gave them
considerable power (e.g. in land allocation), which otherwise was being
progressively eroded. On the other hand, European ambivalence
towards traditional structures prior to 1951 did place headmen/chiefs
in a somewhat precarious position in that dissatisfied black people
could appeal to a higher authority against the decision of the
headman.
The appeals for the installation of Llewellyn Mhlambiso as headman
probably had as much to do with his opposition to government
officials as with the fact that he was a Mhlambiso.
Certainly, by the time of the promulgation of the Black Authorities
Act in 1951 (the Gaiko-Mbo Tribal Authority under which the
Amatola Basin falls was established in 1966), the "chiefly ideal" had
been totally undermined in the Basin and surrounding areas. As
Manona states:
"The peoples' social universe had expanded during the long
period of close association with the colony and the new efforts
aimed at reconstructing the old patriarchal social structure
were no longer consistent with the situation that had
emerged."36
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d) Land Tenure
In the early days of settlement Mhlambiso's people were relatively
few and land was plentiful.37 Within a few years the Imperial
Government was forging ahead with plans for the survey of land into
individual allotments - part of Grey's plan to break the power of
the Chiefs and to promote "civilisation".3 8 It was also argued that
survey would result in better control over black people- taxation
would be easier and close settlement would be of advantage in
security matters.
Du Toit quotes from a letter written by Rev. Impey to Sir Harry
Smith in 1850 which "anticipated the work done by Grey and
Maclean". This passage is worth quoting in full as it so clearly sets
out what happened after the Mlanjeni War, despite Rev. Calder-
woods's objection that Grey's plan was impracticable because it was
"inconsistent with the pastoral habits of the people". Impey wrote:
"There are multitudes of localities where at present within a
radius of 2 miles, or even less, there are numerous kraals
consisting of from six to eight houses each: the whole of
which could be collected to a central position from which the
cattle might graze over the very same pasturage, the people
obtain the same supply of water, and cultivate the same lands
as they do at present, whilst they would be living in a village
or Township of 100 families, get-atable for the purposes of
instruction, and placed under the immediate government of a
headman or local magistrate, who would be responsible to the
Commissioner of the District. The hold which the Government
would thus, from the concentration of persons and property,
have over the population would be vastly increased; the way
for the introduction of municipal and fiscal regulations would
be opened up. The people thus concentrated would soon acquire
an interest in the soil and have a much greater stake in the
peace and welfare of the country at large, and sedition could
be more easily at once be nipped in the bud."39
Grey's point of view was clearly set out in a speech to Parliament
in 1855: "We should try to make them (i.e. black people) a part of
ourselves, useful servants, consumers of our goods, contributors to
our revenue; in short, a source of strength and welfare for this
Colony, such as Providence designed them to be".4 0 The mould for
future white-black relationships in the area was thus set out in
those earliest years, as Grey's comment shows.
Sir George Grey's motives for the introduction of individual tenure
as set out by Colonel Maclean to the Chiefs and Headmen of the
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Crown Reserve thus should not be taken at face value. Maclean told
them that Grey had "determined to allow you to hold your lands on
the same terms on which land is held in the Colony by the white
man You will thus be placed on equal. terms with the white
man "41
Certainly, within twenty years Government officials were far more
explicit with regard to the reasons for the introduction of individual
tenure.42 For example, the Civil Commissioner's Report for the Blue
Book of 1876 stated that:
"The gradual introduction of individual tenure of land among
the native ... will, no doubt, deprive numbers of natives of
the means of leading a lazy lounging life, at the expense of
their more industrious fellows."43
In 1891 in a report to the Under Secretary of Native Affairs, the
Civil Commissioner expressed the 0pInlOn "that the issue of
individual title to natives occupying crown lands would materially
assist in supplying the labour market with cheap labour". The issue
of titles would also "weaken the influence of the headmen to a
great extent".44
The Civil Commissioner recapitulated an earlier letter where he had
set out his aims more clearly:
" . . It may be urged that under this system (individual
tenure) the locations will not carry as large a population as
under tribal tenure and as the native population goes on
increasing from year to year and no fresh ground is available .
. . this outgrowing of the available land by the population may
prove to be an advantage and when a father finds that his land
is not large enough for the support of himself, and his
increasing family, that he will force those of his children who
are able to work to leave in search of employment and thus
the labour market of the colony will be supplied from time to
time with cheap labour ."45
Sir George Grey set out his plans for the survey of individual title
in the Crown Reserve as follows:
"In taking steps for the preparation of Title In lots as
proposed the following is worthy of attention:
1) To select lots from some portion of the location to be
dealt with as being more likely to meet the wishes of the
occupant.
2) Extent of lot for agricultural or garden purposes say 2
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acres.
3) ...
4) Every payer of Hut Tax as shown by return to be (docu-
ment indecipherable) by Superintendant of Crown Reserve to
receive in his name a separate title ...
5) The land to be held on Quit Rent Tenure.
6) Land not to be alienated except with the consent of
government.
7) Penalty of forfeiture for disloyalty - and occupation in any
portion of the Reserve to be prohibited.
8) Grazing ground, i.e. land not held on title to be common
within districts here - after assigned ...
9) The erven to be arranged, as far as practicable, in village
form in groups of not less than 25 erven, the object being to
prevent natives from scattering themselves over the whole
Reserve ... ,146
In July 1856, Commissioner Maclean met with the chiefs and
headmen of the Reserve to persuade them to accept the new
system. The chiefs saw quite clearly the aims behind this move - to
destroy the chieftainship. They also objected to being tied to one
plot of land - a practice contrary to their "conventional mode of
agriculture".47 They were sceptical that two acres would be
sufficient and were extremely suspicious of government motives,
recognizing too the threat individual tenure posed to polygyny. It is
noteworthy that only Mhlambiso did not object: "I have been longer
under the Government than others in the colony and I never heard
of any thing of this kind before but I am under the Government and
I will do as they wish". Nevertheless, his support was grudging.48
Mhlambiso appears to have been a shrewd man. He must have
forseen that resistance would not alter the Government's intention.
By agreeing to the survey he could, perhaps, strengthen his position
vis-a.-vis the government. Furthermore, he probably did not envisage
any loss of land for his people as thus far loyalty to the Imperial
government had paid dividends in that they were well-treated and
had been given suitable land to live on.
A month later, on 21 August 1856, government officials reported
that Mhlambiso had applied to have his location surveyed and divided
into erven before the sowing season commenced. This was agreed to
by Ayliff, Superintendent of the Crown Reserve, who felt that
survey would serve as a practical illustration which would remove
many of the objections to individual title expressed by other
(Mfengu) groups.49 Mhlambiso had paced off three acres which he
felt would be sufficient for a man with one wife,S 0 and by 1858
the Basin had been surveyed and divided into eight villages.s 1 It was
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found after survey that Mhlambiso had enough people to fill only
seven of the villages and so it was decided by government to move
some of Zibi's people into the area as they belonged to the same
"tribe".52 (From the few remaining records it appears that just over
400 buildings and roughly the same number of garden lots were sur-
veyed.)5 3
In April 1859, P. Campbell, Superintendent of the Crown Reserve,
reported to Colonel Maclean that "UMhlambiso and his people are
settling down in their villages on their allotments •.. ", adding "I
am not aware of the Chief having shown any opposition to the
people settling on their allotments ... in fact .•. he has appeared
anxious that they should get on with their buildings. "54 It is not
clear what degree of movement was' involved. It is clear, however,
that passive resistance defeated the introduction of individual tenure.
Campbell stated that "the people have generally made the excuse
that thatch was scarce"55 (for not taking up allot ments) and in
1863 the people of Matole village asked for an exchange of lands,
arguing that the land surveyed and allotted to them was "not good,
it is poor and not fit to produce food enough for us in these dry
and trying seasons .•. ".56 Thirty years later it was necessary to
resurvey the location as "nothing appears to have been done beyond
the completion of survey toward carrying out this intention" -(i.e.
the introduction of individual tenure),57 for the agricultural and
building lots surveyed by Dumbleton in 1858 "were never taken up
by the natives".5 8
In Decernber 1889, Ebenezer Mhlambiso approached the Civil
Commissioner's office:
"I write to inform you that it seems to me and the rest of
the people of my location here at the Amatola Basin that the
time is come when this land of, ours should be resurveyed'
according to the government regulations and conditions.
We are so desirous that it should be done or commenced next
June I have already told the people to prepare for the matter.
Hoping that you will soon comply with our request ...
(signed Ebenezer Mhlambiso and the rest of the Amahlubi" .)59
Ebenezer's motives are not clear. Possibly he saw in acceding to
obvious government plans a way of getting back into favour with the
government after his dispute regarding his proposed move to
Pondoland. Once again, however, a large portion of the Basin's
people were in opposition to this move and under Jacob Mdlankomo
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about one-third of the inhabitants refused to accept individual
tenure. A letter written on behalf of jacob stated that he was the
senior headman and that the wishes of himself and his people must
be given consideration and that neither his people nor those under
Ebenezer could afford survey costs. Further he argued that he and
his people did not see why they should pay to have lands surveyed
which they had lived on since the settlement of the Basin arid that
the present system of occupation was adequate. The letter
concluded by insisting that survey should not be instituted unless it
was the unanimous wish of the people.60 Neither Ebenezer
Mhlambiso nor jacob could, had they so desired, have held out
against individual tenure, as with the promulgation of the Glen Grey
Act in 1894, the Government was free to proclaim individual tenure
in any district.61 However, resurvey was to prove costly for the
inhabitants of the Basin and would result in an ongoing protest to
Government from Mhlambiso over the loss of land for many years.
Survey was made between 1878 and 1890 and about 400 building and
400 garden lots were laid out (the maximum which the surveyors
thought was possible if undue crowding was to be avoided).62 Indivi-
dual title was granted to 187 applicants in 1901 and a further
thirty-eight in 1907 under Act 40 of .187~ 3 - and not under the
Glen Grey Act. However, clauses incorporated into the titles ensured
that there was so little difference between the two that later
officials would refer to the Basin as being under the Glen Grey Act.6 4
Already in 1890 problems were encountered as a large portion of
th~ commonage had been proclaimed forest land under the
conservancy of the Eastern Forest Department and now formed part
of the Schwastenwald forest. The Conservator of Forests refused to
follow the surveyor's suggestion of allowing the forest to revert
back to commonage.65 The surveyors, Murray and Gerhardi, had
assumed 10 000 acres of commonage, giving 400 families twenty-
five acres each. However, this demarcated forest, forming part of
the commonage, consisted of 4 000 acres. Thus, the remaining
6 000 acres would give 400 families only fifteen acres each. In any
event, there were 255 applicants for survey for individual title
under Ebenezer, while jacob's followers, apparently about one-third
of the total group, refused survey.66 These figures, supplied by the
surveyors, with their talk of 255 applicants for 400 plots and all of
jacob's followers refusing survey, only obscure what survey and the
issue of individual title really meant for the inhabitants of the
Basin. The fact that there were only 255 applicants out of 399
household heads under Ebenezer shows that there was considerable
resistance to the introduction of individual tenure among both
groups in the Basin. Nevertheless, there was no option available.
The surveyors' report stated that jacob and his people's refusal to
accept individual title would not stop survey of their lands.67
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Furthermore, the Middledrift Report for the Blue Book of 1901 (the
year in which title was issued) gives the following census figures
for the Basin:68
Table 1: Amatola Basin Census Figures: (1901)
Huts. Male Adults People Churches Schools Trading
Stations
Jacob's Location 109 109 +-545 1 1
Ebenezer's Location 399 399 1 995 2 2
508 508 2 540 3 3 2
• (i.e. Homesteads)
From: Blue Book (Middledrift Report) 1901
The above figures show explicitly the positiOn the people found
themselves to be in. The issue of individual title meant that 108
families would be left without land and there would be no room for
expansion. The surplus would be forced to become labourers in the
South African economy in order to survive. This would be done
through the principle of one man - one lot, which meant that the
younger males in each family had no legal access to land in the
Basin, while other male inhabitants (some of them later arrivals)
were not provided with allotments in the first place and found
themselves in the same position.69
Ebenezer Mhlambiso insisted that the original boundary beacons
included other Crown land and land in the Wolf River Valley70 as
well as the forest now lost. In 1915, the government argued that "it
is extremely unlikely that so long ago as 1858, that is, before the
location had become congested, that the question of boundaries had
arisen"/l Applications to the Beaumont Commission, petitions to
the Prince of Wales and lawyers' 7 2 letters protesting about land
loss, were unsuccessful.
By the turn of the century land was increasingly short and some of
the inhabitants of the Middledrift district sought other means of
surviving on the land. For many years people had been moving to
Pondoland in the Transkei and now Zibi, headman over the Mfengu
in the location neighbouring the Basin, bought land in the Transvaal
to which several families moved, at least one of them from the
Basin.73 By the 1920's land shortage and 'overstocking were acute
problems/4 Agricultural demonstrators, reported the magistrate, had
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for some years been busy trying "to induce improvements in
cultivation" /5 By 1928 the government was considering a resurvey
as encroachment on commonages in many locations was so severe:
and worst in the Basin where - "encroachment (by the inhabitants)
in some cases equals if not exceeds the garden lot".' 6
4 Agricultural Decline
Black agriculture thus faced increasing difficulties through the
years. Furthermore, the South African state supported the
development of commercial and capitalist farming amongst whites,
at the expense of blacks.
By 1867 commercial farming was well established in South Africa."
Black peasants soon began responding to market opportunities
providing, with their lower labour costs among other things,
competition for white farmers and freeing themselves from the need
to labour as migrants. Bundy's Rise and Fall of a South African
Peasantry has documented this phenomenon as well as the
consequent decline of black peasant farming.' 8 Bundy argues that
Middledrift was an important centre of successful Mfengu peasant
farming. One would therefore expect the Amatola Basin, with its
favourable rainfall, to have been an important part of this.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to assess this due to a lack of records.
It does, however, appear that the introduction of the plough, so
crucial to the peasant farmer, appeared comparatively late in the
Basin, partly as a result of the lack of a mission station there.' 9 It
is therefore impossible to assess the extent to which the Mhlambiso
Mfengu produced for the market. Nevertheless, they did suffer from
the negative effects produced by state policy - land shortage being
one of these.
Wilson argues that had black people had the land and the State
support which whites enjoyed, they could have undercut white
farmers. State assistance and financial credit to white farmers was
available through the Land Bank (established in 1912). The Pact
government passed legislation aimed at encouraging better
organisation of agriculture for export purposes. Co-operatives were
established and e?,panded rapidly. In addition, through the
establishment of Boards, the white agricultural sector was protected
from fluctuations in the market price and from outside competition.80
All this was done at the expense of the black farmers, as can be
seen in the disparities in allocation of land, funding, education,
services and legal protection, particularly since 1910, which has
continued to the present.81
It is clear that adherence to traditional ways is not solely to blame
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for agricultural decline as has been argued, by Sadie for example,
who asserts that:
"the economic conditions of. the underdeveloped community is
fundamentally a function of its socio-cultural customs and
institutions, in consequence of which the generation of the
economic development of a people by themselves is neither
.more nor less than a socio-psychological process".82
It is clear, however, that the decline of the reserves is to a large
extent the result of their position in the wider South African
economy. This decline accelerated from the 1920's.
In the mid-twenties the total population of Middledrift was reported
to be 30 200 people on 119 875 morgen (including forest land),
broken. down as follows:
Table 2: Ratio of People to Land in Middledrift District' 3
(mid-1920s)
Adult Males
Morgen
Rural Locations
7 000
116 225
Native-owned land (none of
which was in the Basin)
400
3 650
The male adult population of the Basin - 747 - was roughly ten per
cent of. that of the total adult male population of the whole district
- 7 400. The total female population of the district was recorded as
8 000 and there were 14 800 children. (Unfortunately? there is no
breakdown to sub-district level for these latter figures.)
Stock figures were reported as follows:
Table 3: Stock Figures for Middledrift District and Amatola Basin" 3
(mid-1920s)
Amatola Basin Total: Middledrift
'-./ Equines 204 2 953
Bovines 1 835 14 320
Wooled Sheep 5 348 53 516
Other Sheep and Goats 3 542 36 039
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All expenditure was met by cash earnings from Johannesburg and
other labour centres. Although staple crops were mealies and
sorghum, the magistrate reported that "the purchasing power of the
native is above his income every time ..• 84 The food supply comes
from the cultivated land but the greater amount out of the Traders'
Stores. They do not really raise enough for their own needs".8 5
Stock was rarely sold for food or taxeS' 6 (tax payments being met
by cash earnings).87 It was no wonder that the magistrate reported
that with annual expenditure per family at about £25-0-0 plus £3-0-0
"annual contribution" (in indirect taxation) it was "imperative that
they (i.e. black people) go to work in European areas",8 8 and that
"natives would die out if not allowed to go to industrial areas".8 9
Overstocking was. seen by government as one of the greatest
problems facing inhabitants of Middledrift during this time. Grazing
areas were reported to be shrinking, owing partly to the growth of
noxious weeds (especially jointed cactus) which were difficult to
eradicate. Stock losses were heavy as a result of' land shortage and
"as much as seventy-five per cent of the cattle (have) died in a
drought year". Stock losses were reported as usually resulting from
drought rather than disease.9o The thirties saw the area suffering
from such severe droughts that relief measures had to be instituted.
From the earliest years, these measures were initially resisted by
government officials at both the local and the central level, who
felt that as long as black people resisted recruitment for labour
purposes, a little starvation would "promote industry".91 Blacks, for
their part, also resisted migrant labour for as long as they could.
During this period reports from Middledrift exclude the Basin to a
large extent, as, comparatively speaking, the area was better off
owing to the numerous forests which produced more moisture, and
the soils which were not easily erodable. Officials concentrated on
what they considered to be the worst areas, such as Cildara and
Regu.92 However, this is not to say that the position of the Basin was
any less acute in other ways. If the whole district was dangerously
overstocked and overpopulated as a result of land shortage, the
Basin was no less so. In 1937, Norton, the Senior Agricultural
Officer at Fort Cox, reported that although the official scheduled
area of Middledrift was 116 000 morgen, the actual area measured
by planimeter was only 77 000.93 The area of the Basin equalled
8 625 morgen or 8,9 per cent of the total actual area, while the
Basin's population of 3 439 was 8,9 per cent of the total population
of 30 717. Furthermore, it must be remembered, a considerable
percentage of the commonage (4 000 acres) was reserved forest
land where no cultivation was permitted. Stock numbers in the Basin
were established by Norton to be as follows:
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Table 4: Stock Figures for Amatola Basin (1937)
Amatola Basin Dist rict
Cattle 1 406 15 384
Sheep 4 251 70 548
Goats 2 798 31 390
Small stock per morgen 1,6 1,9
Morgen per taxpayer 9,3 10,8
Norton found that, on a basis of 95 000 morgen, the district could
carry 9 500 large and 57 000 small stock, showing an existing
surplus of about 5 900 large and 45 000 small stock. (Cattle and
small stock in the district were in a ratio of 1:6.) The average
holding per taxpayer was four cattle units or twenty small stock units.
Three thousand large stock, 22 500 small stock and 1 875 owners
would have to be removed if over-stocking was not to result in
deterioration of the land. However, he also pointed out a
problem which would face numerous development projects: "At
present many lands remain unworked for lack of draught - yet the
same number of lands will have to be worked by fewer draught if
culling takes place". Culling would result in less milk in an area
where malnutrition "was a problem". He also pointed to a shortage
of labour.
Norton's report concluded:
"To sum up the natives are living at a sub-economic level;
there is a downward trend in the value of their land and their
stock and in their physical well-being. Any adverse movement
in any economic factor brings about conditions of want,
sometimes requiring State intervention to prevent serious
distress. There is no safety margin.'19 4
In the late twenties, but particularly in the thirties and forties, the
government decided to promote agricultural education through the
example of government agricultural officers and through the
establishment of agricultural schools such as that at Fort Cox
(opened in 1930).95 Anti-soil erosion measures were adopted and the
government attempted to introduce more efficient agricultural
methods by the hiring out of government tractors for ploughing
purposes.96 (Most locations could not, however, afford this.)
Inducements were provided by means of agricultural shows and
prizes.97 Parallel "development" was to take place in the pastoral
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field by the culling of stock, the introduction of dipping tanks to
eradicate diseases such as' scab in sheep and the provision of good
quality bulls to improve stock strains.98 Local government officials
would argue that headmen and their people unanimously accepted
such propositions in most cases. The breaking down of fences, the
setting of fire to commonage, and the loss of support for headmen
who supported such moves, as well as other hostile acts would show
that such reports were biased and over-optimistic.99 In the Basin, for
example, twelve months after one of the dipping tanks was so
damaged as to be unusable, the inhabitants steadfastly refused to
repair it.lO 0
In July 1959, the Basin was declared a Betterment area under
Government Notice No 1009.101 The Reclamation and Settlement
Report, giving the results of investigation in the Basin and making
recommendations for the implementation of Betterment, reported
that the vote at the meeting accepting the betterment scheme was
unanimous and the people were co-operative (a point disputed by
inhabitants today). The report gave the impression that the Basin
was actually in a relatively good position: rainfall was good, the soil
deep, not easily erodable and "still in good heart and productive".
Over ninety per cent of the lands were reported to be, in a good
condition, neither exhausted nor badly eroded. The stock was "good
foundation stock" and their condition "even at the end of winter
was good". Any necessary stock culling could "not prove an
excessive hardship to the land-owners" (although 135 stock owners
had no land).l 0 2 The avowed intention of Betterment was to make
"peasant" farming possible. As such, land and stock improvement
were of importance.
However, Betterment could only succeed if there was sufficient
labour free of the necessity to leave the area for part of the year
in order to earn money in industrial areas. Any development plan
would also require sufficient land per population unit to provide food
and some income for taxes, education, improvements and so on. The
optimistic bent of the report, which ignored past records, also
ignored the two crucial factors in any development project: the
shortage of manpower due to migrant labour, and the total
dependence of the inhabitants on the income generated by this
labour. The vicious circle in which the Basin inhabitants found
themselves as a result of their participation in the South African
.economy, and the neglect of this by the Ad Hoc Committee, did
not bode well for the "betterment" of the Amatola Basin.
5 Migrant Labour
The, increasing crucial dependence on migrant labour which has
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already been mentioned, had a long history and was an important
factor in the underdevelopment of the area. This dependence was to
prove disastrous for African agriculture,l 03 especially in an area
like the Basin where steep slopes and poor roads militated against
mechanisation (even if this could be afforded). Furthermore, loss of
land and the introduction of the one man-one lot principle ensured
that" males, often against their will, left the rural areas as migrant
labourers.
In the Eastern Cape in particular, pass laws were extensively applied
in order to recruit and control labour for white farmers} 04 As early
as 1859 it was reported that numerous Mfengu were applying for
passes "to proceed to the colony to cut corn and shear sheep".l 05 In
1877 5 046 passes were issued and 1 261 endorsed in the Middledrift
district. By 1892 this number had increased to 8 000 new passes
issued1 06 (and during this period a portion of Middledrift district
was attached to Victoria East).
Reports repeatedly stated that black people resisted migrant labour for
as long as possible and were selective about the type of work they did.
For example, in 1891 it was reported that no black people
"left under engagement - they prefer to engage themselves in
the locality selected and the employer they prefer rather than
engage themselves to agents sent to look for labourers. "107
From the early years, government was continually seeking means of
increasing the labour supply. Local officials recommended better
wages, treatment and food. Vigne, the Magistrate at Keiskamma-
hoek, for example, insisted that what was necessary was "to increase
the wants of the natives by inducing them to acquire civilised and
Christian habits and they must work".10 8 The Special Magistrate of
Middledrift in 1873 suggested
"that each unmarried man pay annually for occupying and
cultivating Government land the sum of 5 shillings. This might
induce some fine healthy young men to seek employment and
to further induce (original indecipherable) to seek service. I
would insist on all the natives wearing at least a pair of
Trowsers and shirts and to purchase these articles they must
work. The want of clothes would create a desire for
employment.1Il 09
Migrant labour and the resultant incomes were crucial to the Cape,
and later the Union economy. In 1884 the Civil Commissioner
reported that direct taxation in the King William IS Town district
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(with 60 000 people) had raised £9 236. However, black people also
"contributed greatly indirectly through buying articles of European
manufacture" and, he added "it is well known that it is native trade
which is the commercial mainstay of this part of the colony"} 10
It is impossible to find exact figures of migrancy for the Basin as
all reports were compiled at the district or sub-district level and
magistrates conceded that they were unable to assess the number of
people leaving for work who did not apply for passes} 11 (In fact
local officials frequently recommended the scrapping of pass laws,
arguing that they were useless and merely perpetrated "great in-
justice"112 (such as police harassment). However, it is clear from
magistrates I reports that as congestion on the land increased and
black people became more susceptible to natural disasters such as
droughts, locusts, etc., and to animal diseases, so the need to labour
in industrial centres became greater} 13 For example, in 1882
Middledrift experienced drought conditions which sent men out to
work and the magistrate anticipated
"that few but old men, women and children will remain at the
villages and be supported by their absent relatives" .114
On the other hand, the Middledrift Annual Report for 1877 tells of
an abundant harvest - the best in many years of successive droughts
and threats of famine. As a result people were "indifferent" to
work and farmers and "others" were experiencing labour problems.115
The main source of employment was initially found on the railways
and diamond fields, although the Rand later attracted many workers,
as did the mines of South West Africa. The Report of the Inspector
of Native Locations (Middledrift) for 1898 gave the following
breakdown: 2 000 passes issued, with pass-bearers proceeding to the
following locations:
Graaff-Reinet 91 G rahamstown 62 Jagersfontein 22
Johannesburg 196 Fish River 31 Bedford 37
Kimberley 6S Cradock 26 Llewellyn 33
Cape Town 437. Uitenhage 27 Mafeking 2S
Port Elizabeth 137 Somerset East 36 Other towns 222116
A -large number of black people were also reported to be working
on the local railway line (about 6 000 men in 1898).117 However,
complaints about conditions on the Railways were frequent (in
particular, workers reported that they were ill-treated) and if
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possible, labourers resisted working on the railways.118 For instance,
in 1884 the Aliwal North Railways sought 600 men from Middledrift
to work for three shillings "per. diem" plus rough housing. Only one
dozen men responded (Diamond Field Agents were also unsuccessful).1l9
The following year (1885), despite reports of severe drought, black
people refused recruitment offers to the Railways because the
remittances offered were too low. They also argued that they
objected to practices on the Railways whereby they were forced to
buy goods at high prices from shops on the railways belonging to
contractors. In this case, the wages offered were 2/6 to 3/- per day.120
In 1891 various rates of employment were given as:
Railways Average from 2/6 to 3/- per diem
Diamond Mines Average from 4/- to 5/- per diem
Shearing Average from 6/- to 7/- per 100 sheep
Reaping Average from +-2/- per diem with food
It was also reported that black people were avoiding agricultural
labour as far as possible as the rates of pay were too low.121 For
example, in 1892 Western Province farmers attempted to recruit
labourers on half-year contracts. No black people were willing to
take up this employment offer.122
Nevertheless, the option of remaining at home and working the land
became increasingly unattractive: the proportion of adult male
tax-payers who worked as migrants had risen to 71,7 per cent in
Middledrift during the period 1928/29.123 However, the t rend of
wherever possible resisting badly-paid employment, continued. For
instance, in 1935 Ninus Mhlambiso, headman of the Basin, reported
that the inhabitants of the Basin refused to accept relief work on
anti-soil erosion measures in Middledrift as the rates of pay were
too low. (The other headmen of the district reported the same.)124
The pay ratios for relief work - which involved working on anti-soil
erosion measures, bush clearing and so on - were, in 1945, reported
to be 1/6 per man per day and 1/- per women per day.1 25 These
attempts by black people to control the conditions of their
employment had some success: in the Middledrift Local Council
Minutes for January 1947, it was reported that the Native
Recruiting Corporation Representatives were intending to close down
the local recruitment office as, despite lowered quotas, recruits
could not be found.1 26
Lacey has noted, that the State claimed that migrant work was
beneficial for Africans in the reserves because it:
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"saved the African from starvation. It relieved population
pressure on the land. It enabled the African to maximise his
income. And furthermore, it. cushioned the impact of western
civilisation by enabling the tribal African to preserve his
traditional way of life".
She argues that, in actual fact, it was a crucial component of the
process of dissolution of the reserves. Declining yields, overstocking
and overcrowding produced "a rising spiral of rural poverty" which
put pressure on black people to "offer their services as labourers".
Labour migration became the only practicable way in which they
could meet their cash needs.l 27
6 Health
Conditions of overcrowding and drought which sent males out to
labour must have had adverse effects on the general health of the
population. Throughout the hundred years covered by this essay,
magistrates I annual reports repeatedly insisted that the health of
the population was generally good. However, interspersed among
these reports are those mentioning the ravages of "European"
diseases. Small-pox made its appearance at the "mouth" of the
Amatola near Fort Cox in 1859 and five days later several cases
were reported in Mhlambiso's location. A month later Campbell, the
Superintendent of the Crown Reserve, reported that "the small-pox
is still very bad in the Amatola Basin ... and ten deaths have been
reported ... " Medicines and vaccines were initially sent out, but in
October it was decided that no medical aid could be sent on
account of the distance. Campbell also reported that the people
rejected further medication, saying "that my (Campbell's)
medicine was not good, that all who had taken it had died".
Reports of small-pox outbreaks throughout the area continued for
some years.l28 As migrancy increased, so did the prevalence of
tuberculosis along with diseases such as venereal disease. Typhus was
also mentioned frequently in reports.l29
Shortage of land, and the labour necessary to work it, also suggest a
general decline in health, as they must have had an effect on the
quantity and quality of food produced. These effects are made clear
in some official reports. In 1908, an unusual mortality rate was
reported in the Basin, supposedly from some sort of fever. The
district surgeon found the death rate to be unusually high among
children, especially babies - that portion of the population most
susceptible to illness aggravated by poor nutrition. The precise
nature and cause of the illness was not ascertained.l30
By the 1940's, it was necessary to introduce pre-school feeding
35
schemes to stave off starvation during drought periods. In four
months 21 750 lbs of food went to the Basin to feed a daily
average of 750 children.l3 1 However, several years prior to this, the
need to supplement nutritional requirements had been recognised.l 32
In 1937, it was proposed to supply the Basin schools with cows from
the Tribal Trust herd; however, in 1939, despite the acknowledge-
ment of the problem of malnutrition and a serious shortage of milk
due to land pressure, an application from the Mdlankomo Methodist
school for milk for schoolchildren was turned down by government
officials as the Trust herd was not yet large enough} 33
The drought conditions which prevailed in the thirties and forties
throughout the Ciskei meant that the inhabitants of the Basin -
seemingly less vociferous in their complaints and geographically
better-off (the Basin formed the watershed of the Amatolas and
had a higher rainfall than the rest of the district), were ignored for
as long as possible.l34 The general position could not, however, have
been good. The Interim Smit Report on Nutrition and Health
Education in 1945 found that the school feeding schemes instituted
throughout the Ciskei (400 of them) had "little educative value" and
the vegetable gardens were a failure.l35 It was further reported
that in 1947 in Middledrift about 6 000 bags of grain were
harvested from 20 000 morgen (under one-sixth bag per acre). This
was under a quarter of a bag per head of population, or 2,5 baKs
under the government-estimated needs of each unit (head) of
population. The Report also said that Traders had reported that the
purchasing powers of black people had diminished considerably, and
all children that had been, examined by the Committee were found
to have symptoms associated with dietary deficiency.l36
The Government attitude to relief measures was to withhold them
while labour on farms, mines or industry was short, unless actual
famine was facing the population.l 37 The justification for the
withholding of relief and ending it as soon as possible was that
"there is (was) every danger that the continuation of relief
measures will, by undermining the admirable Native trait of
communal self-help and lowering the self-respect of the people,
result in their general pauperisation".13 8 In 1946, the Chief Native
Commissioner told the Ciskeian General Council that it had come to
his attention that in some areas parents were informing their
children that as they received a meal at school, they must forego one at
home. This was to be stopped immediately as it was "not intended
to relieve parents of the duty to feed their children". He also
stated that it was not intended to delay the rehabilitation of the
"native reserves".
"This is not a matter in which the Department desires to act
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without the full co-operation of the African people • . . if
this is not to be the case, then my Department will have to
take such steps as are necessary to protect your land, your
stock and your water supplies. These things are not your own.
They form a heritage which must be handed on to your
descendants. • There is nothing behind the scheme to
rehabilitate the reserves ... nothing but the desire to improve
your living conditions, to see a happy and contented African
nation; agriculturally and industriously inclined. "139
To this end "Educative" measures in the agricultural and pastoral
spheres had been, not very successfully, introduced.
7 Education
The type and quality of education available to black people
reflected the position the Government deemed suitable for them to
have within the South African society. Most schools only went to
Standard IV and inspectors' reports concent rated on the quality of
drilling, singing and needlework. The other branch of education
offered post-Union was agricultural education "by example", and to
this end agricultural extension officers were sent to black districts
- part of the Government's plan to "rehabilitate" the reserves to
ensure a partial subsistence base. for migrants and their families.
Western-type education had come early to the Basin as a result of
missionary endeavour. Even if unwittingly, missionary education -
with its emphasis on acquiring the "civilised" habits of Europeans -
must have played an important role alongside government in ensuring
that the Africans joined the South African economy as labourers.
In 1859~ the Surveyor-General reported that a number of Mhlambiso's
people were members of the Wesleyan Church, and although
dependant on the ministers at Burnshill and Middledrift for religious
instruction, their children were taught by a native teacher employed
by the Wesleyans. At that stage, a full-time missionary was not
considered necessary by the government as the population of the
Basin was too small to warrant this.l 40
The Wesleyans, the Church of England (Anglicans) and the Free
Church of Scotland soon all had schools in the Basin, and reports of
favouritism toward the Wesleyans by Mhlambiso (a nominal
Wesleyan) were frequent.14l The local inhabitants contributed
towards the upkeep of teachers financially, and also by means of
board and/or lodging.l 4 2 By the turn of the century government
grants constituted a considerable percentage of teachers' salaries;
for example, in 1911 at the three schools in the Basin there were
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seven teachers. Grants at these schools ranged from £40 to £16 per
teacher, whilst teachers at other schools received £3 and board and
lodging.143 Subjects taught were Translations ("Kafir" to English,
and vice-versaY, Geography, Arithmetic, Writing, Singing, Sewing and
Drill. Teachers were not highly qualified - inspectors' reports
continually exhorted teachers to get suitable qualifications.
Teacher-pupil ratios were inadequate a random sample of
pupil-teacher ratios taken from reports gives an average of
thirty-two pupils per teacher.144 It must also be remembered that
teachers were responsible for more than one class at a time.
School buildings were variously reported as being too small, dark,
lacking in equipment, and rat-infested. Discipline was lax/45 perhaps
not surprisingly, and it was reported that children I were frequently
absent as they had to remain at home to herd cattle.146
A further problem was inadequate funding .. In 1916 the Assistant
Resident Magistrate in Middledrift complained of the unsatisfactory
condition of educational matters in the district:
"Apart f rom the matter of attendance, the work is terribly
handicapped by the difficulty of collecting school fees.
Committees in the various locations have no legal status".147
He argued that as teachers were underpaid, quality of staff suffered
and recommended that 25/6d be collected from all Hut Tax and
Quit Rent Payers - to improve the efficiency of schools. and to
induce parents to send children to school as they would be
compulsorily contributing money to schooling anyway. After some
doubt and a month's deliberation, the headmen approved the scheme.148
Apart from the fact that younger children had other duties to carry
out such as herding and household duties, many young men must
have left school early in order to earn money as migrants. The
necessity of leaving the Basin in order to complete schooling at high
school level - and the added expense this involved, would have
ensured that only a small minority of inhabitants would achieve any
higher standard of education. These constraints on achieving a
decent level of education, as well as the quality of that education
available in the Basin itself, meant that in this sphere as well, the
large majority of inhabitants within the Basin would find it difficult
to achieve any better standard of living or any greater choice in the
field of work available to them.
8 Conclusion
Despite the paucity of records for certain periods, the overall
pattern of the underdevelopment of Amatola Basin is clear. Through
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the years, Mfengu from the Basin increasingly suffered from land
shortage and a dependence on migrant labour. Today the Basin
forms part of the impoverished Ciskei.
In this concluding section, it is instructive to compare the
experience of the Amatola Basin Mfengu with observations made by
other writers on the South African reserves, particularly the
Transkei.
Wolpe has argued that the South African reserves underpin the South
African capitalist system. He identified one of the problems faced
by the South African capitalist state as the necessity to maintain
production in the reserves at a level which, while sufficient to
contribute to the reproduction of migrant workers as a class, is yet
not high enough to remove the economic imperatives of migration.149
As Legassick has described it, it was from the reserves
"that migrant labour was to come to the towns. . . It was in
these areas that the families of migrants were supposed to
earn that subsistence that was not paid to the migrants on the
mines. It was in these areas that children were to be raised,
the sick and disabled were to be nursed, and old men were to
die. Thus the white-controlled State of South Africa was to be
spared, in large measure, the welfare costs of housing,
pensions, social facilities and amenities for the non-white
majority of the work-force. "150
The consequences of this policy - agricultural decline coupled with
overpopulation in the black rural areas - threatened what these
writers see as the "historical function" of the reserves: the
reproduction and maintenance of a cheap labour force for South
African industry. This threat provoked state intervention in the
reserve areas in the form of betterment schemes which were an
attempt to prop up the reserve economy and prevent permanent
migration to urban areas.
Whereas Wolpe identified state intervention with the policies of the
National Party after 1948, Moll has recently argued that the
reserves faced a crisis of underproduction as early as the 1930'S.lSl
He sees the crisis of the thirties as decisively affecting food and
stock production and soil erosion. It resulted from the enforced
change-over from shifting cultivation to a rural existence based on
fixed residence and reasonably permanent allocation of arable land,
which broke down with increased population.1s 2 Conditions in the
Transkei - susceptibility to drought, the dependence ,On migrant
labour for survival, opposition to cattle-culling and dipping measures,
soil erosion, stock thefts, the administrative system - are all
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paralleled to a remarkable extent with what was happening in the
Ciskei.
As we have seen, in the earliest years of Hlubi residence in the
Basin, land was plentiful. The area was well-watered. with good soil,
while indigenous forests provided fuel and building material. Through
the years the preservation of forest land, the introduction of
individual tenure and the necessity to find work outside the Basin -
first to pay taxes, later to supplement declining agriculture
brought about conditions of want and a decline in the ability of the
inhabitants to achieve a living solely off the land. The quality of
education available to inhabitants did not offer many chances of an
improvement in this position. At the same time, traditional political
structures were first weakened by contact with Europeans, and then
artificially maintained through incorporation with the European-
imposed government. Through these various mechanisms the
inhabitants of the Basin lost control over their own lives.
Such was the decline in living standards, that active intervention by
the white government was required to prevent the collapse of the
economy in the rural areas. Although officially Betterment was only
introduced to the Basin in 1959, it is clear that intervention began
much earlier, through agriculturaL schools and demonst rators, soil
erosion works, the hiring of tractors and through feeding schemes to
stave off malnutrition - these schemes often being reluctantly
int roduced.
Indeed the history of the Amatola Basin substantiates Lacey's
(1981) contention that a deliberate policy was pursued for almost a
century to create a pool of labour in the black rural areas with
which to feed the South African economy at minimal cost.
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pressure and other factors was mted - as well as the irrplications for
malnutrition. Also BAC15:As early as 1929the annual report noted a
shortage of milk for children. The tribal trust herd was established
under the 1936Native Trust and LandAct v.A1icheralded in the era of
European "trusteeship" of Black South Africans
134 Steyn, G.J. (1982) p.35 gives the follONing rainfall figures for the
Basin:
5OOm1in the west
6501min the East and
990rm in the high mountains
re also states that conditions could vary considerably in the different
areas
135 1/MJT6:Chief N.C. M-drift, 11 March 1948
136 1/MDT6:Chief M.C.M-drift, 11 March 1948. It is obvious that all 20 000
rrorgen - roughly the total, could not have been under cultivation. Never-
theless, crop porduction could not feed the population. It is not clear
v.A1ythe purchasing power of Africans had diminished since the war
47
137 BAC4O:In addition, w1lererelief \\Orkwas offered, instructions fmn the
secretary for Native Affairs was that arploj1'lB1twas not to be given to
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139 BAC33:Chief N.C. to Ciskeian teneral Council, Cttober 1946.
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142 SGE2/203, 2/676, 2/407, 2/122, 2/277, 2/670, 1jM)T1.The Report for the
Blue Bookfor 1910stata:l: "Natives contribute largely towards support
of the schools, especially by wayof gratis labour on school buildings
(SRP1/2/1p.301 )
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for 1980as follONS: Wlites 1:19 Coloured 1:29 Asians 1:26. Black pupil-
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3 Education- v.Mqingwana
1 Introduction
Education is the cornerstone of the development of any society, be
it traditional or modern, capitalist or socialist. Basically, education
should serve three purposes: communication, liberation and
development. As a vehicle for communication, it builds bridges
between people who have not had equal access to opportunities and
resources. It plays a emancipatory role when it frees the individual
from the shackles of tradition, prejudice, ignorance and superstition;
.when it makes him self-reliant and encourages intellectual
independence and individual initiative. On the developmental level,
education should lead to an improvement in the quality of life of
the individual and society, and an. increase in the level of control
that the individual or society has over the environment. Education,
therefore, should be the medium through which man acquires and
maintains freedom.
Pre-colonial black education was characterised by its relevance to
the' lives of the people. Much of it was informal as it was acquired
by the young from their peers or from observing the behaviour and
deeds of the elders. Formal education took place during traditional
ceremonies and rituals. Walter Rodney maintains that what
distinguished pre-colonial education was "its close links with social
life, both in the material and spiritual sense; its collective nature;
its many-sidedness; and its progressive development in conformity
with the successive stages of physical, emotional, mental develop-
ment of the child".l
It has been argued that there should be a relationship between the
technological level of a society and the kind of education it pursues.
This emanates from the contention that educational development and
economic development are complementary. Although one may not
argue st rongly for a differentiated education between rural and
urban areas, it cannot be gainsaid that there is a need to teach
"people to improve their environment rather than use their superior
education to escape from it in favour of what is perceived to be a
better one".2 The chronic problem of rural-urban migration which
faces all developing countries could partly be solved by the provision
of an education that is relevant to the pupils I environment.
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According to Malherbe3 the development, control and financing of
black education in South Africa can be divided into four historical
stages:
1 The 19th century, during which virtually all educational progress
was due to missionary endeavour;
2 The period between 1904 and 1954, when control was exercised
jointly by the churches and provincial education departments,
although the central government gradually bore part of the
financial burden through aid to the churches;
3 The period between 1954 and 1968, when it was highly
centralised under one central state department in Pretoria;
4 From 1968
homelands
maintained.
against the
Africa for
decentralisation took place according to regions and
although close liaison and co-ordination were
Such liaison and co-ordination should be seen
background of the homelands' dependence on South
about seventy-five per cent of their budgets.
Thus, when the Ciskei established its own Education Department in
1968, education in the territory had developed along the same lines
as in the Republic of South Africa. The high proportion of
school-age children, the inadequate education budget, and the
perennial shortage of schools and qualified teachers made it
impossible for the Ciskei to embark on a compulsory education
policy. Even in 1974 when the Ciskei Legislature passed the Ciskei
Education Act which vested control and administration of education
directly 10 the Ciskei Government, compulsory education still
remained a cherished dream. In 1981 the Ciskei Minister of
Education declared: "All modern advanced nations have free
compulsory education. This is the goal of my Department, but we
have not been able to realise it because of lack of funds. Our goal
is an education in which attendance at school is compulsory for all
pupils up to the age of 16, for all classes from Sub A to Std 10,
and such education to be totally free".4 According to the 1970
census, about half of Ciskei's population over 10 years of age was
able to read and write.s
Although the Ciskei has the oldest black university in South Africa
(the University of Fort Hare was established as the South African
Native College in 1916), and a number of teacher training colleges
and high schools, it is only very recently that an attempt has been
made to provide training in commercial and technical skills.
Zwelethemba Trade School in Zwelitsha, the Buchule High School,
the Gcisa Commercial High School, the Mveliso Industrial School and
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the Mdantsane Textile School - all in Mdantsane, have been in
existence for an average of less than ten years. The urban bias in
the establishment of these schools is a striking example of
conventional planning.6 The lack of facilities in this important field
is the legacy of the apartheid policy whereby white labour was
protected at the expense of the training of blacks. At both primary
and secondary levels, education in the Ciskei still remains largely
academic. School-Ieavers still find themselves misfits in an
economic, social and political structure that is discriminatory, and
tends to favour the elite~
2 Profile of the Adults
During the early days of missionary education, som.e parents were
less willing to send their children to school because education was
perceived as being detrimental to the continued existence of a
social structure based on tradition. Moreover, relative .economic
independence did not induce people to look for opportunities outside
their villages. However, people gradually accepted Christianity and
began to become Westernized. Those families that paved the way in
sending their' children to school, probably wanted to maintain their
status as "progressives". Thus, it could be expected that the majority
of the children in the schools would come from the Christian
families rather than the traditional ones, and that children from the
former group would remain at school longer, while the drop-out rate
would be higher among the latter group.
Nowadays, while some parents may not send their children to school
or may withdraw them because, inter alia, they require their labour
in domestic aCtivities, there is no doubt that they value education.
According to a survey conducted in 1981,7 the Amatola Basin was
home for about 5 600 people, thirty-two per cent of whom lived and
worked outside the Basin. More than sixty per cent of the adults in
and outside the Basin had had more than four years of schooling.8
Women had higher qualifications than men. About two out of every
three women (61%) living outside the Basin and almost one out of
every three (31%) in the Basin, had Standard Six or higher
qualifications; whereas the figures for men were thirty-one per
cent and twenty-four per cent, respectively.
During interviews with members of the community and school
principals, it became clear that there was a great demand for
education in the area. The fact that parents were not contributing
well enough towards the erection of additional classrooms, was due
mainly to poor financial circumstances, rather than lack of concern
for the welfare of their children. The fact that older residents had
. lesser qualifications than the younger ones, may be indicative of this
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demand, but at the same time note should be taken of the fact
that educational facilities were less accessible twenty years ago
than they are now.9
3 Location of Schools
From earliest times there was great variation in the provision not
only of school facilities but also of health and other services in the
Colonies. Areas situated next to towns and mission stations usually
received priority treatment. The establishment of schools in the
rural areas (usually through the financial contributions of the local
residents) was generally regarded as proof that the evangelization
efforts had begun or were succeeding. In the Eastern Cape, rural
schools provided basic education for the lower standards, while
missionary institutions like Lovedale (Presbyterian), Healdtown
(Methodist), and St Matthew Is( Anglican), to name only a few, were
the centres of secondary education and teacher-training. The
missionary aim was to achieve literacy so that the converts could
read the Bible and the Catechism, and act as agents of evangeliza-
tion. It was also important that the teachers themselves should be
committed Christians, and, more often than not, denominational
affiliation was a major criterion for appointment to teaching posts.
When the Cape Government started subsidising education in the
1850s, producing junior clerks and messengers for the Colonial
administration also became an important aim.
Until the mid-1950s there were few black schools in the rural
areas. Usually there was one lower primary school (going up to
eitherStd 2 or Std 4) serving two or more villages, and one higher
primary school (going up to Std 6) servi'ng four or more villages.
The surrounding lower primary schools acted as feeder schools for
the upper classes of the higher primary schools. If they wanted to
continue with their education, children who had passed Std 6 had to
leave their villages for the missionary institutions, or to board with
relatives or other people near the secondary schools. The scarcity of
secondary schools is manifested by the fact that, up to the 1970s,
at least two districts in the Ciskei, Peddie and Middledri ft (with
about twenty higher primary schools each, and according to the
1970 census with 42 604 and 65 465 residents, respectively) were
each served by one secondary school. The mushrooming of schools in
the rural areas is a post-1970 phenomenon. The Government's aim
became the establishment of at least one primary school for each
village, and one secondary school for each cluster of .schools.
There was a slight increase in the number of schools in the 1950s
when the control of education was transferred from the mission
societies and provincial governments to the central government.
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Better funding, though inadequate, made it possible for commUnItieS
to establish schools on the Rand-for-Rand system of subsidisation.
Had it not been for the Rl3m expenditure ceiling placed on black
education, more schools would probably have been built during the
first fifteen years of state control. Differential treatment of black
education (where. the per capita expenditure on black pupils was
one-tenth of that of whites) was a retarding factor. The fact that
the government did not introduce compulsory education, affected not
only the number of children at school but also the provision of
buildings and the training of teachers.
Rural areas were further disadvantaged by the anomalous policy in
terms of which rural schools could be established on a Rand-for-
Rand basis (which meant that the community had to tax itself),
whilst schools in the urban areas (whether in the homelands or in
white South Africa) had the capital costs borne by the South
African Development Trust.10 As funds for the Trust were derived
from either direct taxation or were voted by Parliament, the rural
areas were therefore subsidising the urban areas.
The Amatola Basin is a typical rural area which was affected by
these developments in education. The first primary school was
established. by the Methodists in the 1860s, and was an outstation of
the Burnshill Mission Station. By 1959 there were seven schools: four
offering claSses up to Std 6, while three only went as far as Std 3.11
Until the 1970s when Mhlambiso Secondary ~chool (named after the
local chief) was established, local children had to leave the Basin
for Std 6 classes. Although not very many could have been affected
by the lack of high school facilities in the Basin, those who did
leave'the Basin, were not only placed beyond parental control at an
early age, but also represented labour lost by their parents and the
'comm'unity.
In 1981, of the thirteen villages compnsmg the Basin, eight had
schooling facilities. Four of the schools provided classes up to Std 5;
two up to Std 4; one up to Std 2; and one up to Std 1. Some
children who were attending primary schools in other villages or the
high school in Komkhulu, had to cover between eight and ten kilo-
metres to and fro. Such a situation would not only discourage
children from going to school, but also from proceeding beyond the
standards available in their own villages. In most black communities
parents tend to think that their children are educated when they
have passed the highest standard available lobally; on the other
hand, the level of education rises with the upgrading of local
school~. Travelling long distances has educational implications
because by the time children reach school they may be hungry and
tired.12 It is not surprising, therefore, that teachers ranked lack of
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punctuality and irregular attendance as the third highest problem
facing their schools. Few schools, distance from school, laziness and
starvation were also perceived as contributing to pupils dropping out
at an early age. In 1981 the distribution of schools was as follows:
Table 1: Distribution of Schools (1981)
Name of School
Amatola Basin
Dish
Machibini
Mdlankomo
Mhlambiso
Ndlovura
Ngwangwane
Roloshiramba
Zixinene
Village Highest Standard
Komkhulu 5
Mkhobeni 5
Machibini 4
Mdlankomo 5
Komkhulu 9
Ndlovura 2
Ngwangwane 4
Dish 1
Matinise 5
The cent ral village, with the Great Place for the chief of the Basin,
has the only high school in the area which was built as a result of
the levies imposed on the whole Basin. Siphingweni, Mqhayisa,
Mkhuthukeni, Mdeni and Chamama have no school facilities: children
f rom these villages attend school in the neighbouring villages. Whilst
all the villages contributed towards the building of the high school,
the area is divided into zones for the purpose of the primary
schools. Thus, the residents of Mdeni and Chamama joined those of
Komkhulu in the Amatola Basin Primary Schoolj Matinise, Mqhayisa
and Ndlovura were responsible for Zixinenej Siphingweni joined
Machibinij Mkhuthukeni joined Ngwangwane; Dish and Mkhobeni
pooled their resources for Dish Primary School; and Mdlankomo was
reponsible for its own school. It should be borne in mind that
villages like Dish and Ndlovura also had to be responsible for their
own primary schools. Thus, residents of these villages would be taxed
thrice: for the local lower primary, for the zonal higher primary,
and for the high school. The topography in the Basin determined
where schools would be built. Villages like Ndlovura and Dish, that
experienced difficulties in reaching the nearest school, preferred to
erect their own lower primary schools to cater for the young. This
partly eCCOunts for the fact that Mkhuthukeni, with eighty
homesteads, does not have its own school while Ndlovura and Dish,
with sixty-nine and forty-seven homesteads respectively, each have
a lower primary school. As the Basin is bisected by a river and is
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also hilly, the high school is not easily accessible. This would
possibly account for the fact that sixty-two per cent of the children
studying outside the Basin were at the secondary school level.13 Edu-
cation in the Basin, therefore, remains not easily accessible in
terms of both the number and the location of schools.
4 School Accommodation
As already stated, rural areas are treated differently from urban
areas. Until the 1960s when the then Department of Bantu
Education in South Africa laid down specifications regarding the
nature and size of classrooms, com munities could decide, depending
on financial constraints, what kind of buildings they would erect. As
a result, communities used to put up structures ranging from
rectangular buildings to thatched- or corrugated iron-roofed
rondavels. The Rand-for-Rand system of subsidisation on capital
expenditure retarded the development of education. Not only was it
difficult for the community to tax itself, but there were also
problems encountered in the collection of funds. Those who were
entrusted with the task of collecting funds incurred the disfavour of
some members of the community. On the other hand, accusations of
embezzlement were not uncommon .. A zealous principal who
employed carrot and stick tactics achieved better results than the
one who threatened the community with resignation if they did not
erect additional or better classrooms. The Zixinene school, which
has modern buildings and is the biggest in the Basin, is an example
of the untiring efforts of the principal and the chairman of. the
school committee. To ensure that. no liable resident defaulted, they
enlisted the services of the Tribal Authority. Defaulters had their
stock impounded, but it appears that no stock was sold, as people
paid the levy once their stock had been impounded. 14
Problems faced by the communities were further compounded by the
policy whereby the Department of Education of the Ciskei would
payout the subsidy only when its inspector had confirmed that the
building had been completed and that it fulfilled certain specifica-
tions. This late payment of the subsidy sometimes had beneficial
results because a better organised or an education-conscious
community would use its own financial resources to complete the
building, and the subsidy would form the foundation for another
classroom or two. The vast difference between Zixinene and other
schools is rooted mainly in this fact.15
The ability and willingness of the communities to pay for the
erection of classrooms should be seen against the background of
other school commitments that black parents have; for, unlike their
white counterparts, education for their children is not free. It was
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only in the early 1970s that the Ciskei Government started supplying
black children with textbooks, but because exercise books and
set books were not supplied, the cost of keeping a child at school
was reduced by less than half. The fact that almost all the children
in the Basin were in full uniform, reflects the financial burden the
parents had to bear. Parents also had to pay school fees which
averaged about 40c per year in the lower primary classes; R1;20 per
annum in the higher primary classes and R4,00 in the high school.
Although the fees are designated as voluntary contributions by the
Ciskei Department of Education, principals (in order to ensure equal
treatment of all pupils and also because of the need for funds to
meet other financial commitments of the school) demanded payment as
though the fees were compulsory. Children had to pay sports fees
which varied from school to school; but for out-going sports trips
alone, pupils could spend as much as R20 per annum.
In 1981, it was estimated that the Ciskei had an accommodation
backlog of 1 000 classrooms.l6 This meant that out of the
estimated 225 000, pupils (if a conservative estimate of forty pupils
to a classr'oom is accepted), 40 000 either had very poor accom-
modation or' none at all. Lack of funds was always given as the
cause of poqr accommodation.l7
The accommodation situation in the Basin must have been amongst
the worst in .the Ciskei. Both the number and the quality of the
classrooms left much to be desired. Of the six schools visited, four
made use of church buildings. In one extreme case at Roloshiramba,
two classes (Sub Std Band Std 1) were accommodated in an old
one-roomed church building. Without the aid of a physical partition,
pupils from each class sat back to back, facing' their respective
teachers. Four schools could not accommodate the children on the
school premises and sought accommodation in privately-owned
rondavels in the village. Not only were pupils cut off from the rest
of the school, but the principal could not supervise the teachers
properly. During the period when this research was done, it was not
uncommon to observe the teacher leaving the school premises and
wending her way to her "school" about 600 metres away.
With the exception of. Zixinene, which had seven classrooms, three
other schools had two modern classrooms each, and one had
"prefabs" on loan from the Ciskei Department of Education~ A
striking feature of the struggle to provide better accom modation
was revealed by the fact that two schools had uncompleted class-
rooms that had been under construction for at least two years;
while in another school, bricks were breaking up after lying in the
school yard for about four years. Informants pointed out that their
efforts at raising funds were being frustrated by the Department of
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Education which had undertaken four years previously to assume
responsibility for the erection of buildings. They claimed that
circulars and statements from Government officials had created so
much confusion that they did not know what the official policy was.
In his 1980 Policy Speech, the Minister of Education said: "In rural
areas, communities are finding it more and more difficult to raise
their share of the cost of erection of schools. I am happy to
announce to this House that the Cabinet .has agreed that the
Government will bear the full cost for erecting school buildings in
the rural areas as from the 1981/82 financial year".18 Meanwhile,
people withheld payment in the hope that the day would come when
the Government would build the schools; or that their local leaders
would so endear themselves to the Government that they would also
receive the favours which they saw other communities enjoying when
they had schools built at no cost to themselves.
Another aspect which merits attention is overcrowding. The standard
classroom is supposed to cater for forty pupils; but in the Basin the
average number of pupils in the six schools was forty-seven per
classroom. Such a figure is, of course, misleading unless it is taken
into consideration that some of the buildings did not qualify to be
regarded as classrooms. Moreover, fifty-two per cent of the teachers had
between forty-six and sixty-eight pupils in a class. In some schools
the situation was aggravated by a shortage of furniture, with the
result that available desks seated double their capacity, and
sometimes the children had to use benches or squat on the floor.
Sports facilities were almost non-existent. More often than not the
school had to improvise a rugby or a netball field. A stadium, which
could have greatly alleviated the problem of sports facilities in the
Basin, lies uncompleted. Informants stated that when tl:le Govern-
ment built it, it neither consulted the community nor did it indicate
for whom it was building it.
5 Profile of the Teachers
During the earliest days of missionary education, teachers'
qualifications were either non-existent or very low.. It was not until
1901, 1912 and 1929 that in the Cape, Natal and the Transvaal,
respectively, the entrance qualification for teacher- t raining was
raised to Std 6.19 By 1950, two certificates were being offered: the
Native Primary Lower Certificate (NPLC), that is, Std 6 plus three
years' training, the first of which involved academic work; and the
Native Primary Higher Certificate (NPHC), that is, Std 8 plus two
years I professional training. By the beginning of the 1960s, it was
generally accepted that the NLPC was not an adequate qualification
even at the lower levels of the primary school. This course was
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gradually phased out so that by the 'end of the decade it had
disappeared completely. However, underqualified teachers continue to
be the bane of black education. Std 10 is the entrance qualification
for other population groups, and the authorities soon realised that
Std 8 was not a suitable entrance qualification either. Thus, in 1981
the entrance qualification for black student-teachers was raised to
Std 10. The vicious circle in black education is perhaps illustrated
by the fact that, according to 1979 statistics, only eighty-six per cent of
the teachers in the secondary schools had professional training; and
of these, only thirty-six per cent were qualified to teach at secondary
level.20 This vicious circle of underqualified teachers who had been
taught by other underqualified teachers needs to be taken into
consideration when the quality of education is assessed.
All the primary teachers had professional certificates and, except
for one female teacher (51 years old), had passed Std 8. Table 2
indicates the academic qualifications of these teachers:
Table 2: Primary School Teachers: Highest Academic Qualifications (1981)
Full Matric (Std 10) 4
4 Matric credits 1
3 Matric credits 2
2 Matric credits 5
1 Matric credit 3
Std 8 11
Std 6 1
TOTAL 27
Teachers expressed keenness, to improve their qualifications. An
attempt at starting an adult education centre in 1981 had the
backing of the Department of Education) but aborted when the
Department indicated that it would only subsidise the centre once it
had become fully operational. In practice, this meant that tutors
would not be paid for their services, and the Department would not
provide the necessary teaching aids. According to informants, besides
the transport problems which affected attendance, the Department's
belief that teachers should offer a voluntary service was the knell
that saw the attempt survive solely for a couple of weeks. On the
other hand, Ciskeian urban areas like Mdantsane, Zwelitsha, Sada
and Dimbaza had principals appointed on a full-time basis to
organise adult education.21
The comparatively low salary scale of teachers without Matricula-
tion, together with the South African Government's reluctance to
effect parity with whites at the lower levels, probably accounts for
the eagerness to improve qualifications. Moreover, with Ciskeian
independence, Matric probably was seen as the key to occupational
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mobility and promotion. Tables 3 and 4 depict the position in the
high school:
Table 3: High School Teachers: Academic Qualifications (1982)
Degree
Incomplete Degree
Matriculation
TOTAL
2
1
9
12
Table 4: High School Teachers: Teaching Qualifications (1982)
University Education Diploma 2
Senior Secondary Teachers' Diploma
Junior Secondary Teachers I Diploma
Primary Teachers' Certificate 7
No ProfessiOnal Certificate 1
TOTAL 12
The staff positIOn in the high school was probably representative of
the position in Ciskei schools. Of the twelve teachers, only four
were qualified to teach at the secondary school level. Five teachers
with a Matric certificate taught classes up to Std 9. It should be
borne' in mind that these teachers had not been trained for the
secondary level; all had acquired. Matric through private study -
which in itself has its limitations. Besides being underqualified, some
of them, because of the shortage of teachers, were compelled to
teach subjects they would normally avoid,22 not being t rained to
teach them.
Almost half of the primary teachers (48%) had a teaching
experience of between one and five years; nineteen per cent had less than
a year; whilst a thi rd had more than six years' experience. Most of
the teachers (89%) had been born in a rural area, which would
suggest that, on the whole, the Basin would not be that much
different from the areas where they had been brought up.
Seventy-eight per cent of the teachers were below 30 years of age,
while the rest were above 36 years. Two-thirds were unmarried,
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while ten of the unmarried female teachers each had an average of
two children. As the Department of Education penalises unmarried
mothers or suspends them for absconding during confinement, some
of the teachers had had their careers disrupted. Three mentioned
that their presence in the Basin was a direct result of such
suspension.
The educational qualifications of the parents of the teachers
indicated that they came from families with a tradition of
education. Seven out of ten had one parent with Std 6 or higher
qualifications, while twenty-two per cent had one parent with a'
professional certificate, mainly a teaching qualification. None had
siblings who had left school without at least four years of
schooling. Eleven teachers had between then sixteen siblings with a
teaching, and four with a nursing, qualification. More than half of
the respondents (56%) did not want their children to become
teachers. Nursing, followed by medicine, law and agriculture were
the most preferred vocations.
Of a sample of twenty female and seven male teachers, there were
twenty-one assistants, four principals, and two (one male and 'one
female) Heads of Division. In 1980) the Ciskei Minister of Education
declared: "The Ciskei Department of Education is ahead of its sister
departments in other Black States in the creation of promotion
posts of Deputy Principals and Heads of Division, with commensurate
salary scales, for all grades of school".2 3 Although this policy seems
to have been pursued with vigour in the secondary schools, the
primary schools seem to be lagging behind. Yet one of the ways in
which teachers could be attracted to or retained in places like the
Basin, is by creating promotion posts. It is not surprising that one
of the male matriculants who was an assistant teacher with seven
years' experience, expressed dissatisfaction with promotion
opportunities.
One of the manifestations of differential expenditure on education
appears in the teacher-pupil ratio. In 1980 average ratios for the
varIOUS population groups were as follows: whites 1:19, coloureds
1:29, Asians 1:26 and blacks 1:46.24 Table 5 indicates the ratio in
the six schools surveyed in the Basin.
Although the average teacher-pupil ratio may appear lower than the
national average, and the Ciskei average (1:44 in 197815 , it should
be noted that more than half of the teachers taught forty-six or
more pupils. Table 6 illustrates the incidence of pupils among a
group of teachers:
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Table 5: Teacher-pupil Ratio in the Primary Schools (1982)
Schools No. of teachers No. of pupils T-P Ratio
Amatola Basin 6 253 : 42
Dish 5 213 : 43
Machibini 4 178 1 : 45
Ngwangwane 6 223 1 : 37
Roloshiramba 3 114 1 : 38
Zixinene 10 428 1 : 43
TOTAL 34 1 409 1 : 41
Table 6: Incidence of Pupils (1982)
No. of pupils per teacher
20 - 30
31. - 40
41 - 45
46 - 50
51+
Frequency
4
4
5
6
8
%
14,8
14,8
18,5
22,2
29,6
Effective teaching can only take place where the teacher has not
only adequate teaching aids, but also has a small class in order to
cater for the above- and below- average pupil. Eighty-five percent
of the teachers thought that twenty to thirty pupils was an ideal
number for effective teaching. .
6 Profile of the Pupils
As already indicated, education in the Basin was brought by the
missionaries. The denominational links of the eight primary schools
are as follows: Amatola Basin (Methodist), Dish and Roloshirarriba
(Reformed Church of Africa), Machibini(Free Church of Scotland),
Mdlankomo (Methodist), Ngwangwane (Anglican), and Zixinene
(Presbyterian). Some of these schools are still situated on church
property and use church buildings.
There is no compulsory education in the Amatola Basin, or indeed in
the whole of the Ciskei. It was not possible to establish accurately
the incidence of non-schooling in the school-age population. Parents
send their' children to a local school or a school in a nearby village.
Proximity is not the only criterion as shown by the fact that some
parents in Mkhuthukeni preferred the Methodist school in Komkhulu
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(Amatola Basin) to the nearer Anglican school in Ngwangwane.
Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of children among the various
classes in the six primary schools and the high school. The general
drop-out trend in black schools is illustrated by the fact that the
number of Std 5 pupils comprises about half that of the Sub-Std A
pupils, while the Std 9 roll is 2,1 per cent of the total enrolment.26
Figure 1: Number and Percentage of Pupils in Six Primary Schools
and One High School (1981)
As Percentage of Total Number
of Pupils
2,1%
5,8%
5,3%
7,0%
8,3%
9,9%
8,3%
8,9%
12,5%
15,6%
16,3%
36
100
Std 7 - 91
Std 6 - 120
Std 5 - 144
Std 4 - 171
Std 3 - 143
Std 2 - 154
Std 1 - 216
SSB - 269
SSA - 281
As Percentage of S S A
Enrolment
12,8%
35,6%
32,4%
42,7%
51,2%
60,9%
50,9%
54,8%
76,9%
95,7%
100%
Figures obtained from the schools indicated an average drop-out of
about eight per cent in 1981. The drop-out rate was higher in Std 4
(19%); Std 1 (14%), and Std 5 (13%). These must be treated with
caution, as the teachers apparently did not withdraw from the
registers all children who had left the school. If anything, the
drop-out rate could be 'even higher. When teachers were asked to
explain the high drop-out rate, they gave a variety of reasons,
including the following: financial difficulties regarding purchase of
clothes, books and fees; parents who are uneducated and did not
appreciate the value of education or are not interested in educa-
tion; starvation and corporal punishment.
Teachers thought that the drop-out rate could be reduced if: there
was compulsory and free education; interesting activities were
provided at school; the government provided free books and
bursaries; there was a feeding scheme; parents were educated so
that they could value education; and if parents could be provided
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with jobs so that they could finance the education of their
children.
What is significant about the teachers' perceptions is their high
level of awareness of both the internal and external factors
influencing the drop-out rate. This is, however, qualified by the fact
that none mentioned factors relating to the actual teaching
situation, viz., their qualifications, the size of the classes, and the
provision of facilities such as laboratories and libraries.
As regards the attendance rates, the same problem that was
experienced with the drop-out rate emerged. The teachers' registers
were completely unreliable for such an assessment. Interviews with
the teachers gave the impression that the attendance rate could be
about ninety per cent in the primary schools, dropping to about eighty per
cent in the high schools. In the primary school, boys had a. poorer
attendance than girls as they had herding and ploughing duties to
perform. In the high school the reverse situation applied - a trend
ascribed to the fact that girls took greater advantage of the fact of
diminished parental control, since many high school pupils leave home
to take up rented accommodation in Komkhulu. Teachers also
mentioned that when rains fell and children who stayed across the
river could not attend, those not affected took advantage of the
situation by also absenting themselves.
Data on the age distribution of the children was collected from six
schools (one high school; two schools with Std 5; two schools with
Std 4, one with Std 1. Figures for another higher primary school
could not be obtained). Table 7 illustrates the age-distribution.
This age-distribution is probably truly representative of the position
in the Ciskei. It should be noted that the Ciskei has not yet
introduced the age restrictions applied by the Depart ment of
Education and Training of the Republic of South Africa. These
restrictions, operative from 1982, are that no child who is over 16
years may remain in the primary school (SSA to Std 5) without
Ministerial approval; the cut-off age for Stds 6-8 is 18 years; and
20 years for Stds 9_10.27 Homeland governments, aware of the
problems faced by blacks In education, may find it difficult to
adopt these rest rict ions.
The Republic of South Africa has dropped the admission age to six
years, with effect from 1982. Although this has been adopted by the
Ciskei, we may assume that most of the children in the Basin
entered school at the age of seven years. ~That being the case,
children in Std 9 should be 17 years old. As is clear f rom Table 7,
many pupils do not succeed in maintaining this rate of progress.
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There are many reasons why children could be above their class-age,
among which are that they might have started school late; there
might be a significant number of repeaters; they might have dropped
out and returned later; and, particularly in the high school, the riots
of the previous years might have affected them.
Table 7: Age Distribution of Pupils (1982)
Age Standard
A B 2 4 6 7 8 9 TOT %
6-7 88* 7 95 7,1
7-8 118* 19 1 138 10,4
8-9 25 127* 18 4 174 13,1
9-10 47 44* 17 108 8,1
10-11 - 13 61* 37 4 115 8,6
11-12 - 3 23 26* 20 75* 5,6
12-13 - 2 13 15 34* 27 3 2 97 7,3
13-14 - 7 6 21 31* 30 20 4 121 9,1
14-15 - 4 10 25 19* 29 7 2 97 7,3
15-16 - 8 15 23* 19 9 74 5,6
16-17 - 1 4 21 30* 24 5 85 6,4
17-18 - 1 18 12 25" 7 63 4,7
18-19 - 1 6 12 17* 9 45 3,4
19-20 - 2 10* 3 16 1,2
20+ 4 12* 12 28 2,1
TOT 231 220 171 105 89 97 71 120 91 100 36 1331 100
% 17,4 16,5 12,8 7,9 6,7 7,3 5,3 9,0 6,8 7,5 2,7 99,9
NOTE: * figures contain the median.
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Of the 1614 pupils who wrote exams in 1981, 1247 (77%) passed, and the
overall class average pass was seventy-two per cent. The highest pass
was in SSB (88%) and the lowest in Std 8 (39%). It should be noted that
SSB writes an internal examination while Std 8 writes an external
examination. In 1980 the riot toll was very heavy in the high school
where, of the 261 students registered at the beginning of the year
for Stds 6 to 8, 256 sat for the examinations and only thirty-seven
passed.
In a study conducted by Nyikana28 in 1981, a number of probable
causes of repetition of classes in the Ciskei, were identified. These
are regarded as being relevant here because it is mainly those pupils
who do not pass who repeat classes. He divided the causes into
internal and external. The internal causes were: teachers'
qualifications, experience and lesson preparation; the curriculum
content; teaching methods; the policy of promotion; transition
between school phases; lack of textbooks and equipment; and
examinations and standards. The external causes were: poverty;
language difficulties; home problems (farming problems); behaviour
patterns of the parents and community; attitudes towards and
interest in education; motivation of pupils towards education, and
illiterate parents. Although most of these causes have not been
researched here, they are all important for understanding the
education situation in the Basin.
7 Conclusion
Any attempt to assess the nature and quality of education is
fraught with many difficulties. One such difficulty relates to the
fact that there may be no relationship between the quantity and the
quality of the education a pupil receives. In this study, no attempt
has been made to assess and comment on the aims, nature and
content of the school syllabi, or on the social consciousness of the
teachers and the community. The prevailing conditions in the Basin
are a manifestation of social, economic and political disparities
between urban and rural areas. Educational inequalities, therefore,
extend beyond the parameters of education. As Turner puts it: "The
problems of our schools are the problems of our society, and
education cannot be turned into a liberating experience until our
society makes room for free people".2 9 Education should not be
divorced from the community for which it is supposed to be
preparing children. Turner further makes the point that, all other
considerations notwithstanding, the homelands, freed from colonialist
control, have an innovative potential which would manifest itself as
a result of the introduction of relevant education. Education can
play an important role .in reducing dependence and poverty as
educated people have better occupational prospects and potential for
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individual initiative.
If education is to be made more effectively available to people in
rural areas, there is a need for affirmative action; that is, positive
discrimination in favour of these areas. Rural people, usually having
a lower per capita income, should be provided with schools by the
Government, teachers should be provided with accommodation, and
there should be other incentives which would make it worthwhile for
teachers to sacrifice the relative comfort of the urban areas in the
interest of providing reasonable opportunities for all segments of the
population. Additional and better classrooms, libraries, science
laboratories and equipment will undoubtedly result in improved
standards of education. Teaching efficiency and, therefore, learning
ability should be improved. A case must be made for compulsory
education. The acquisition of education which contributes to the
development and prosperity of a nation, should not depend on the
parents' ability to pay fees and maintain their children at school.
The Ciskei authorities seem to be aware of the importance of
education for national development. A major constraint is the
availability of funds - a problem that is not unique to the Ciskei.
Proper planning with proper priorities could result in a better
utilisation of funds.
Education, particularly adult education, could raise the level of
communication between the authorities and communities in rural
areas. Problems of agriculture, health, local government, and indeed
of education itself, could be tackled better once these com munities
have acquired a certain degree of literacy. Adult education should
not aim simply at the acquisition of literacy, but at broadening the
scope of the individual and enabling him to advance and to make his
contribution to the general development of the society of which he
is a member.
8 Footmtes
1 Rod~y ~~.(1981) p.262
2 Sensa (1981) p.76
3 Malherbe E.G. (1977) p.558
4 Ciskei Legislative Assartly (CLA)Debates, vol 16 1981, p.363
5 Benso (1981) p.73. Ciskei Departrrent of Foreign Affairs, (1981) p.87
6 tvanbers of the Ciskei Legislature have always expressed concern at
this urban bias. and the iVlinister, although expressing the need to
establ ish technical faci Ii ties next to industries for practical training,
has consistently replied: II ••• you have to start s01B'Jhere.1I (CLA
Debates, vol 13, 1980, p.173); II ••• to allay the fears of sme
66
~rs whothink that these innovations are only for rvtIantsane
and ZlNelitsha, let rre tell than that INehad to start sarewhere. II
(CLADebates, vol 16, 1981, p.365)
7 Bekker S.B. et al (1981a) p.11
8 This contrasts with the position at Tsweletswele, a camunity which
has recently migrated into the Ciskei fran white farms in the Border,
where eighty per cent of the respondents over forty years of age
reported that they had received no school education at all
(S.B. Bekker et al (1983) p.67)
9 . In 1954there INere5 700 schools for Africans carpared to the 11 000
in 1978. (South African Institute of Race Relations (1981) p.464)
10 Ciskei Carrnission Report (1980) p.29
11 Departrrent of Native Affairs, Unionof South Africa (1959)
12 ConTenting on these conditions, A.M.Tapa, fVP observed: IIIndeed,
the children fran rural areas suffer the ITDstin getting education.
They saretirres have to travel long distances to school. They carre to
school with very little food in their stanachs, they have to sit in an
overcroNed classroon with inadequate lighting and poor ventilation.
Theyuse uncarrfortable, hard desks.1I (CLADebates, vol 13, 1980,
p.155
13 Bekker S.B. et al (1981a) p.18
14 see MananaC. infra, p.86
15 Canparative statistics an incarre, land rights, and possession of stock
do not reflect that Zixinene was in any wayeconomically better off than
the other villages in the Basin (see Bekker et al (1981a), ,AppendixD)
16 Benso (1981) p.75
17 CLADebates vol 16, 1981, p.371; vol 2, 1982, p.131
18 CLADebates, vol 13, 1980, p.144. The Ciskei Education Budget has
risen fran R23nin 1980to R31min 1981and R41min 1982.
In 1980 the Minister announcedthat eighty-five per cent of the budget was
for salaries; and in 1982 R450000 was budgeted as carpensation for erection
of school buildings. During the three financial years 1980/83, the only
funds eannarked for the erection of bui ldings by the Education Departrrent
\V€refor a school hostel and special schools
19 Horrell M. (1963) p.26
20 Hartshone K. (1981)
21 CLADebates, vol 13, 1980, p.148
22 Ciskei Carrnission Report (1980) states: liTheproblan at secondary level is
not that the teachers are not professionally qualified, but that one-
third are teaching beyond the limits for which they \\ere trained or
for \vtlich they have subsequently qualified thanselves acadanically.1I
(p.26)
23 CLADebates, vol 13, 1980, pp.144-5
24 South African Institute of Race Relations (1981) p.460
25 Ciskei -Gmmission Report (1980) p.28
26 These figures carpare favourably with those carpiled by the Research
Unit for Education SysteT1Planning of the University of the Orange Free
State for the Republic of South Africa where SSAcarprised 19,8 per cent
67
and Std 9 1,9 per cent of the total nL.rrJrerof black Students in South
Africa. (University of the OrangeFree State, 1981 )
27 Proclamation NoR2600,South African GJvemrent Gazette, 19 Decerber 1980
28 Nyikana H.K. (1982)
29 Turner R. (1972) p.73
68
4 Local Government - c. W. Manana
1 Introduction
The. purpose of this chapter is to consider the constraints and
possibilities local government provides for rural development in the
Ciskei. With regard to the Amatola Basin the focus is on the
so-called Tribal Authority which is officially recognised as a
decision-making body that links this community with the central
government in the Ciskei. This is the institution that provides the
framework of local government. The passing of the Black Authorities
Act in 1951 effected a radical change in the structure of local
government in the Ciskei. Up to this time the policy of the white
administration had been to rule blacks through government-appointed
. headmen who were placed in charge of demarcated "locations II
serving as basic administrative units. Although these headmen were
directly under the control of magistrates, they settled minor cases
locally and discharged certain duties which were delegated to them.
Other local government responsibilities were undertaken by District
Councils (also under the control of magistrates), which in turn were
affiliated to the Ciskeian General Council which was constituted in
1934. Although the District Councils were empowered to advise
magistrates on a wide variety of matters affecting the people they
represented, they achieved little, mainly because they had limited
financial resources. However, in contrast with what was to happen
after 1951, the District Councils had no traditional roots and tended
to attract the better educated people in the various districts.l On
the other hand, the Act abolished the Council system, shifting the
administrative focus from the headmen and providing for the
establishment of Tribal Authorities which were associated with the
chiefdoms which once existed in the area. The Tribal Authorities
were headed by chiefs who were to be assisted by councillors under
a system which sought to revive traditional leadership. This implied
chiefly rule and rule through elders. The system of local government
in the rural areas of the Ciskei was thus changed from direct rule
to rule through traditional leaders.
2 Local Government
In the literature on local government institutions, attention has
recently been given to the related problems of competence and
legitimacy of such institutions. Robertson2, who gave the lead in
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this regard, stresses that statutory bodies like the Tribal Authority
can function effectively only if they have recognised rights and
duties which they are also able to execute (competence), as well as
the authority to make decisions for the people they serve
(legitimacy). The competence of an institution of this type is
certainly not only related to the formal or statutory definition of
its duties, but also closely linked with what the body can actually
do. Its legitimacy, on the other hand, derives both f rom its
relationship with the public it serves, as well as with the wider
political system of which it forms a part. These concepts provide
the general framework in which the local government system in the
Amatola Basin will be discussed.
In many of the emerging countries local governments are unable to
function properly, largely because they lack local decision-making
autonomy and, apart from this, derive little support and guidance
from central authorities. Although it is not easy to generalise on
recent political developments in Africa, Picard describes the growing
tendency towards centralization of authority in African states in
terms that seem relevant for the understanding of our case. He
notes: '''There has been a fairly standard flirtation in Africa between
new states and an apparently attractive type of local government.
District councils have usually been hastily instituted during the last
stages of colonial rule; important functions are transferred to them
after independence, and there is great faith in their ability to act
as autonomous. links between the centre and the periphery. This
initial period of optimism, however, quickly dissipates and is
replaced by growing disappointment with the ability of the councils
to handle various problems. A recentralization of authority in the
captial city then becomes almost inevitable."3 Picard further notes.
that the major problem which contributes to the. centralization of
government functions, is the fact that local governments commonly
experience severe financial difficulties and have to depend on the
central government for funds. The position of these local government
bodies is further undermined by a shortage of trained administrative
personnel, inefficiency of its councils and the problem brought about
by the need to neutralise these local institutions so that they do
not develop into forums for political opposition.
Yet there is increasing evidence to the effect that devolution of
political authority, coupled with financial and administrative support
from central authorities, are measures that contribute much to the
improvement of local administration and development. In Malawi, for
example, the work of District Development Committees is greatly
stimulated both by the substantial . financial assistance these
committees have been receiving from the central government since
1966, as well as by the decentralized structure of local government
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in that country. These committees have been able to increase their
competence largely by encouraging local residents to participate in
the affairs of their own communities.4 Local autonomy, therefore,
promotes popular participation and increases the capa.city of local
government bodies to carry out their responsibilities. Similarly, any
kind of political centralization has grave disadvantages in that in
such a political structure "the central government is called upon to
answer for all the sins of its agencies in the hierarchy; the
resentment of the people can then be directed only at the apex, at
the central government itself".5
We also need to note that the attempt to revive traditional
authority locally was incompatible with political developments taking
place in many African states, particularly in a period during which
the process of decolonization was at its climax. In most of the
newly independent states, chiefs were associated with the colonial
regimes which were being overthrown and their political functions
were reduced drastically. Commonly, on the local level, greater
powers were conferred on District Councils, which were dominated
by the new (educated) elites who clearly identified with the new
states rather than with the traditional rulers.6 In Botswana, for
example, chiefs were relegated to a powerless "Upper House" of
Parliament and their responsibilities were transferred to District
Councils over which they had no influence/ While in much of Africa
power was shifting from traditional to elected authorities,
contemporary developments in the South African black-occupied
rural areas were to the contrary. In the sense that the Black
Authorities Act brought chiefs out of relative obscurity and gave
them increased powers in these rural areas, the new policy ignored
the fact that much change had taken place in areas like the
Ciskei. The incorporation of the Ciskei into the colonial system. as
early as the mid-19th century effectively undermined the chiefly
ideal in many Ciskei communities. This was the case in the district
of Keiskammahoek where colonial rule was established immediately
after the 1850-53 war between the Xhosa and the British. Since
then the chiefs' authority was undermined in these districts to the
extent that in the early 1950s chiefly traditions were no longer of
any significance to the people living in the Keiskammahoek district.8
The Amatola Basin seems to have been in a similar situation when
the Black Authorities Act was introduced.
The people's social universe had expanded during the long period of
close association with the colony, and the new efforts aimed at
reconstructing the old patriarchal social structure were no longer
consistent with the situation that had emerged. It was a similar
development which suddenly brought adverse publicity to Zimbabwe
(the then Rhodesia) in 1965, when those in power in that country
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claimed that African chiefs were the true representatives of blacks
living there and, to that effect, conferred greater powers on them.9
This is one of the problems that needs to be borne in mind when
assessing the relevance of traditional leadership in the present
situation.
Before turning to local government in the Amatola Basin, a brief
consideration of the central Ciskei Government structure is
necessary (see Figure 1). The Ciskei National Assembly is a
unicameral legislature headed by a State President with executive
powers. In 1980, this legislature included fifty-seven members
consisting of twenty-nine elected members and twenty~eight chiefs.
At present, the forty-two Tribal Authorities that have been created
constitute the local administrative units of this government. The
ruling party is the Ciskei National Independence Party (C.N.J.P.)
which was formed in 1973, more or less at the same time as the
now defunct opposition Ciskei National Party. After its formation
the latter party gradually lost its parliamentary representatives to
the ruling party and was eventually rendered virtually powerless by
the landslide victory of the ruling party in the 1978 general
election, when this party won every seat. When the election results
were announced in July 1978, out of a total of fifty-five members
of parliament, only six chiefs could continue to represent the
opposition in the Legislature. Three of them joined the ruling party
before the next parliamentary session which was held in August of
the same year. Although the remaining chiefs occupied the
opposition benches during this session, they too, subsequently, crossed
over to the governing party. These developments made the Ciskei a
de facJo one-party state that is presently characterised by an
increasing measure of authoritarianism.
3 Local Government in the Amatola Basin
The main questions with which we are concerned here are: What is
a Tribal Authority?' What tasks does it perform? How does it
perform those tasks? What is its relationship with the people it
serves, as well as with the external political environment? The
Tribal Authority in the Basin was established in 1966 and is
officially known as the Gaika-Mbo Tribal Authority. Chief Cyrus
Mqweli Mhlambiso is the head of this body which constitutes part of
a Regional Authority which in turn is linked to the Ciskei
Legislature. The magistrate's office in Middledrift is the link
between this Tribal Authority and the Ciskei Government in
Zwelitsha. The head of the Tribal Authority is a member of the
ruling Ciskei National Independence Party which he joined in 1978
after having been a member of the opposition Ciskei National Party
since 1973. Although the factors that explain his change of political
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Figure 1 Administrative Structure of the Ciskei (1981)
Ciskei Legislature
Magisterial Districts -------Regional Authorities
(Middledrift) (Middledrift)
Tribal Authorities
(Amatola)
Village Councils
(e.g. Komkhulu)
73
Ciskei National
Independence Party
Regional Party
Branches
I
Local Party Branches
Party Cells
affiliation are noted later in this chapter, it may be mentioned here
that by 1978 he had hardly any option but to support the governing
party. In the Ciskei National Assembly, the Amatola Basin residents
have two representatives: their elected member who lives outside the
Basin (in Middledrift) and represents the Middledrift constituency in
the Ciskei Parliament, and the chief who is an ex-officio Member of
Parliament. The Tribal Authority functions alongside the local
organization of the ruling party which constitutes a sub-region of
the C.N.J.P. and with which it technically shares its authority over
the community.
The authority comprises the chief (who is the head of this council),
two salaried headmen and nineteen councillors who receive no
remuneration for their services. Candidates for headmanship are
chosen by the people and require the approval of the Ciskei
Government. No formal elections are held when a headman is to be
chosen: nominations are made at a meeting of the Tribal Authority
and usually several such meetings are held before a final decision is
made on the matter. On the other hand, the councillors who
represent their villages on this Tribal Authority are recruited to
their positions in a somewhat informal manner: they are nominated
by the Tribal Authority itself without prior consultation with the
local communities they represent on this council. An investigation
into the manner in which the present councillors became members
of this body, shows that the men concerned were asked to become
councillors while they were attending a routine meeting of the
Tribal Authority, and others were nominated in their absence. Most
said they were selected because they were interested in the affairs
of the Tribal Authority. At the same time, individuals do not
compete for this position: it is merely conferred on them. The
members tend to regard nomination to councillorship as an honour in
more or less the same way that councillorship in the past was a
respectable position. It seems that some of the difficulties which
emerge later in this chapter with regard to the present role of
councillors partly reflect the fact that members of this community
do not compete for councillorship.
Although the sub-headmen of the various villages are not fully-
fledged members of this council, they are expected to attend all
the council meetings. Their positions, which are not salaried, closely
associate sub-headmen with the Tribal Authority in that they
function as the main links between the Authority and the residents.
Moreover, the bulk of the responsibilities of the council is
discharged by the sub-headmen. They are elected by the residents
of their villages. Although such appointments require the approval of
the Tribal Authority, the council seldom interferes in this matter.
74
All the councillors are men and partIcIpants at the meetings are
overwhelmingly men. Women usually attend these meetings only
when they are involved in the court cases handled by this body.
There are, however, special occasions on which they have to attend
these meetings. For instance, in July 1981 a special meeting of this
council was addressed by a representative of a meat producing
company in the Transvaal. The women who were at this meeting had
accompanied some of the young boys who were seeking employment.
On the whole, however, women's role in this Authority is minimal.
At village level this situation is different. Previously, village councils
(iinkundla) were constituted by initiated adult males. Largely due to
the fact that men are frequently away from their homes, women do
attend and participate in these village meetings at present.
Other people associated with the council are the urban representa-
tives of the chief - one based in Port Elizabeth and another one in
Cape Town - who. keep Amatola Basin residents working in town
informed about developments at home. They are chosen by the local
residents who work in town and do not receive payment for this
service. Occasionally, they collect funds which they remit home for
some of the projects undertaken in the Basin, e.g. the erection of
the local high school and the teachers' quarters. Otherwise, they do
not have any specific powers of authority vis-a.-vis the Tribal
Authority.
Council meetings usually take place monthly, on week days, and it
is the duty of the Secretary of the Tribal Authority to send out
written notices to the members when such a meeting is due. Since
some members have to travel long distances (more than ten
kilometres in some cases) to get to the village of Komkhulu where
the meetings are held, attendance is sometimes poor. Two of the
councillors are appointed by the Tribal Authority as chairman and
vice-chai rman. A prayer is said before and after the proceedings.
The Tribal Authority is closely associated with the person of the
chief and on arrival at meetings the members normally give the
chief's salute. They do so even if he is absent from the meeting.
As a sign of respect for the authority of the body, men leave their
sticks outside the assembly hall.
The Tribal Authority court meets when required and deals with a
varying number of cases per month. Although any adult man living
in the Basin is free to attend and to participate in this court, in
practice it is the members of the Tribal Authority who constitute
this judicial body. Petty quarrels, minor assaults, local stock theft
and damage clai ms arising from girls' pregnancies are typical cases
which are brought before this court. Sentences are monetary fines
which are sometimes enforced through the confiscation of property,
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either stock or household property. This task is undertaken by one
of the councillors who serves as a messenger of the court, (umsila).
Later on in the discussion, however, we hope to make it clear that
the extent to which this council can enforce its decisions, is
extremely restricted. Sub-headmen also settle minor disputes in
their villages and refer other matters to the Tribal Authority.
Anyone not satisfied with a decision of a sub-headman can appeal
to the Tribal Authority court. In like manner, defendants in the
Amatola Basin can appeal to the Middledrift Magistrate's Court,
where cases involving serious violence and theft are heard as a
matter of course.
The comprehensive duties of this Tribal Authority include:
I The maintenance of roads, dams and bridges.
2 The organization and promotion of agricultural actIVitIeS, e.g.
the control of grazing and arable land, the establishment of
agricultural co-operatives as well as the purchasing of stud
stock.
3 The promotion of education by means of erecting and
maintaining school buildings, granting of bursaries and loans to
scholars.
4 The improvement of the economic and social life of the
people through measures like the organization of relief
employment, the screening of applications for old age pensions
and other social benefits and care for the aged and indigent.
5 The preservation of law and order,
settling minor disputes. Major cases
Middledrift Magistrate's Court to which
the right to appeal on local decisions.
including powers for
are heard in the
local defendants have
6 It also organises meetings at which labour recruiters contact
workseekers living in the Basin.
The council has access to the services of a trained Agricultural
Extension Officer who lives locally. He is employed and paid by the
Ciskei Department of Agriculture. Although he is expected to
establish a working relationship with the Tribal Authority and the
community generally, he is directly responsible to the Ciskei
Department of Agriculture. A full-time clerk in the employ of the
Ciskei Government handles the routine affairs of the council, e.g.
correspondence, the recording of minutes at meetings and the
keeping of records relating to the employment of people in relief
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work locally. Previously, the Tribal Authority had two secretaries
and a wider scope of duties than at present. These included the
registration of births and deaths and the administration of permits
for workseekers. All these matters are now dealt with in
Middledrift. The council also employs two rangers whose salaries are
paid by the Ciskei Department of Agriculture which, together with
the Tribal Authority, regulates their functions. They take care of
fences, look for stock. brought into the area without permits and
give assistance when stock is brought in for dipping.
The first question we consider regarding the performance of the
Tribal Authority concerns its personnel. The principles underlying the
Tribal Authority system seek not only to reconstruct old customs
and usages, but also to revive traditional leadership. It is, therefore,
not surprising to note that this council tends to be a homogeneous
body of men who are advanced in age: two councillors are aged
eighty-three and eighty-two respectively, eight are in their
seventies, ten in their sixties and only two are in their fifties. This
gives an average age of 68 years for the councillors. Moreover, with
the exception of the chief who is a qualified teacher and taught for
many years before taking up his present position, the majority of
the members of this council have only a few years of schooling.
Seven passed either Sub B or Standard One, ten passed Standards
Two or Three, one passed Standard Four and only three passed
Standard Six. All have worked for longer or shorter periods as
labourers outside the Basin and little of their work experience is
relevant to their present positions.
These factors characterise the Tribal Authority as a conservative
body which does not reflect the educational and occupational
diversity of the community. As a result, the younger and better
educated members of the community have virtually no influence over
the affairs of the council. Although an entirely "elite" council
would probably be equally unrepresentative, the point to note here is
that most councillors lack the educational background which would
enable them to deal more efficiently with administrative matters.
Older and less educated people do not easily adapt to change and
are not in a position to articulate the varied interests of a society
undergoing rapid change. Yet we should realise that "a political
structure can remain compatible with its socio-cultural environment
by adapting to it or by adapting the environment itself".lo In its
present form the Tribal Authority is not in a position to make those
adjustments. Moreover, this form of leadership may be described as
oligarchical in the sense that roughly the same councillors serve on
the Tribal Authority year after year. This is largely due to the fact
that no specific period is prescribed for the members' tenure of
office and councillors can serve on this body for as long as they
like.
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Similarly, the exclusion of women from membership of the Tribal
Authority is no longer consistent with the present situation in which
women playa more active role in many organizations than do men.
Women serve on virtually all the committees that are associated
with various organizations locally and they constitute a significant
proportion of the members of the nine school committees .in the
Basin. Out of a total of seventy-one members of these committees,
thirty-four (48%) are women. Apart from their active participation
in a wide range of voluntary associations, their important role in
the Project Management Committee of the Fort Hare development
project in the Amatola Basin is widely acknowledged. Each village is
represented by two men and two women on the committee. An even
more remarkable change is the involvement of women in party
politics. The local party branch of the C.NJ.P. has a committee of
eight members, of whom three are women. In addition women are
by far much more active than men in party political activities and
they playa prominent role in the political rallies held from time to
time outside the Basin. Yet, although the social status of women
has changed and continues to change, this can hardly have much
influence on the Tribal Authority since it is based on the traditional
notion of male authority. The fact that earlier we designated this
council as the "so-called Tribal Authority" is related to the
questionable basis on which local decision-making in a community
undergoing rapid social change can be based solely on traditional
principles. The information presented later in this chapter will
emphasize this lack of representativeness or relevance of the Tribal
Authority. For the moment we consider the Tribal Authority's
relation with the Ciskei political structure.
Although the Tribal Authority has a wide range of duties, the fact
that it has limited budgetary powers and meagre financial resources
has adverse effects on its performance. Initially, the finances of
Tribal Authorities were handled by Regional Authorities, but in 1969
this function was transferred to the then Department of the Chief
Minister and Finance.11 The tendency towards the centralization of
government functions is evident here. The bulk of its funds are
voted by the central government, while the revenue it generates
locally (mainly in the form of court and pound fees) constitutes
only a small proportion of its annual income. During each year the
council, in conjunction with the magistrate, makes recommendations
for its estimates of income and expenditure for the following year
and submits them for consideration by the central authorities who
alone make final decisions on such matters. The Tribal Authority
itself exercises no influence over this budget and its ineffectiveness
locally stems largely from the fact that its annual grants are small.
For example, apart from various amounts of money which the
government made available for the administrative affairs of this
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council, expenditure approved by head office in Zwelitsha for the
financial year ending 31 March 1983, included R200 for the purchase
of stud stock and RSO for economic improvement. Since these are
only small amounts, it is not possible for the Tribal Authority to be
the focal point of rural administration that can be responsible for
the promotion of the general well-being and economic development
of the community.
In particular, it is worth noting that although the council has the
responsibility of erecting and maintaining school buildings, the
budget made no provision for suchan undertaking. Consequently, the
council's functions in promoting education locally are extremely
limited and the important task is almost entirely in the hands of
school committees which operate largely independently of the Tribal
Authority. It seems necessary, however, to mention that in the past
few years~ the council has managed to raise funds from the residents
for the erection of two. buildings which are used as teachers'
quarters in the central village of Komkhulu, as well as making
arrangements for the official opening of the local high school.
What we have said above has already suggested that the Tribal
Authority has limited executive powers ana on many issues it may
not act independently (to any degree) of the central government.
Instead it has to focus its attention mainly on the ways and means
of carrying out instructions received from higher authorities. For
instance, parliamentary matters hardly feature in the debates of the
council: before the parliamentary sessions there are no resolutions
made specifically for parliament and no report-back meetings are
held. Similarly, a perusal of the council's records and observations
made at those meetings attended during fieldwork, show that many
of the issues discussed by the council are concerned mainly with
matters emanating from outside the community.. and almost
invariably such matters necessitate the raising of funds.
The council's concern with its external relationships is illustrated by
the fact that most of the levies raised are related to developments
outside the Basin. Over a period of two years, between June 1979
and June 1981, the Tribal Authority authorized twenty-one levies for
specific projects and of these only four were of direct local
concern. Many levies are raised for projects which are either not
directly related to the needs of the local residents, or are organised
for social occasions involving other chiefs in Ciskei. For example,
during the period mentioned, levies were raised for installation of
chiefs, initiation and weddings of their sons, as well as occasions
when other chiefs visit the Basin. In another instance .• money was
collected to enable the chief in the Basin and a few other
councillors to visit the chief's representative in Port Elizabeth. In
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addition, the co~ncil collects annual donations from all the house-
holds for "ne.edy people" in the Ciskei. Just as with many other
levies, many residents did not know how the funds would be
distributed (as to whether the needy people in the Basin would
'benefit from this fund eventually) and merely made their
contributions because they had to do so. "We are just told what to
do. You must donate whether you want to or not." "There is
nothing you can do about what has been decided." The authority
thus finds itself in a situation in which it has to carry out
obligations which it cannot always justify to the residents. Its image
suffers as a result. Moreover, pressures from the external political
environment divert th~ council's attention from matters of local
concern. The four cases in which money was raised for local
projects during ttte period mentioned above, included the official
opening of the local high school, the building of additional teachers'
quarters, the creation of a fund to maintain a truck which belongs
to the Tribal Authority and the erection of a building for disabled
people in the Basin. However, the council has not been able to
maintain its truck and has no transport of its own at present.
Likewise, it decided to abandon the idea of building a house for the
disabled people. There is thus little the Tribal Authority has been
able to achieve so far and few of its tasks spring from the real
needs of the community. Similarly, the ever-present need to
contribute money for projects and issues conceived outside this
community is one of the most obvious manifestations of the
pressures of the encapsulating political structure.
The weakened structural position of the Tribal Authority vis-a.-vis
the government within which it operates, is partly reflected in the
political tensions which emerged here prior to the eclipse of the
opposition party in the Ciskei in 1978. At that time the intense
party political strife which was evident virtually everywhere in the
Ciskei, was mirrored locally in a long-standing boycott of the Tribal
Authority by a substantial proportion of the councillors. Largely on
account of the fact that Chief Mhlambiso had been affiliated to the
opposition Ciskei National Party since its inception in 1973,
opposition to his political stand increased with the growing political
strength of the ruling party. Those councillors who supported the
latter party disassociated themselves from the Tribal Authority and
stopped attending meetings for an appreciable length of time. This
was the situation which virtually forced Chief Mhlambiso (together
with two other chiefs) to join the ruling party soon after the 1978
general election when the official status of the opposition party in
the Ciskei was seen to be not only irrelevant but also creating
formidable problems for political leaders on the local level. This
breaching of local autonomy, largely through pressure on Tribal
Authorities to support the ruling party, has resulted in the
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emergence of what Perry aptly describes as a "constricted society"l2
in the case where rural communities in Lesotho have experienced
similar political changes recently.
Other problems which the council experiences stem from poor communi-
cation between it and higher offices. Most of the time it is isolated
and pursues discussions on its own and instances where government
officials attend Tribal Authority meetings are few and negligible.
Consequently, urgent problems often remain unsolved. This was
illust rated on the occasion when early in 1982 the roof of the
assembly hall of the council was badly damaged by wind. Although
the council made several appeals to the magistrate for assistance in
this regard, by the end of the year the hall had not been repaired.
The Tribal Authority eventually decided to levy a sum of RS ,00
from every household in the Basin for this purpose. Similarly, in
1979 a fence around a mountain camp broke and created problems
with regard to the herding of cattle. It was only after a number of
letters had been written and delegations made to the Middledrift
Development Office that this fence was mended. In other cases, the
council sends representatives to the magistrate's office for some
urgent business and these representatives return home having failed
to meet the magistrate~ Council minutes also reflect instances
where the Tribal Authority fails to get replies to letters written to
the magistrate's office. These are some of the problems which
indicate the council's lack of co-ordination with higher authorities.
This contrasts with the situation found in other parts of Southern
Africa (e.g. Botswana) where local councils work closely with
government officers (District Councillors) who have a special
knowledge of the policies emanating from the capital and who have
an influence there. This arrangement gives local councils a regular
means of bringing local problems to the notice of relevant
authorities, while it also makes it possible for such officers to gauge
citizen reaction to government's policy initiatives.l3 In the Basin,
however, councillors find themselves in an ambiguous position in
which they have to carry out government instructions while they
have neither adequate guidance from the government nor easy means
to channel people's needs to the cent ral government. The views of a
senior member of this Tribal Authority give some indication of this
feeling of frustration and powerlessness:
"We are lagging behind other districts in the Ciskei. I do not
know the reason for that. Since the time when I joined this
council (in 1966), we have had little success in solving our
problems here. Things are simply at a standstill. For years we
have been pleading with the government to provide us with a
bridge over that stream. Up to now nothing has been done."
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A consideration of the relationship of this Tribal Authority with the
people it serves raises other problems of trust and legitimacy. One
of these is related to the fact that councillors are nominated by
the Tribal Authority itself without prior consultation with the
villages the men represent. That their authority is based on
appointment from above rather than on the consent of the people
raises major problems when one considers that the people have no
direct sanctions they can apply over this council. In this sense, the
councillors represent the Tribal Authority, not necessarily the
people. Also, they are not directly answerable to the residents of
their villages for the decisions they make in the Tribal Authority.
At the village level, their positions are relatively secure in that it is
not their duty to hold village meetings concerning the matters
discussed by the Tribal Authority: this is done by the sub-headmen
to whom people turn for many of their problems. Moreover, the
fact that the residents know that the councillors themselves have no
power of their own, means that it would be useless for the people
to exert any pressure on the councillors who also have to respond to
a situation which they can hardly control.
Sub-headmen are the main communication links between the Tribal
Authority and the various villages and they also handle the bulk of
the work done by the Tribal Authority. They. thus deserve our
attention here. Because they have many responsibilities, they are
forced to sacrifice a great deal of their time in the performance of
their duties. Apart from having to organise village meetings, they
supervise the collection of the levies required by the Tribal
Authority. In spite of this. they receive no salary and there is no
indication that they commonly receive gifts from the people for the
services they render. Moreover, at present, their powers are even
more restricted than they were in the past; they can no longer
impose any court fines because "the Tribal Authority needs the
fines for its funds". They also have little influence since in this
council many decisions are largely dependent on those councillors
who have greater influence; they no longer draw up lists of people
who qualify for relief employment since this duty has now been
taken over by one of the (salaried) headmen. It is, therefore, not
surprising to note that there are few candidates who accept
.sub-headmanship with complete willingness. In this regard) the
explanation some gave was something like: "The men in the village
forced me. I did not want to be a sub-headman". From the
interviews conducted with all sub-headmen, it became clear that
virtually all felt their positions were exceptionally unenviable as the
following comments show:
"Sub-headmanship is' a difficult pOSitiOn. Things would be
better if all the people were co-operative. I would be pleased
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if I could be relieved of this duty. I cannot do so on my own
because that would cause t rouble for me."
"The work we are doing is bad. There is no reward for it. I
do it because it is a'duty the Tribal Authority gave to me.
Yet we get nothing for all this. I have lost interest in it. Even
if they were to start paying us, I would not be interested in
sub-headmanship. I said it several times that I do not want to
continue as a sub-headman but I cannot relinquish the position.
I cannot attend to my own affairs because I spend much time
attending to the affairs of this village."
"A sub-headman is always involved in argument. The work
would be easy if people did what they had to do. It is
difficult to get money from people and the Tribal Authority
blames you when people do not pay their dues. I would be
pleased if someone else could take this responsibility from me.
I cannot work for my children because I have to do this
work."
Some of the sub-headmen have found their pOSitiOnS so frustrating
that they have either formally resigned or have just relinquished
their duties. While we were in the field, the sub-headman of one of
the villages was sacked by the Tribal Authority for not attending a
series of meetings of the authority. The residents of this village
elected another sub-headman and submitted his name to the Tribal
Authority for its approval.
Another consideration of some importance here relates to the
manner in which the Tribal Authority makes decisions, at least with
regard to those matters for which it has such a mandate.
Hammond-Tooke has already shown that an important feature of
traditional government was the soliciting of public support for major
issues at public meetings.l4 Besides, the chief's dependence on the
support of his amaphakathi, his inner circle of advisers, guaranteed
people's rights and ensured that no substantial body of opinion in
the com munity could be ignored. Although the Tribal Authority is
supposed to take on the appearance and character of the traditional
political structure, there are many ways in which it fails to
measure up to this ideal. Primarily, the change from a more
consensual to a less consultative form of decision-making is
indicated by the fact that the chief in the Basin (and possibly in
many other places in the Ciskei) has amaphakathi only in a
restricted sense: he manages the affairs of this community with the
assistance of Tribal Authority members who are neither his close
advisers nor acknowledged representatives of the people. This
question impinges on one of the problems with which this chapter is
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concerned, namely, the relationship of a political institution to
derived power. The elimination of amaphakathi is a manifestation of
the new political situation in which chiefs generally are no longer
directly responsible to their people but are civil servants with
specific obligations to the government. In the same sense, the Tribal
Authority is an arm of the government and its decisions are made
with that as its primary objective. Much of its authority. comes
from above~ where once it was based in substantial measure on
legitimacy bestowed from below. Consequently, it has come to be
identified largely with the interest of the external political struc-
ture. At the same time these interests do. not always relate to the
needs of the people. It is upon that dilemma that the legitimacy
and significance of the Tribal Authority turns.
Another great weakness of the Tribal Authority system is its lack
of effective contact with the villages it serves. Reflecting the
constraints of the wider political system which is based on a large
measure of authoritarianism, e.g. the one-party system in the
Ciskei, the Tribal Authority has failed to encourage participation at
grass-roots level and the various villages have consequently lost
much of their autonomy. Virtually all decisions on important local
matters are made by the Tribal Authority and there are hardly any
instances where issues to be decided are ever referred to the
residents in their villages. As a result, most meetings in the villages
are convened merely for the purpose of notifying the residents about
routine administrative matters or for the passing of instructions
from the Tribal Authority. In this situation the councillors tend to
be out of touch with the residents' needs and aspirations and have
to make decisions concerning a community they know less and less.
Also, that this body operates solely in the central village of
Komkhulu, and that its council and court are held there, results in
a waning of its influence in the outlying villages. The greater part
of the infra-structure that exists in the Basin is in Komkhulu and
the villages further away from this .centre experience great
difficulties regarding school facilities, roads, shops, water supplies,
clinics, etc.
The result of all this is a growing distance between the interests of
this body and the residents - a development which is most clearly
indicated by the fact that few people attend the meetings of the
Tribal Authority. In essence, this body convenes as chief-in-council
with negligible and often no involvement of the public. This is partly
due to the fact that the Tribal Authority itself has done little to
encourage people to attend its meetings. While village meetings are
almost invariably held during weekends to enable the residents to
attend, the Tribal Authority meetings take place during the week
when many people are either away at work or are occupied with
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their own affairs. At the same time, it seems many people do not
attend these meetings because they see no point in doing so: there
can hardly be much enthusiasm for a political structure which
80nsistently fails to benefit the people it serves. Some residents
suggested that the Tribal Authority has no meaning for them and
others displayed little knowledge about what this body actually does.
The extent to which the Tribal Authority has become bureaucratised
and formalised is evident in the limited scope for free expression of
opinion in the Tribal Authority. With the weakening of the older
forms of community debate and consensus, the council can no longer
be regarded as a forum for the airing of grievances. For instance,
many councillors do not play an active part in council debates and
the initiative for raising or pursuing particular issues is almost
invariably taken by the more influential members. The councillors,
also, seldom oppose each other in these discussions and possible
dissension is concealed largely by the formality the councillors must
observe in this situation. Consequently, many conflicts remain
unresolved and underlying contradictions emerge mainly in informal
discussions outside the council. This contrasts with the situation in
the villages where meetings are characterised by a large measure of.
free expression in which open clashes of opinion are regarded as
normal.
There is also no doubt that the council's reliance on penalties and
coercive measures to exert its authority is indicative of its own
feelings of alienation and rejection. Throughout the minutes of this
body one constantly comes across fines imposed on those residents
who have failed to co-operate with the body, either by not paying
their levies or by not responding when asked to appear before the
Tribal Authority. These inflexible and formal procedures are
reflected in the procedure of the Tribal Authority itself. For
instance, the councillors are sometimes reprimanded (usually by the
chairman) for lateness at meetings and. in June 1979 the council
decided on a fine of 25c for any member who either arrived late at
a meeting or absented himself without good cause. The council also
brings considerable pressure to bear on sub-headmen to attend its
meetings and in 1.979 it decided to introduce a. R2,OO fine for any
sub-headman who failed to attend these meetings. They also have to
ensure that people pay towards the various funds raised locally. The
council's records show, too, that sometimes some sub-headmen are
fined for failing to present to the Tribal Authority the names of
the people who do not co-operate in this regard.
A consideration of the council's sanctions is relevant here.
Occasionally, to enforce some of its decisions the Tribal Authority
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authorises the messenger of the court, who also happens to serve in
the capacity of chairman of the Tribal Authority, to "attach" (i.e.
impound) the stock or property belonging to people who have been
fined. It is generally known, however, that such measures are
adopted by the Tribal Authority in order to "threaten" the people
who have failed to co-operate with the Tribal Authority, usually by
failing to contribute towards the many levies imposed locally.
Virtually all the stock "attached" when they are brought for dipping
and later impounded, are handed over to their owners soon
afterwards because most of the people do pay when their stock has
been impounded. The point to note here, however, is that the fact
that the Tribal Authority has to resort to compulsive measures to
back up its decisions, points to its lack of legitimate authority.
It is necessary, on the other hand, to mention that the Tribal
Authority is, to a large extent, serving a very necessary function
with regard to the settlement of disputes locally. It is possibly for
that reason that the councillors and the residents tend to see
arbitration as the primary function of the Tribal Authority.
However, even with regard to these judicial functions, the Tribal
Authority encounters difficulties on certain occasions. The cases in
which some of the residents dispute the decisions of the local court
and appeal to the Magistrate's Court arise out of the dissatisfaction
of some of the residents with the decisions of the local court. The
impression gained from interviews suggests that the complicated
interplay between the "traditional" and "modern" perceptions of law
encourage some of the. residents to seek definitive legal solutions
outside the Basin. Although this does not seem to be a common
occurrence, the fact that some of the sentences are set aside at
the Magistrate's Court gives some idea of the complexity of the
Tribal Authority's task.
We conclude by considering some of the new problems which
complicate the Tribal Amhority's task. As from 1980, the council
has .encountered difficulties relating to the general unrest among
scholars in the country. On several occasions the students at the
local high school boycotted classes .and defied their teachers at
school. The authority sent its representatives to address the students
and for some time men from all the villages in the Basin had to
ta~e turns guarding the school at night. This was undoubtedly a
novel situation which even people with a deeper insight into
problems relating to black education generally, could not easily
solve. In the case of this Tribal' Authority the school boycott led to
many complications. The records of the council show that
subsequent to this incident some of the men in the Basin were
prosecuted by the Tribal authority for failing to take their turns in
guarding the school.
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The following case shows other difficulties the Tribal Authority
encounters with regard to the younger members of the community,
as well as the isolation of the body from the greater proportion of
!he adults. During the last week of July 1981, a number of boys
who live in the villages of Machibini and Mdeni went to Komkhulu
and attacked school boys as they were leaving school. For several
days sporadic fights occurred among the boys and the following
week the Tribal Authority called a meeting to look into the matter.
Although each boy was supposed to be accompanied by a parent at
this meeting, some of the parents and boys did not attend the
meeting. Some of the councillors strongly criticised the parents for
failing to keep their children under control and on several occasions
indicated that the police would be called if the fights continued. It
was clear, however, that not all the parents attending this meeting
shared the views of the councillors on this matter.
One of the few parents who spoke at this meeting said it was
unfair for the councillors to blame the parents for what had
happened because the parents themselves were trying all they could
to discipline their children but were not succeeding. The implication
behind these ideological differences between the people and the
and the Tribal Authority is clear: that generally the council has no
legitimacy in the eyes of the residents and as a result it often tries
to maintain its position by giving people commands even in those
critical moments where consensus and open discussion of issues are
of paramount importance.
The recent advent of illegal liquor outlets in many, if not all, the
villages has also been a social problem the Tribal Authority has not
been able to solve. Although the council believes that violence will
increase here if liquor is made freely available, all its attempts to
close down the so-called shebeens) or to force some of the traders
to stop selling liquor locally, have been to no avail. At the same
time, the central authorities do seem to view this matter
differently. Recently they suggested that the Tribal Authorities in
the Ciskei should establish liquor stores in their areas of jurisdic-
tion. To this effect) they requested the representatives of the various
Tribal Authorities in the Ciskei to go to Mdantsane where they were
shown how such concerns could be established in the rural areas.
Subsequently, on several occasions, this suggestion was considered by
the Tribal Authority in the Basin and was rejected. It is worth
noting, however, that this Tribal Authority will undoubtedly have to
reconsider their decision if higher authorities were to insist on the
establishment ,of liquor stores in the Ciskei. In the meantime, the
illegal sale of liquor in the Basin is most likely to continue. Such
an issue, it seems, cannot be resolved without taking into account
the changing attitudes of the community at large. This case also
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highlights the clash between the traditional values emphasized by the
Tribal Authority and the new influences flowing in from outside the
Basin.
Although the Tribal Authority is, by virtue of its official definition,
the focus of local government, there is a need to refer briefly to
the significance and role of the ruling party locally. The Amatola
Basin constitutes a sub-region of the Ciskei National Independence
Party .. This sub-region includes five branches which are further
subdivided into cells. However, these structures hardly exist as
channels through which local needs can be communicated to the
Legislature. Instead, virtually all party activities are concerned with
matters like the collection of party membership fees and donations
for various government undertakings as well as attendance at
political rallies and similar public gatherings. Consequently, local
party leaders do not seem to have any clear idea of the competence
of the sub-region of this party beyond the fact that "it represents
the government". The role of the ruling party locally, is all the
more problematic in the sense that the elected member of
parliament lives outside the Basin and seldom visits the community.
Moreover, the fact that before parliamentary sessions no resolutions
are made specifically for parliamentary consideration, illustrates the
political constraints under which this form of local government operates.
4 Conclusion
The subject we are discussing focuses attention on the theme of
rural development as a relationship between a community and a
government which enables that community to improve its circum-
stances. In the Amatola Basin there are a number of mutually re-
inforcing constraints which result in deficiencies in the functioning
of local. government. The centralized nature of government in the
Ciskei can be seen most clearly in the limited powers and meagre
financial resources of the Tribal Authority. Although one of the
functions of a local authority is to assist in the delivery of state
services, the Tribal Authority has neither the authority nor the
material resources to enable it to perform this co ....ordinating role
efficiently. The corollary of this powerlessness is the lack of regular
means of communication with the Ciskei central authorities. Coupled
with the inefficient co-ordination of government services, these
difficulties limit the means by which felt needs can be communi-
cated up the bureaucratic hierarchy. To this effect, there are hardly
any means by which the residents can freely articulate their
aspirations and receive a satisfactory response, either from higher
offices or from the Ciskei Legislature itself. Instead, the council
finds itself in a situation where it has to focus its attention on the
means of carrying out various directives from higher authorities.
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This concern with external relationships diverts the attention of the
Tribal Authority from matters of local interest. As a result, the
council has not been able to achieve much, largely because few of
its tasks are related directly to the perceived needs of the
community. Similarly, the Tribal Authority's lack of effective
communication with the people in the Basin is an indication of its
pressured position which necessitates compliance with the demands
of the encapsulating political order.
It is also evident that the Tribal Authority is unable to generate
change locally" partly because it is not fully representative of the
community. Since it includes mainly the older and less educated
members and, in particular, makes no pr'ovision for the representa-
tion of women, it is not in a position to reflect the varying
interests of this changing society. The resultant isolation leads not
only to the stifling of community initiative and loss of autonomy on
the village level, but also to the weakening of the Tribal Authority
itself. Yet good communication between the Tribal Authority and
the residents is one of the bases on which grass-roots development
efforts depend.
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5 Cultivation - c.]. de Wet
1 Introduction - A Perspective on Agriculture in the Ciskei
Agriculture in the Ciskei consists of cultivation and stock-farming
under dryland conditions, and in limited areas, under irrigation. For
the period 1971/72 to 1977/78, the gross value of agricultural
production in the Ciskei is estimated to have risen by twenty-three
per cent. However, against current inflation rates during that period,
this represented a negative growth rate.l Agriculture contributed less
than twelve per cent to the gross domestic product of the Ciskei in
1977/782 giving an average marketed plus subsistence output of R40
per capita for the estimated 357 000 members of the Ciskei's
"farming population".3
It is clear that, with the exception of some of the more successful
irrigation projects, agriculture is able to provide only a subsidiary
form of subsistence. Agriculture is therefore not able to release
families from the need to participate in migratory labour. The
current situation is rather that it is a family's participation in the
migratory wage labour economy that provides it with the money
necessary to cultivate. Rural agriculture cannot be seen in isolation
from the wider economy.
Yields in the Ciskei fall far below those of the white farming areas
nearby: two to four bags of maize per hectare for Ciskeian farmers
as against eighteen to twenty-four bags; three to six bags of wheat
per hectare as against twenty to twenty-five bags; and a cattle
turnover of two per cent per annum at a margin of R18 per head
as against a turnover of twenty per cent per annum at R50 per head."
Performance on the irrigation schemes is much better, and Ant robus
estimates that on two of the more successful irrigation schemes,
viz, those at Keiskammahoek and Tyhefu, "earnings have ranged from
R500 to R4 800" per annum.5 In addition, these schemes provide a
limited amount of employment in the surrounding areas. These
schemes are not yet, however, cost-effective independent economic
ventures, as they operate under outside managerial control and in
the case of the Keiskammahoek scheme, with protected markets for
the sale of milk. In addition to irrigation projects, there is also a
joint venture between the Ciskei Government and a private company
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producing pineapples in the Chalumna district.6
Ciskeian farmers are assisted by the Ciskei Marketing Board and a
network of 124 agricultural co-operatives. The C.M.B. purchases
livestock, milk, wheat and fresh vegetables, and buys other items on
a consignment basis. The agricultural co-operatives provide farmers
with balanced packages of seed, fertilizer and weedkiller on a loan
basis. These co-operatives are able to reach about forty or fifty per
cent of farmers in the Ciskei.7 Recently an agricultural credit
scheme was established whereby people may obtain access to
tractors, as well as to seed, fertilizer and insecticide. With the.
dryland crop a total failure because of the drought during the
1982/83 season, the loans for that year were waived by the Ciskei
Government. The recently formed Ciskei Agricultural Corporation is
currently (1984) organizing agricultural services and marketing
structures in the Ciskei.
While there are several agricultural schools for scholars, trammg for
agricultural officers is provided by Fort Cox Agricultural College
near Middledrift, and the University of Fort Hare at Alice. The
Ciskei has a limited number of agricultural officers (an estimated
thirty in 1980), working mainly with the agricultural co-operatives.8
The differing fortunes and yields of agriculture in black and white
areas must be understood largely in terms of the differential
allocation of land, funding, education, services and legal protection
afforded black and white farmers since 1910.
The major factor influencing the fortunes of black agriculture was
the Native Land Act of 1913 and its successor, the Native Trust and
Land Act of 1936. These laws determined the amount of land which
would be made' available to the homeland areas. Under current
consolidation proposals, the Ciskei will comprise 8 300 sq. km. or 0,7
per cent of greater South Africa, and will have a population density
of eighty-seven people per sq. km., as opposed to the rest of greater
South Africa's density of twenty-five people per sq. km.9
In addition to unequal access to arable land, white and black
farmers have not enjoyed equal access to services and assistance.
While agricultural departments serving white farmers were
functioning before 1910, an agricultural service was only started in
the Native Affairs Department in 1929.10 White farmers have
enjoyed access to financial credit, subsidization and protected
markets - facilities not shared by their black counterparts until
much later.11 In this regard the Land Bank Act of 1912 and the
Co-operatives Act of 1922 assisted white farmers, as did the
subsidies on maize, wool and sugar.12 The Soil Conservation Act of
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1946 did not apply to black areas, and it was not until 1946 (in the
opinion of the Tomlinson Commission) that agricultural extension
services began to be effective in black areas, whereas they had been
working for years in white farming areas.l3
That this differential treatment of black and white agriculture has
affected their relative performances, seems fairly clear. Any
exploration of agriculture in the homeland areas must take into
account the constraints under which it has operated in the past, as
well as current constraints and opportunities. These constraints and
opportunities may arise out of a homeland area like the Ciskei's
position in the wider South African political economy, as well as
out of factors operating within the Ciskei, or even within particular
communities.
Against this background, this chapter will consider various factors
influencing the patterns and effectiveness of cultivation in the
Amatola Basin.l4 A brief outline of the basic details of cultivation
in the Basin will be followed by a discussion of how access to
arable land is obtained, and how this affects cultivation. The
principle obstacles to cultivation will then be considered, as well as
past and current attempts by external agents at improving the
situation. A case study of one village in the Amatola Basin will
then show how people are able to overcome some of the obstacles
to cultivation through co-operation. In conclusion, various suggestions
will be offered towards improving the situation.
2 Dryland Cultivation - A Brief Outline
Agriculture in the Amatola Basin consists of dryland cultivation and
stock-farming. In addition a recently established community garden
is administered by the Tribal Authority. Except for the community
garden, very little of the agricultural product is sold.
Nearly half of the households residing in the Basin have rights to
arable land. The average size of these arable allotments is 2,5
morgen (2,14 hectares). Households that do not have land rights may
obtain informal access to all or part of another household's fields.
Taking these landless cultivating households together with households
with land rights that do cultivate, during the 1981/82 season seventy-
six per cent of the households currently resident in the Basin, cultivated
fields. The degree of access to, and utilization of, arable land in
the Amatola Basin is shown in Table 1.
There is an average of 0,27 morgen (0,23 hectares) of arable land
available for each resident individual, (i.e. members of the de facto
population of 3 830 people). Stock, which includes equines, cattle,
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Landed Cultivating Households
Landed Non-Cultivating Households
Landless Cultivating Households
Landless Non-Cultivating Households
sheep and goats) is owned by two-thirds of the households. Cattie
are owned by sixty per cent of the households, while substantially
fewer households .own sheep and goats. In addition, the majority of
households own pigs and poult ry.
The relative wealth of cultivating and non-cultivating households in
terms of average monthly household income and ownership of cattle
is given in Table 2. The figures for average household income
include cash income from what limited sale of crops takes place,
but do not include calculations of either income in kind or costs of
cultivation.
Table I: Amatola Basin: Land and Cultivation as Indicators of Wealth
15
(1981)
% of Households: 1981
40%
7%
36%
17%
Table 2: Amatola Basin : Household Income and Ownership of Cattle as
Indicators of Wealth16 (1981)
Average Monthly % Households
Household Income Owning Cattle
Landed Cultivators R88 71%
Landed Non-Cultivators R65 64%
Landless Cultivators R54 56%
Landless Non-Cultivators R54 39%
The landless non-cultivators are the worst off, as they lack both the
funds and the cattle necessary to cultivate.
Each household provides its own labour or obtains help from
relatives, but there is a high degree of dependence on labour
obtained from outside the household. Ploughing is usually done with
cattle, although, where money and terrain allow, use is made of
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tractors. Those cultivators who can, use their own cattle or borrow
from relatives. Again, there is a high degree of dependence on
cattle obtained from outside the household.
Where ploughing is done by tractor, the Ciskei Government subsidises
both tractor and driver. Where ploughing is done with cattle, men
and schoolboys do the actual ploughing. An adult male will usually
hold the ploughshare, while the span of oxen may be led by two
men, or schoolboys. Sowing involves walking behind the plough
and sowing seed in the open furrow, and may be done by anyone.
The furrow is closed by the action of the ploughshare in ploughing
the next furrow. Alternatively seed may be mixed with manure in a
.cultivator, which is pulled by oxen. Hoeing is usually done by
women, as is reaping. Little use is made of fertilizer (other than
manure), or insecticide.
There appears to be little formal remuneration, in cash or kind, for
assistance offered in terms of labour or cattle. Various kinds of
informal remuneration exist in terms of reciprocal favours both in
agricultural and other matters.
It is not always the case that a household without sufficient labour
or cattle obtains them both from the same source, which further
underlines the widespread network of co-operation and dependency
upon which the majority of households rely in order to cultivate.
Almost every cultivating household grows maize, while more than
half the cultivating households grow vegetables (beans, peas,
potatoes, pumpkins and melons) as well as maize in their fields.
The major agricultural
plough, to plant, to
overwhelmingly taken
majority of whom are
decisions include the decision
hoe and to harvest. These
by the effective heads of
women.
as to when to
decisions are
household, the
Eighty-five percent of households in the Basin have gardens ranging
from approximately 250 square metres to more than 1 000 square
metres. Nine-tenths of households with gardens work their gardens.
The crops most frequently grown are maize, cabbage, potatoes,
beans, spinach, onions and tomatoes.
It is difficult to get reliable estimates of yields.l7 The average
yield per "acre'l (approximately 0,43 hectares) ploughed by cattle
only, in 1981, seemed to be two bags of maize on the cobs. This
average does not, however, take into account the eating of green
maize before harvesting. Two bags of cobs amount to roughly 90 kg
of stripped maize. Fertilizer (other than manure) and insecticide are
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rarely used. Excluding informal costs for labour and cattle, net
profit per morgen (0,86 hectares) if converted into cash terms,
amounted (in 1981) very roughly to R50 per annum/8 for Ulaize
only. Estimates for other crops. were not obtained.
The Basin's two agricultural officers are required to advise farmers
about farming practices and to assist them to obtain tractors for
ploughing, seed, fertilizer and stock medicine.
3 Access to Arable Land as a Factor Affecting Cultivation
a) The Land Tenure System
The quitrent form of land tenure obtains in the Amatola Basin.
Under quitrent, land is not owned outright, but for practical
purposes it is held under ownership conditions, subject to a yearly
payment which previously amounted to R1,00 per annum for arable
allotments and RO,25 ,per annum for residential sites. Furthermore, the
land may not be "alienated or leased without the consent of the
Governor" (Proclamation No. 117 of 1931). With the advent of
betterment, (see p. 103 ) the quitrent fee appears to have .been
changed to R1,00 for -a person with a residential site but no land,
R1,00 for a person with a residential site and one lot of land,
R2,00 for a person with two lots of land and a residential site.
According to records in the Middledrift Magistrate's offices, all
available arable land (410 allotments averaging 2,5 morgen or 2,14
hectare each) has been allocated in the Amatola Basin.
Lots may not be subdivided or held by females, but must be
allocated to one male on the principle that land must pass from
father to eldest son, or failing issue, to collateral male kin, i.e.
brothers of the deceased, failing which, nephews of the deceased.
On the death of a landowner, his widow is entitled "to occupy the
land after her husband's death, without actually taking transfer .
. Only after the death of the widow can the heir take transfer".1 9
However, a woman loses her prospective rights to her husband's
field in the event of divorce. Nowinile X "lost her field to her son
when she divorced", the field going to her son on the death of his
father. Similarly, Nosize Y and her husband were divorced. The
husband remarried. He then died, and the field is now used by his
second wife, and will on her death pass to Nosize's son. If a widow
remarries (and has no son) she loses her field. If she has a son, the
field becomes his.
Lots may be transferred or sold with the consent of the Administra-
tion, and sales occur when quitrent payments become long overdue20
or if the family wishes to sell. Although it is the policy of the
95
Administration not to allow a man to have more than one lot, this
does occur, either by virtue of inheritance or by "unofficial" sale,
whereby effective transfer is taken although the title deed remains
unaltered.21
Quitrent is a relatively secure form of land tenure in that as long
as the rent is paid, it is not necessary to cultivate the 'field or even
to reside in the area in order to retain rights to the field.
Quitrent is seen by the people as providing a greater security of
tenure than communal tenure, where "the headmen can take fields
from people without any reason". A title-holder will only lose a
field if he or she fails to pay rent. As long as rent is paid, the
title-holder may for all purposes be an "absconder" (i.e. one who
has permanently left the village), and still maintain his or her rights
to the field.
One informant's statement may illustrate the situation: "At Village
X a man had a field. His eldest son (i.e. the rightful heir)
absconded for many years. The old man died, and the younger son
(i.e. -brother to the absconder) cultivated the field and paid the rent
for all the years. Then the son of the absconder came home and
saw the field full of maize and told his uncle not to set foot in
that field again. The magistrate ruled that the field belonged to the
absconder's son. We felt bad about the matter".
Moreover, (it is argued) it would take time and effort to obtain the
field of an absconder. One cannot obtain such a field without the
p~rmission of his family, although after a reasonable time, it seems
that the field may be appropriated if his family cannot be found.
Although an individual holds the title to a particular field, it is
argued that he cannot dispose of it without the permission of his
family, and particularly of his brothers.
Technically, the law is seen as prohibiting people who do not have
fields f rom keeping stock. However, this is not regarded as
acceptable, and in the words of an informant "we do not enforce
that here, so that the men will. be able to rear stock". Moreover,
"most of the people with fields have no stock, and they are helped
by the people without fields, who plough their fields".
From the viewpoint of a migrant labourer involved in the wider
South African political economy, the quitrent system of land tenure
provides him with a secure rural base, which he can fall back on if
need be. It is not necessary to cultivate the field, or even to live in
the village in order to keep his right to the field. A landowner is
thus free to participate in the wider wage economy without having
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to divide his energies between rural and urban options.
From the viewpoint of agricultural productivity, the quitrent system
raises various problems. Fields may lie uncultivated for years, because
the people who are at home and may best be able to cultivate
those fields, may be unable to gain access to them. Absentee
landlords may arrange to have their fields cultivated by tenants, or
they may simply let their fields lie fallow. So some fields of
absentee landlords have been uncultivated for up to ten years. Fields
of landowners who are present in the Amatola Basin may also (and
in fact do) lie untouched for several years.
Productive farmers are prevented from gammg access to large
enough tracts of land to make a commercial venture of farming.
Sharecropping or hiring land are not conducive to making permanent
improvements to the land (like fencing or contour-banking) as with
sharecropping half of the crop is lost to the landowner, and if the
tenant significantly improves the land, through e.g. fencing it, or
taking anti-erosion measures, the landlord may well take back his
,land. Moreover, some landowners simply do not want other people to
work their lands, and so they lie empty.
In 1981 the Ciskei Government sent out a directive to the effect
that if a landholder did not cultivate his field, the government could
take the field and give it to someone else for five years. After five
years it would be returned to the original landholder. If he then
failed to cultivate it, it could be taken from him permanently, (oral
testimony and Tribal Authority records, Amatola Basin). It is hot
yet clear what the effect of this directive will be on patterns of
landholding or cultivation.22
b) Informal Access to Arable Land
Nearly half of the occupied homesteads in the Basin have rights to
arable land. Households which do not have rights to fields may gain
access to arable land by various means. They may:
a) enter into a sharecropping arrangement;
b) hire someone else's land;
c) pay the quitrent fee of a field and have use of it;
d) obtain the use of land as a gift.
Sharecropping involves an arrangement between two households in
which typically one supplies the land, and the other supplies
everything necessary for its cultivation, i.e. labour, cattle, seed, and
tools. The maize reaped is then equally shared, although vegetables
grown may be kept by the tenant. It is accepted that green maize
will not be eaten before harvesting. Sharecropping seems to be
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designed to enable two households to have the benefits of cultivation
(as without the tenant's contribution, the' landlord would be unable
to cultivate), rather than to provide rewards proportional to inputs.
For example, one household may provide land, plough, cattle, seed
and even a part of the labour force, while the other household
provides only a part of the labour force and the product (i.e. the
maize) will still be halved. The convention of "isithathu" (occuring
elsewhere in the Ciskei, whereby the tenant obtains one-third of the
crop if his input is proportionately less) does not seem to be
employed.
When a tenant hires land, he pays R2 for what is termed "an acre".
The size of an acre (of which there are usually four or five in a
field of 2,5 morgen or 2,14 hectare), is not constant. It is clear
that the. hiring fee is only nominal, as the fee appears to be
constant, regardless of the size or fertility of the acre to be
cultivated. Moreover, Mills and Wilson report that in 1950, land was
rented in the Keiskammahoek area for "£1 per season for an
"ox-acre" . . . Large and small "acres" are recognised, but the
price for all remains the same; nor does the price vary according to
the fertility of the soil. "23 The price of an "acre" has not
increased over thirty years and hiring should be seen as a non-
profit-making arrangement whereby. land is made available to the
landless.
People who have left the village and who wish to keep their fields
as security, or people who do not cultivate their fields, may rent
their fields to others. The tenant then pays the R1 quit rent fee
each year, and has free access to the whole field, while the
landlord maintains the title, and may reclaim the use of the field
whenever he so chooses.
A landless person may be given the use of all or part of an
allotment which he/she may use free of charge and cultivate in any
way he/she wishes. Such free land is usually obtained from a
relative.
It is generally acknowledged by the people that it is in the best
interest of a landlord to negotiate a sharecropping contract with his
tenant, as he (the landlord) then gets half the maize crop for doing
nothing, whereas if he hires out a portion of his field, the money
will be quickly spent. Conversely, it is seen as in the tenant's
interest to push for a hiring contract, as the fee is uneconomically
low, and he then has the benefit of the entire crop, as well as the
right to eat green maize before harvesting. However, as will be
shown, landlords do not always push for a sharecropping contract,
but often hire sections of land out, or rent or even give their fields
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to landless households, saying that "we must help each other".
Various possible reasons may be advanced for this apparent altruism
on the part of landlords, who often are not bound by ties of kinship
to their tenants. Firstly, the landlord may need the cash derived
from hiring out a part of his field, perhaps to contribute toward the
cost of cultivating the rest of it. Secondly, the landlord may prefer
the cash to half an uncertain and often low yield derived from
sharecropping, particuarly after a period of drought. Thirdly, the
tenant may not be willing to sharecrop, given such low and
unpredictable yields. Once a field has stood for several seasons, the
soil becomes hard, and ploughing with cattle (particularly cattle
weakened by recent drought) may not be feasible. So if the landlord
wishes to have his field cultivated, and cannot do so himself, he
may be obliged to settle for a contract less favourable to himself
than sharecropping. Fourthly, the landlord may use such apparent
altruism to long-term advantage. Landlords sometimes hire, rent, or
even give their land out on the understanding that after a few years
the tenant will then enter into a sharecropping arrangement.
Longstanding relationships are thus built up, whereby the landlord
obtains a moral clai m to the tenant's cont ract and labour, and so is
assured of an important source of income in kind. This acts as a
form of insurance against the uncertainties of illness and old age,
and as a counter to the sporadic and often low income derived from
migrant remittances.
Cultivation is an activity which has wider implications than its
immediate and often limited economic gain, relating to people's
personal dignity and to their standing in the community. The fact
that landlords do not always push for the short-term economic gain
of sharecropping, indicates that the yields obtained from cultivation
are not perceived as significant enough to push for, at the possible
cost of the longer term moral and economic security of valuable
social networks.
While sharecropping or hiring one's land out has the short- term
benefits of increasing output, it has various long-term defects,
which are not conducive to sound agricultural development. These
land-sharing practices encourage absentee farming, and accordingly
there is not sufficiently strong interest from the landlord or
security of tenure for the tenant to make long-term improvements,2 4
even if the funds should be available. There _ is also no unified
decision-making process, as the inputs and effort of landlord and
tenant occur at different stages of the agricultural process. In the
case of sharecropping, the fact that each party will only get half of
the crop, reduces the incentive to make innovative changes, as the
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potential reward is not seen as worth the risk.25
However, in a sub-subsistence agricultural economy, where often
neither the land nor the funds are available to make significant
long-term improvements, the short term benefits of tenant
agriculture will probably continue to be exploited.
4 Obstacles to Dryland Cultivation
The fact that landless households are able to gain access to the
fields of landholding households indicates that many landholding
households are either unwilling or unable to cultivate all of their
fields. It is argued here that a number of factors combine in a
negative and cumulative fashion so as to impede the full and
effective cultivation of arable land. Until these factors are coun-
tered, dryland ,cl;1ltivation cannot provide any significant source of
income; nor, consequently, lessen the dependence of rural black
.villagers on sources of cash coming from outside the village, i.e.
migrant remittances and pension grants. Although these factors will
be discussed only in relation to the Amatola Basin, their effect is
similar in Lesoth026 and the Transkei.27 These factors include (a)
shortage of labour, (b) shortage of draught power, (c) shortage of
cash and equipment, (d) inefficient agricultural extension services,
(e) lack of market outlets, (f) lack of co-ordinated decision-making,
(g) shortage of rain and (h) lack of motivation.
a) Shortage of Labour
Access to the labour necessary to cultivate is affected by the
absence of many active adults (mainly males) working as migrant
labourers.28 This mainly affects the ploughing aspect of agriculture,
which is the work of men. It seems we are not dealing with an
absolute shortage of labour, but rather with a shortage of effective
and motivated labour. Ploughing involves the plough being held, and
the oxen being led and coaxed along with a stick or whip. The only
physically demanding labour in this regard is the holding of the
plough, as little boys of six to ten years often lead and coax the
oxen. A teenager of say sixteen years is quite capable of holding
the plough steady so that it opens a straight and sufficiently deep
furrow. Such teenagers are, however, usually at school during the
week,29 and during the weekends, agriculture must compete with
ceremonial, social and sporting activities. The effective shortage of
male ploughing power is a consequence not only of absent male
migrants, but also of the relatively low value which is placed upon
agriculture in relation to other activities by those who remain at
home.30
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Hoeing and reaping are largely the work of women. There are
usually women at home, but much of their day is taken up with
such time-consuming tasks as fetching water and wood, and cooking
and keeping house. Again, there is some free time for schoolchildren
over weekends to hoe, but then they must forego the weekend social
life of the village.
Labour seems to be effectively short, at the level of the cultivating
household, which may lack either the labour itself, or the means
needed to obtain labour. Additional labour may be obtained by soli-
citing help from neighbours and kinsmen, by sharecropping land, by
two households pooling their labour resources, or by hiring labour.
b) Shortage of Draught Power
The main form of draught power used is cattle (nearly eighty per cent
of households ploughed solely with cattle in 1980/81). Although sixty
per cent of households own cattle, they do not necessarily own
enough cattle or enough sufficiently strong cattle to plough. The
shortage of cattle may be overcome by a few households poolirig
their cattle in a company or by hiring tractors. However, the
availability of tractors depends on their state of repair, the
accessibility of the agricultural officers (who in 1981 had no form
of motorized transport), and upon having the necessary funds.
Moreover, the fields of five villages in the Amatola Basin are partly
or totally inaccessible to tractors, either because their fields are
too steeply sloped, or are too stony for tractors.
c) Shortage of Cash and Equipment
Inaccessibility of equipment constrains a household's ability to
cultivate. The Ciskei Government is able to supply seed, fertilizer,
fencing and other agricultural equipment at subsidized prices to
Ciskeians. At present the existing agricultural co-operative in the
Amatola Basin (which requires a joining fee of R25,00) provides only
a limited service to its relativ,ely few members. Its effectiveness is
limited largely to Komkhulu, which is the central village in the
Basin, and which has the highest average household income? 1 Non-
members must buy seed and equipment at unsubsidized prices, and
those households that cannot afford these higher prices, must do
without. In 1980/81 there was as yet no agricultural loan or credit
scheme (other than that which shopkeepers might offer to a few
farmers) available outside of the co-operative.
d) Inefficient Agricultural Extension Services
Effective extension services are hampered by the fact that the two
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extension officers have no form of transport. They are therefore
unable to provide an effective link between the people of the
Amatola Basin and the Ciskei Department of Agriculture, or to visit
households on a regular basis. Accordingly, they are unable to fulfil
their intended role of providing people with advice, encouragement
and incentive, as well as more effective access to equipment and
tractors.
The effectiveness of extension services is also limited by the fact
that the Ciskei bureaucracy has not been long established. It
therefore has to deal with the problems caused by inexperienced
personnel and limited funding, and its effectiveness in the field of
agricultural extension is correspondingly limited. The process of
obtaining a dipping tank (for which government approval had been
gained) in the highland area of the Amatola Basin took more
than a year for these reasons.
e) Lack of Market Outlets
The lack of either sufficient or sufficiently regular household
incomes aggravates the situation caused by the above problems.
People are often unable to hire labour or draught power or to pay
for available equipment and services. This lack of income is again
aggravated by the lack of any effective outside market link-up
which might provide households with an outlet for their product,
with an income from their agriculture and with the incentive to
commit their labour and resources less to migration and more to
agriculture.
f) Lack of Co-ordinated Decision-Making
Most effective heads of household in the Amatola Basin are women,
and they make most of the important agricultural decisions, e.g.
when and whether to plough, plant, hoe and reap. However, they are
dependent on the mens I remittances in order to carry out these
decisions, and these remittances may not always be forthcoming at
the time when they are needed. Accordingly, a female household head
may find herself unable to start or to complete the agricultural
cycle, for lack of funds, or she may find herself in potential
conflict with her husband who sends money home with the order to
cultivate, in a bad year, when she can see that the crops will fail.
The husband then comes home to find his field uncultivated, and his
wife is answerable to him.
g) Shortage of Rain
The unpredictability of rain also increases the negative effect of all
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the above factors. It plays havoc with yields and, accordingly,
undermines peoples willingness to commit already scarce resources
to agriculture, even after it has rained. A drought of several years
hardens the soil while weakening or killing necessary draught
animals, and a household with limited labour and stock may not be
able to recover from the effects of a drought.
h) Lack of Motivation
All of this raises the question as to whether the "average"
rurally-based Ciskeian family (e.g. in Amatola Basin) really wants to
cultivate badly enough to try to overcome these obstacles. Many
probably do not, because thei r experience of agriculture does not
tell them that it is a worthwhile pursuit. Yields are low, work is
hard, services are often sporadic, and there is little, if any, hard
cash in return. In these circumstances, many households commit
themselves to the apparently more secure and predictable income
derived from working in the city. Remittances and energy are used
to meet more immediate needs in the first place and are risked on
cultivation in the second place, if at all.
Several of these factors inhibiting cultivation arise out of the
Ciskei's position in the wider South African political economy.
Ciskeians need to work in the cities because their own areas. cannot
support them, resulting in shortages of labour, funds (as a result of
low wages which must support the worker in town and his family in
the country), draught power (for lack of funds) and co-ordinated
decision- making. Other factors, such as the shortage of equipment
and services are} to a large extent} the outcome of the differential
access to funds and services enjoyed by black and white agriculture
in South Africa over a long period.
The Ciskei Government is a fledgling bureaucracy, short on funds,
experienced and skilled personnel, and largely dependent on South
Africa for these necessities. Its ability to overcome its agricultural
problems will depend largely upon the funding and training it
receives from South Africa, as well as the position of its labour
force within the wider South African economy.
5 Previous Attempts at Improving Agriculture in the Amatola Basin
During the 1960s~ extensive agricultural betterment schemes were
implemented throughout the Ciskei by the South African Govern-
ment. In the Amatola Basin, this involved some villagers having to
move their residential sites into already existing residential clusters
to make space for the fencing-off of rotational grazing camps.
People were financially compensated for the move but it is seen as
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something which was imposed upon them against their will, and it is
a memory which rankles.
The betterment. scheme does not appear to have increased yields.
The betterment report of 1959 states that "the existing average
would be in the vicinity of 2 to 3,5 bags per morgen".32 In 1981,
yields in one of the highland villages appeared to be fairly similar
(see p.94 ). The scheme did not affect the demarcation of fields in
the Amatola Basin, which were held to be "in good condition,
neither exhausted, nor badly eroded."33
Its effectiveness in terms of the improvement of grazing and so of
stock is more difficult to assess. The betterment report recom-
mended culling of stock.34 and Steyn35 suggests such culling did
take place, although oral testimony suggests that it did not take
place in the highland area of the Amatola Basin.
The betterment report states that "the overall condition of the veld
is (sic) good" in 1959.36 Steyn37, however, states that "the veld
condition score for Dohne Lowveld, which comprises 45 per cent of
the veld, is 69 per cent below its potential. . . False Thornveld,
which makes up the major veld type (49%) is 85,5 per cent below
its potential. Generally, the basal cover is very low, and is
susceptible to severe soil erosion". However, this deterioration must
be seen against the background of severe recent droughts, the fact
that "there is no enforcement of rotational grazing"38 and the fact
that the proviso that families without land should not be allowed to
keep stock, is not enforced in all parts of the Amatola Basin. Steyn
estimates that the Amatola Basin is currently overstocked by 361
per cent.39
The decline in the quality of the grazing must at least be partly
~scribed to the fact that the people have not accepted all the
. recommendations of the betterment scheme, such as rotational
'grazing. This non co-operation stems largely from the fact that the
. people-did not want betterment (and did not necessarily see the
need for it) - in spite of the fact that the betterment report
claims. that "the vote at the meeting accepting the betterment
scheme was unanimous and up to date the people appear to have
been most co-operative".40 The reasons for the rejection of better-
ment .in a' nearby area, and for the misunderstandings involved, have
been discussed elsewhere~ 1 Although some people saw the value of
~ot.aticmal grazing, and saw it as an improvement when it was first
implemented, the fact that the betterment scheme is seen as having
been thrust upon the people, as well as the fact that it was not
followed up by either adequate extension services or supervision, has
significantly undermined its effectiveness.
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Quite a few people see betterment as having left them agricul-
turally worse off than before, and many villagers remain suspicious
of any further attempts at agricultural development.
6 Current Attempts to Improve Agriculture in the Amatola Basin
Since 1978 the Agricultural and Rural Development Research
Institute (ARDRI) at the University of Fort Hare has been involved
in a development project in the Amatola Basin. While not pertaining
only to agriculture, the ARDRI project has been responsible for
various agricultural innovations and changes. These will be discussed
in more detail in Chapter Seven.
The Ciskei Government is considering the construction of a dam in
the South Valley of the Amatola Basin, that is planned to push back
up this valley. It is not yet clear how the dam is planned to affect
activity in the Amatola Basin, or whether it will involve the
relocation of any homesteads or arable land.
A problem that any development activity in the Amatola Basin will
have to take in to account, is the way in which the people perceive
their agricultural problems. Apart from the fact that, as in Lesotho,
agriculture takes place "within the framework of a lack of
expectation",42 as discussed in the earlier section on obstacles to
dryland agriculture, people see their problems as relating to limited
access to resources, rather than to the need for advice or expertise.
Successful farmers are seen to be successful because they have
access to basic - resources such as labour, draught power, seed,
fences, and water rather than because they are skillful or know-
ledgeable farmers. People see themselves as limited in their ability
to cultivate because they lack these resources. While this perception
does accurately reflect many cultivators' economic position, it does
underestimate the importance of knowledge and ability. Both of
these factors crucially affect production, however limited the
resource base may be.
7 Cultivation as a Co-operative Enterprise: A Case Study of
Mkhobeni Village
This section will look at one highland village, Mkhobeni. It will
argue that many households, both landed and landless, do not by
themselves have the necessary resources to cultivate, and that
cultivation is in many instances made possible by the sharing of
resources. In this way a greater number of landed families are able
to cultivate and a greater number of landless familes are able to
gain access to arable land. The productive agricultural unit should~
accordingly, not be seen as the household, but rather as cent red on
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the household, with assistance from relatives and friends.
There are eighty-three homesteads in Mkhobeni, of which sixty-four
(77%) were occupied, while nineteen (23%) stood empty in 1981. In
the majority of empty homesteads, the occupants were living and
working in cities in South Africa, returning to Mkhobeni for
holidays. However, three homesteads stand permanently empty as
their former occupants are said to have "absconded", i.e. they do
not return to Mkhobeni.
The resident population of Mkhobeni (i.e. those members of occupied
homesteads currently at home) amounts to 348 people (~,4 people
per household). The number of members of occupied homesteads
currently away amounts to 179 people (2,8 people per household).
Thus one-third (34%) of members of occupied homesteads are
currently outside Mkhobeni.
There are fifty-one arable allotments (fields of 2,5 morgen each)
associated with Mkhobeni.43 Members of half of the occupied
homesteads (50%) and just less than one-quarter of the empty
homesteads have rights to fields. Rights to three fields are held by
absconders.
During the 1980/81 season, members of twenty-three out of
thirty-two (72%) occupied homesteads with land rights cultivated all
or part of their fields, while members of fifteen out of thirty-two
(47%) landless occupied homesteads cultivated all or part of someone
else's land. Of the fields associated with the empty homesteads, six
out of seven (87%) were uncultivated. Reasons given for not
cultivating included the recent drought, and the fact that the cattle
were too thin to plough, the shortage of cattle, and the shortage of
labour. (Up to 1982, no tractors were available for ploughing in
Mkhobeni.) A total of seventeen out of fifty-one fields (33%) were
uncultivated during the 1980/81 season.
The drought does appear to have limited people's ability to cultivate
during the 1980/81 season. During the three years 1978/79 - 1980/81,
members of only four of the landed occupied homesteads (12%) did
not cultivate their fields, while members of nine of the occupied
landless homesteads (28%) did not attempt to cultivate. In only
three of the nineteen homesteads standing empty in 1981, had their
members cultivated any fields during the above three-year period.
Various factors const rain households that did not attempt to
cultivate. The average monthly household income in Mkhobeni in
1981 was R56,50.44 However, incomes vary widely and one-fifth
(20%) of cultivating households claimed to have incomes of R10 per
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month or less. Average household income combines with various
other factors, notably a shortage of cattle and labour to constrain
ability to cultivate. Of the thirteen households which did not
cultivate for the three years 1978/79 - 1980/81, only two have any
oxen and only three have a possibly adequate labour supply, although
in all three cases the available male labour either works during the
week, or is at school.
During the three cultivating years of 1978/79 to 1980/81,
members of fifty-one out of a total of sixty-four occupied home-
steads cultivated land. Of these. twenty-three landless households and
one landed household gained access to other households' land.
However, to get a more complete picture, we must also include the
homesteads that were empty in 1981, but which cultivated through
co-operation during the period of 1978/79 to 1980/81, as well as
those households in Mdlankomo (a neighbouring village) which gained
access to the land of households in Mkhobeni. This situation may be
represented as in Table 3(a) and (b).
Table 3(a): Mkhobeni : Means of Gaining Access to Land: All Cases
t1978/79 to 1980/81)
Type of Acce;;s
Sha rec rapping
Hiring
Renting
Gift
TOTAL
Total Cases Cases of Access from Relarives
12 6
12 5
3 3
11 10
38 24
The location of land-providers and land-receivers may be represented as follows:
Table 3(b) Mkhobeni: Location by Village of Land-Providers and Land-Receivers
(1978/79 to 1980/81)
Mkhobeni land-receivers from Mkhobeni land-providers
Mkhobeni land-receivers from land-providers outside
Mkhobeni
Outside land-receivers from Mkhobeni land-providers
TOTAL
24 cases
8 cases
6 cases
38 cases
As regards sharecropping and hiring, co-operation is equally with kin
and non-kin, whereas in the case of renting and gift, co-operation
is almost exclusively with kin. While most exchanges (63%) are
between Mkhobeni residents, there is a significant degree of
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co-operation (37%) with the neighbouring village of Mdlankomo.
The extent to which households co-operate in Mkhobeni in order to
obtain the labour and cattle necessary to cultivate is shown in
Tables 4(a) and (b).
Table 4(a): Mkhobeni : Sources of Labour for Ploughing and Planting
(1978/79-1980/81):
Cultivating households using:
Solely Own Labour
Labour of Relatives
Labour of Non-Relatives
Labour of Relatives and Non-Relatives
TOTAL CULTIVATING HOUSEHOLDS
13
26*
8
4
51
(* including 4 households obtaining labour from households outside Mkhobeni)
Table 4(b): Mkhobeni : Sources of Cattle for Ploughing (1978/79-1980/81)
'. Cultivatin~ households using:
Solely Own Cattle
Cattle of Relatives
Cattle of Non-Relatives
Cattle of Relatives and Non-Relatives
TOTAL CULTIVATING HOUSEHOLDS
18
23*
9
1
51
(*including 3 households obtaining cattle from households outside Mkhobeni)
The full extent of this co-operative enterprise is shown by the fact
that only seven cultivating households (14%)" supply all their own
needs in terms of land, labour and cattle, and that only eleven
cultivating households (22%) supply all their own needs in terms of
labour and cattle.
The great majority of the relationships of co-operation discussed
above are with kinsmen. It may, however, be argued that the
distinction between kin and non-kin is not really meaningful in a
small village like Mkhobeni or in an isolated section of the Amatola
Basin, such as the highland area. Most families, by virtue of living
together in the same area, have become related to each other over
time, either through expansion of the founding lineages, or through
marriage. What may be of significance, is the degree of relatedness
between co-operating households.45
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The degree of relatedness between households co-operating in terms
of access to land, cattle and labour for ploughing and planting is
shown in Tables S(a), (b) and (c).
Table 5(a): Mkhobeni : Access to Land by Degree of Relatedness
(1978/79-1980/81)
Type of Land obtained from:
i\ccess: Close Close Distant Distant Non Total
Consan- i\ffines Consan- i\!fines Rel- Cases
guines guines at ives
Share-
cropping 0 2 3 6 12
Hiring 0 1 3 7 12
Renting 0 0
Gift 7 3 0 0 1 11-
TOTi\LS 8 6 3 7 14 38
The possible reasons for landlords not insisting on sharecropping
contracts have been discussed earlier in this chapter. It is clear,
however, in the majority of cases of access of land by means of gift,
co-operation is with close kin. It is this form of access that gives
most economic benefit to the tenant, and it is here that it would
be expected to find the norms of kinship morality operating, rather
than more commercial considerations.
Table 5(b): Mkhobeni : Access to Cattle by Degree of Relatedness
(1978/79-1980/81)
(N.B. a household may obtain cattle from more than one source)
Cattle obtained from:
Close Close Distant Distant Non Total
Consan- Affines Consanguines Affines Relatives Cases
guines
7 4 6 7 10 34
Table 5(c): Mkhobeni : Access to Labour for Ploughing and Planting
by Degree of Relatedness (1978/79-1980/81)
(N.B. a household may obtain labour from more than one source)
Labour obtained from:
Close
Consan-
guines
14
Close
Affines
Distant
Consanguines
10
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Distant
i\ffines
6
Non
Relatives
14
Total
Cases
49
As regards access to cattle, help is received equally from
consanguines and affines, as well as from close kin, distant kin and
non-relatives. As regards access to labour, more help (although not
significantly so) is received from close kin than from distant kin,
although significantly more help is received from consanguines than
affines.
In order to determine whether consanguinity is indeed a relevant
factor in recrUltmg labour, let us look at the proximity of
co-operating households to each other. Households will be regarded
as close together if they are within six adjacent homesteads of each
other, as being a medium distance apart if they are up to half the
length of the village apart, and as far apart if they are further
apart than that.46
Table 6(a): Mkhobeni : Proximity of Households Receiving Assistance
with Cattle (1978/79-1980/81)
Type of Relationship Near Medium Distance Far Total
Close Consanguines 6 0 I 7
Close Af fines 3 0 4
Distant Consanguines 6 0 0 6
Distant Affines 2 2 3 7
Unrelated 6 3 1 10-
TOTALS 21 8 5 34
In the majority of cases (62%), assistance is received from a nearby
household, often from direct neighbours. The majority of cases
where assistance is received. from consanguines are cases where the
households concerned are close to each other, as is the case with
unrelated households. In ten of the thirteen cases of co-operation
with households living a medium distance or further away from each
other, there is a compound relationship, i.e. household A will receive
assistance from household B with regard to labour, or access to
land, as well as cattle. There appears to be little reciprocal
ploughing, and there was evidence of only five ploughing companies
in Mkhobeni, where two or more houses pooled their cattle and
labour.
Similarly with labour, the majority of cases of assistance (67%) are
between households close to each other. Again, this is the case
whether assistance is received from consanguines or from unrelated
households. In thirteen of the sixteen cases where the co-operating
houses are a medium distance or further apart, there is a compound
relationship. Again there appears to be little reciprocal assistance
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Table 6(b): Mkhobeni : Proximity of Households Receiving Assistance with
Labour for Ploughing and Planting (1978/79-1980/81)
Type of Relationship Near Medium Distance Far Total
Close Consanguines 13 0 14
Close Affines 3
Distant Consanguines 8 1 10
Distant Affines 2 6
Unrelated 9 3 2 14- -
TOTALS 33 8 8 49
with labour, and there was evidence of only seven such cases
(including the five ploughing companies mentioned above).
The significant criteria for co-operation and assistance between
cultivating households in Mkhobeni appear to be proximity and
friendship, rather than kinship ties by themselves. People co-operate
primarily with nearby households, and with more distant households
if there is a reason, such as a good personal relationship, or the
fact that they have worked well together previously. If these are
also kinsmen, so much the better.
Many relationships of co-operation are of several years standing and
are of a compound nature. Of the forty cultivating households in
Mkhobeni which were not self-sufficient in terms of both cattle and
labour, twenty-six '<65%) received both cattle and labour from the
same source.
There appears to be little formal remuneration in cash or kind for
assistance offered in terms of labour or cattle. Indeed, relationships
which last over time and which are not single-stranded would seem
to involve more than a transactional bond between the parties. The
transactional aspect of these relationships is perhaps best understood
in terms of informal patterns of remuneration, such as hospitality,
assistance with domestic chores, lending of money, etc. In a
community such as Mkhobeni which has been homogeneous and
physically fairly isolated for over 100 years, and which has not been
disrupted by new immigrants, relationships of trust are built up.
Together with community pressure and the insecurities of unpredic-
table incomes and fortunes, these relationships of trust and
friendship are probably strong enough to lead people to honour their
social debts.
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8 Conclusion
The average land-holding family in rural Ciskei areas like the
Amatola Basin dges not command the resources effectively to
cultivate what land they do hold. It may, however, be argued that
there are people with sufficient resources who are not cultivating
because their land-holdings are too small to make their investment
in commercial agriculture worthwhile. If those who have land rights
are unable to cultivate the land, then surely those who are able to
cultivate it, should be given the opportunity to do so.
It is, however, not clear that consolidated arable holdings, whether
on a freehold, or any other basis (e.g. a collective) will in fact
increase the agricultural viability of the Ciskei. Freehold tracts of
up to twelve hectares lie uncultivated in some areas of the Ciskei.
White agriculture in South Africa remains heavily dependent upon
the provision of state services, markets and subsidies to keep going.
The Ciskei government possesses neither the trained manpower, the
infrastructure nor the economic resources to provide such services or
subsidies to farmers that would be competing with an already
established ,white agricultural control of markets •
.. In spite of the resource.s at its disposal, white agriculture is not
without its problems. Tapson points to the growing problem of debt
among South African farmeJrs.47 Such debt is likely, to become a
severe problem in the Ciskei, where both potential farmers and
government assets are considerably poorer than their South African
counterparts.
The Ciskei government is currently unable to provide the services,
infrastructure and subsidies necessary to enable successful
commercial farming. All such successful farming in the Ciskei takes
place on capital-intensive, managerial-intensive, irrigation-aided
schemes, which are funded by the Ciskei government. The fact that
only two per cent of the Ciskei land surface is suitable for
irrigation,48 and the cost-structures and managerial inputs involved,
mean that such development is possible only on a very limited scale.
Only as the Ciskei develops industrially and so becomes increasingly
able to generate employment and income within its own borders,
will it become able to supply and fund the infrastructural and
institutional base necessary for successful commercial agriculture.
This lessened dependence on South Africa will also mean that it will
have greater command over the resources at its disposal, making for
more stable and predictable financial planning.
Such growth will attract people from the rural areas to the
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developing industrial centres in the Ciskei, thereby alleviating the
pressure on arable land. This will allow for consolidation of arable
holdings to a commercially viable size at the same time as the
structural constraints on commerical agriculture become pro-
gressively less as a result of economic growth. Commercial
agriculture should thus be seen as the culmination of a process of
increasing viability of a homeland like the Ciskei. Until such
viability has increased (which seems fairly unlikely under present
political and economic. conditions in the wider South African
context), land tenure reform does not seem a viable option. The
likely social and economic disruption will not be counterbalanced by
adequate agricultural gains.
Agricultural development should rather be seen as a long-term
project, related to the improvement of the quality of life of rural
communities. As their general quality of life improves, so people
will be able to commit more of their resources and energy to
agriculture than at present.
Some possible starting points for improving
standard of living, which could also be of
agriculture, are:
rural
di rect
com munties'
benefit to
a) Improved access to water. This could involve the placing of .
a few windmills throughout rural residential areas, and the
possible subsidization of water tanks for households able to
afford them. This would save time spent on fetching water,
promote health conditions and make' limited irrigation of
gardens possible .. Such limited irrigation could be made more
effective through the introduction of trench gardening.
b) Improved transport facilities. People would have access to
a wider range of goods and services, both commercial and
agricultural, at more competitive prices. Local markets, as
well as social services such as hospitals and secondary
schools, would also be more readily accessible.
c) Improved access to credit. The provision of credit
facilities, whether for agricultural or other purposes, makes
the planning of a household budget easier. People might
pledge stock as collateral or might invest in savings clubs, or
in Tribal Authority-managed credit organizations, where qebts
could be repaid by providing labour for Tribal Authority
undertakings, such as repairing roads or fences.
d) Improved health services. A healthier community would be
better able to study, earn and cultivate.
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e) The provision of short, intensive trammg courses in optimal
use of scarce agricultural resources in trench gardening and
other techniques of water utilization and in household budget
planning.
As these suggestions do not relate only to agriculture, the burden of
their cost and organization would not fall only on the Department
of Agriculture and Forestry, but would be spread more evenly
throughout the Ciskei administration. Their successful implementation
will require the Ciskei administration to make a substantial
com mitt ment to its rural constituency, and to mount this
committment as an inter-Departmental undertaking.
The investment by the Ciskei government in the meeting of the
basic needs of its rural population should be seen as a long-term
investment in the increasing economic viability of future generations.
While the agricultural benefits of such a policy may take longer to
materialize, the political benefits to the Ciskei leadership would be
much more immediate, in the form of increased support and
political stability.
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6 Institutional Health Care Delivery and
Community Health - R.j. Fincham
1 Introduction
The study of health and health care in Southern Africa is many
dimensional, with considerable variation in both the levels of health
and the extent of health care available to different communities. In
the present chapter the concern is with levels of health and services
available to homeland communities such as that of the Ciskei. In
particular, the Amatola communities are considered in order to
highlight problems and prospects of health care in homeland
environments.
By way of introducing the material, a cursory look is taken at the
disease patterns which afflict various socio-economic communities in
South Africa. It is argued that white South Africans suffer from
diseases of affluence, as do a proportion of urban blacks in the
common area, while the majority of blacks in the common area and
the homelands are plagued by infectious diseases coupled with mal-
nutrition. The question arises as to how successfully health services
in the homelands - the particular concern of this chapter - are
meeting the task of curbing infectious diseases and combating
malnutrition. To attempt an answer to the above question, some
measure of community health in the present case is essential, and
nutritional conditions, especially among young children, will be used
as a surrogate measure of the level of health. Concentrating on the
nutritional status of a community's youth to portray health
conditions is vindicated by the knowledge that it is their level of
health which provides a sound impression of the future human
potential of the community.
Another issue to consider as a backdrop to the empirical work, is
that of the structure of the health care system. The homeland
system is considered briefly so that possible shortfalls in the system
can be highlighted and suggestions made .for improving it. In this
way, the chapter will seek to portray not only aspects of health in a
homeland environment, but also how the delivery of health care does
or can influence levels of health.
The actual study and evaluation of the nutritional status of Amatola
children will include a discussion of the incidence of malnutrition,
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possible causal factors for nutritional status, the impact of the
existing health services on the incidence of malnutrition, and
possible intervention strategies which may be employed to
ameliorate unsatisfactory conditions where necessary.
2 Health and Disease in South Africa
A great deal of evidence collected in the various regions of the
world suggests that two fairly distinct cycles of disease patterns
can be discerned on a global scale. Industrial and post-industrial
societies are more prone to high incidences of chronic and
degenerative diseases, while in agrarian societies, infectious and
parasitic diseases together with malnutrition, predominate. These two
cycles are depicted in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Infectious and Chronic Disease Models
INFECTIOUS DISEASE MODEL.....------....
HIGH FERTILITY
AGRARIAN CULTURAL INFLUENCE
\(
HIGH MORTALITY OF 65 YEARS AND OLDER ~% •
PRESCHOOL CHILOREN
ALL DEATHS
34% LESS THAN 5 YEARS OLD 21 YEARS AND UNDER. 52%-
\
ALNUTRITION OF PRESCHoJL
CHILD CONTRIBUTES TO,
1 INFECTIOUS DISEASES
2 PARASITIC PROBLEMS
(no spe:::d,c treatment)
CHRONIC DISEASE MODEL.....------....
INDUSTRIAL AND POST -INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
I
LIFE STYLES
SOCIETY /
. LEISURE TIME
. AFFLUENCE
CHANGING VALUES
\
MORTALITY
ALL DEATHS.
51% 65 YEARS AND OLDER
\
LOW FERTILITY
65 YEARS AND OLDER. 8%~
21 YEARS AND UNDER. 40%'"
'",0",' 0'"'''' /
1 . CORONARY HEART DISEASE
2 . CANCER
3 DRuG ABUSE
4 . ACCIDENTS
5 HYPERTENSION-STROKE
6 ALCOHOLISM
7 . DENTAL PATHOLOGY
B PROBLEMS OF NEWBORN INFANT
Source: Pyle (1979, p.20)
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While certainly not restricted to the elderly, the degenerative and
.chronic diseases consisting of "new growths" in the form of
carcinomas (cancer) and cardiovascular degeneration. are associated
with the process of ageing. Certain kinds of degenerative diseases
can be caused indirectly by more affluent styles of living in an
industrialized society. Additional factors leading to chronic diseases
include stress, air pollution, diet, and excessive consumption of
alcohol and tobacco. Infectious and parasitic diseases, on the other
hand, are endemic in as much as two-thirds of the Third World's
population, although they are also prevalent among the poor of the
industrialized nations.l, 2 ,3 Micro-organisms which depend on the
human host for survival are responsible for many of these illnesses
which include cholera, measles, infectious hepatitis, malaria, sleeping
sickness, tuberculosis and a host of intestinal diseases. If a person is
malnourished, these diseases take on more serious proportions,
causing a greater breakdown of disease resistance and increased
rates of morbidity and mortality.4, 5,6
In South Africa, the two cycles both appear to be well established
along largely racial lines. Whites fall prey to the diseases of
affluence and longevity, while the blacks are subject largely to
infectious and parasitic diseases, along with malnutrition. The
incidence of disease mortality for these two groups (whites and
blacks) in South Africa is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2 : Causes of Mortality in South Africa : Blacks and Whites
BLACKS
Source: After Dick & Bourne. (1978)
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WHITES 2,0%
While infectious and parasitic diseases account for almost a quarter
of all mortality in blacks, the comparable figure for whites is only
twenty per cent. On the other hand, neoplasms (cancers) and
circulatory diseases (especially ischaemic heart disease), responsible
for a further twenty per cent of black mortality, account for over
two-thirds of mortality in the white group.
The sharp contrast between the disease incidence of the two groups
is very marked. However, the situation is more complex than the two
pie charts suggest. Urban blacks in established metropolitan areas
are increasingly taking on a pattern of disease which mimics that of
whites. Improving socio-economic conditions mean that basic food
requirements are met, but diets are not necessarily conducive to
dealing with the more sedentary life style or its associated stresses.
Yet other urban black.s, especially those in squatter camps, continue
to suffer from the ravages of infectious and parasitic disease. In the
rural and urban homeland environments the diseases of poverty
continue to plague the population. Closer settlements established to
house people repatriated from white South Africa (often referred to
as the "common area") as a result of government policy are other
at-risk environments in the homelands. There is usually little
employment opportunity in these settlements and no agricultural
activity is undertaken either.
A hospital-based study undertaken in 1975 in the Transkei and the
Ciskei indicates that the incidence of diseases of the ci rculatory
system and neoplasms (cancerous growths) and classed as
degenerative or chronic was low, while that of infectious and
parasitic diseases along with malnutrition was high/ Over eight and
a half thousand patients were seen from twelve hospitals and two
factors emerged very strongly. Over sixty per cent of male patients
and forty. per cent of female patients were under ten years of age. In
excess of sixty per cent of diseases fell into three classes (according
to the international classification of disease categories), namely
digestive, communicable and respiratory. Closer analysis reveals these
to be infectious and parasitic diseases associated with agrarian
cultures, as depicted in Figure 1.
Numerous other studies done in homeland areas confirm the general
trend established in the above survey. The Ciskei Commission ReportS
came to the conclusion that infant mortality was high and
malnutrition widespread with rural areas more disadvantaged than
urban areas. Work undertaken by Thomas in the Keiskammahoek
area 9, 10 suggests that, according to accepted measures for
calculating present nutritional states, fourteen per cent of very young
children and up to sixty-eight per cent of older children aged 7 to 8
years of age were undernourished. Rural children were found to be
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worse off than their urban counterparts. Even within the rural
homeland context, health conditions vary on a micro-level depending
on the nature of the community under study.' Access to employment
and financial resources are important constituents for better health
levels. Thomas suggests that povertYJ together with social dislocation
at the household level caused by migrancy and desertion of
households by breadwinners, are key factors responsible for
households with malnourished children and other health problems.
A 1982 study of a closer settlement called Tsweletswele near
Mdantsane revealed that forty-three per cent of young children suffered
from malnutrition; while ten per cent of the children were sufferin&
from frank kwashiorkor .11 While rural areas may be less favourably
placed as regards the health of their people, clearly the closer
settlements are zones of severe problems within homeland environ-
ments.
3 The Structure of Homeland Health Services
The per capita expenditure by the public sector on health in the
Ciskei is approximately R17, or one-third of that spent in white South
Africa,! 2 reflecting the budgetary constraints as a whole within the
territory. The money is used to finance a service structured
specifically for homeland environments.13 The structure of the
service is depicted in Figure 3. The largest regional hospital in the
Ciskei, the Cecilia Makiwane Hospital, is located at Mdantsane. This
hospital provides the most sophisticated services within the Ciskei;
but, although the more than 200 000 urban inhabitants benefit from
ready access to the hospital, its geographical location, peripheral to
the rest of the Ciskei, is a great disadvantage. In terms of rural
population concentration. the central reaches 'of the Ciskei have the
greatest numbers of inhabitants14 and, therefore, these inhabitants
and those in the northern areas have relatively poor access to the
hospital.
Four regional hospitals located at Peddie, Keiskammahoek, Alice and
Mt. Coke represent the second tier of services available. In all cases,
hospital facilities are heavily used and there is much evidence to
suggest that they fail to provide for all those patients who could
make use of them. Distance, in particular, is a crucial variable which
restricts the access of potential patients to hospital services. Only
those within walking distance, those who are able to catch a bus or
who can afford expensive transport by taxi, or those who have time
to catch a train (to Lovedale Hospital in Alice or to Cecilia
Makiwane Hospital in Mdantsane) make use of the facilities. In a
study undertaken in the Alice area,! 5 it was found that forty per cent
of all patients to the Lovedale Hospital came from within a radius
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of five filometres from the hospital and fifty-six per cent from within a
ten kilometre radius; eighty-five per cent of all patients were no further
than twenty kilometres from the hospital, a distance which, however
difficult, is still possible to walk on foot in a day. The origin of
patients coming to the hospital in July 1978 is depicted in Figure 4.
On the assumption that a twenty kilometre radius around a hospital
represents the tributary area of the majority of the hospitals'
patients, it is possible to calculate the approximate number of rural
inhabitants that do not have access to hospital services, and fall
outside such radii. If the hospital to be built at Sada is included,
then approximately thirty per cent of rural people have very limited
or no access to hospital services.16
Figure 3: Structure of Homeland Health Services
C. TERTIARY LEVEL
REGIONAL HOSPITAL
With comprehensive specialist
services and training facilities
B. SECONDARY LEVEL
HEALTH. WARD HOSPITAL
1. At general practitioner level
2. With limited specialist
service and training
A. PRIMARY LEVEL
1. CENTRAL CLINIC
2. SATELITE CLI NIC
(where indicated)
3. SUB. Cl!NIC
@]
o
•
Source: Official Yearbook of the Reoublic of South Africa, (1976, p.649)
Since the road network in rural areas is often inadequate,
improvements in the transportation network would promote access to
hospitals, provided hospital transport is available to take people to
hospital when necessary. Funding for infrastructural improvements is,
however, limited and is likely to remain so. As a result, most
people seeking medical care in rural areas have to make use of
clinic facilities - the primary level of service offered (as shown in
Figure 3). The research done around Alice suggests that people will
go greater distances for better levels of medical care. In the study
of villagers' attitudes to medical care in the area surrounding Alice,
it was found that over fifty per cent of the sample, on first becoming
ill, went straight to a hospital. Only one-fifth went to the nearest
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available clinic, while the rest either frequented traditional
praCtitiOners, private doctors and chemists or did not seek any
medical help at all. The influence of clinics does appear to be
restricted in its geographical extent. Furthermore, the attitude and
degree of commitment of the clinic staff also influence attendance
at clinics; as well as the impact of the clinic within the community
on matters such as family planning and health education. The clinics
must therefore be viewed as an important part of the health care
structure, since they provide the means of providing services down
to the local community level.
A serious problem affecting the efficient functioning of the various'
tiers of the health system is the poor infrastructural development.
Many communities, especially those in the rural areas, can only be
reached by gravel roads which tend to deteriorate markedly unless
continually serviced by the roads department. Since such mainte-
nance is sporadic at best, hospital vehicles which convey people
from village clinics to hospitals and also take hospital teams into
rural areas, soon succumb to the tortuous road conditions. Vehicle
failure and accidents are commonplace occurrances and village
communities can find themselves cut off from institutional services
for long periods of time. During the survey done at Tsweletswele,
hospital records showed that the community had not been visited for
a period of eight weeks on one occasion because all hospital
vehicles had broken down.
The following factors emerge from the discussion so far. Firstly,
infectious and parasitic diseases along with malnutrition, seem to
characterise the black communities in South Africa as opposed to
degenerative and chronic illnesses, or the illnesses of affluence,
which predominate in the white communities. However, a distinction
can be made between the urban and homeland black communities
with conditions being less satisfactory in the homeland communities.
Here, the diseases of poverty appear to be endemic. Secondly, the
institutionalised structure of the homeland or independent state
health care system seems, in theory, to be adequate. In practice
access to facilities is restricted. Public transport is minimal and
since people often have to make the journey to facilities on foot, a
strong distance decay function is evident. Roads tend to be poorly
developed, especially to more remote communities in the homeland
environment, so that hospital services to these communities often
break down and the communities have to fall back on their own
resources.
It is against this background that health levels in the Amatola
Basin, as measured specifically by the nutritional status of the
children, is analysed in the following sections.
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4 Health Conditions in the Amatola Basin
A. Health and Nutritional Conditions in the Basin
The Basin has a central clinic located at Komkhulu. If the clinic is
unable to treat a serious case, that case in theory is referred to
the regional hospital, St Matthew's, which is situated just outside
Keiskammahoek, a distance of about thirty kilometres.
Discussions with the mat ron at St Matthew's show that a team of
two sisters visit the clinic once a month. A doctor is supposed to
make a monthly call, but according to the matron, staff shortages
preclude such a visit. Furthermore, the lack of vehicles and the high
rate of vehicle failure means that the ambulance service from St
Matthew's to the clinic is poor. In bad weather hospital vehicles do
not even attempt the journey into the Basin, no matter how urgent
the need of the Basin communities. In such emergencies the
residents of the Basin have to rely on relatives or taxis to transport
them to the hospital.
The Komkhulu Clinic, in common with facilities of its kind, provides
antenatal care, child care, domiciliary visits and aids for minor
ailments. Records are kept for all patients visiting the clinic. The
child care programme for children under the age of two years
appears to be well implemented and most children in this age
category are seen on a regular basis by the clinic staff. According
to the clinic sisters, a key factor influencing the nutritional status
of the young children is that of drought. During periods of no rain,
crop yields fall off considerably or are non-existent and stock lose
what little condition they may have had. During the period of
extreme food scarcity a sharp increase in the number of kwashior-
kor cases occurs, especially if household finances do not allow for
purchases of food. The amount of rain may be equally important in
dictating the availability of suitably clean drinking water. Stone17 has
shown that in Tsweletswele (the Chalumna/Hamburg area of the Ciskei),
ninety per cent of the water for human consumption comes from
sources shared. with domestic animals. Polluted water, exacerbated
by. no recharge from rainwater, is likely to promote gastro-enteritis
and other infectious diseases which, in combination with malnutrition,
increase mortality among the young .
••
Table 1 provides a record of Amatola children with malnutrition
from January 1977 to October 1981. The number of cases increases
substantially in 1979 and 1981. Although adequate rains fell in
October and November of 1979, the period prior to it and thereafter
was dry. The number of malnutrition cases does at first appear to
be related to the period of limited rainfall. Figure 5 explores the
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relationships between rainfall and the number of malnourished
children. The high incidence of malnutrition is reflected in a
correspondingly low rainfall. Erratic but higher rainfall in 1981
corresponds to a decrease in the number of malnourished children. The
relationship between rainfall, harvest and the availability of clean
drinking water and nutritional status is complex, and other factors
may also play their part. However, the data do suggest that water
availability is an important influence, either di rectly or indirectly, on
the nutritional status of children in rural homeland communities.
B Dietary Patterns
Incomes are low in the Basin so that children are brought up in a
spartan environment. An analysis of the food most often consumed
in the household, (Figures 6 and 7), testifies to the availability of a
very limited range of basic foodstuffs. A delicate balance also must
exist between sufficient and insufficient food in the household.
Mealiemeal is the staple family food in the Basin and is supple-
mented by flour and samp which are items usually purchased from
cash incomes and migrant remittances. During periods of crop
failure even the mealiemeal is bought. Bought mealiemeal is very
refined when compared with the home grown and ground product.
The essential roughage and minerals are therefore removed f rom the
diet at a period when these are most needed. Meat is consumed in
very limited quantities so that the average adult diet is high in
carbohydrates and low in protein. Figure 7 also ,suggests that
essential vegetables are available to very few households, so that
vitamin deficiency from a diet low in vegetables is likely. Soups, tea
and coffee and sugar make up the remainder of a limited diet.
Paraffin is used as a source of energy for cooking and most households
us~ wood for heating. As the price of paraffin increases, so wood
becomes more crucial as a source of energy for cooking as well as
heating of the home. Drought and attendant poor harvests may well
bring on kwashiorkor and additional hardship for the household.
Other factors will play a vital role in dictating whether the child
remains healthy or not during periods of scarce community
resources. If the mother is home and fit and breastfeeding her baby,
the child may be nutritionally sound even during periods of food
scarcity. Children left in the care of unsuitable guardians while the
parents have to migrate in search of work opportunities outside the
Basin may not be so fortunate.
Access to clinic and hospital services may also help in times of
need. In this respect those people in Komkhulu may be thought to
be at an advantage since the clinic is in their village: their children
may be better off than those in remote villages within the Basin.
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Figure 6 : Food Consumed During the Last Evening Meal
(july 1981)
Percentage of Households
91%
6% c=J
samp, mealiemeal
and/or bread
vegetable
and/or fruit
meat
Source: Bekker et al (1981, p.34)
Figure 7 Shopping Basket: "Bought During the Past 14 Days" (july 1981)
Commodities bought for Household
- Percentage of Households
I gr."Io'-------------------Flour, mealiemeal. samp
- bought in bulk from 25kg to 100kg
Sugar _________________ 1 90"l,
Tea and/or Coffee _______________ 1 78%
Soup 31%
Vegetables ______ /30%
I 72%~-------------Paraffin
- small and large quantities: I to 20 litres
Source: 8ekker er al (198ta, p.34)
C An Assessment of Health Problems in the Basin
In terms of the present study, three statements are made as the
basis for analyzing health problems in the Basin.
1 On the assumption that the St Matthew's Hospital Nutrition
Clinic records reflect nutritional conditions of children in the
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Basin as a whole, the present nutritional status of the children
should be satisfactory, but their long- term nutritional status,
poor.
2 Nutritional status may vary from the central village of
Komkhulu outwards to the more remote villages of the Basin.
The contention to be tested here is that the clinic can have a
positive impact on the level of health of inhabitants in its
immediate surroundings through educational programmes and
activities, as well as its more ready access to those in close
proximity.
3 Nutritional status of the Basin's children will depend on
socio-economic conditions within individual households.
To test the above issues a nutritional survey as outlined below was
undertaken. A team of qualified sisters undertook the fieldwork for
the survey which consisted of taking a series of body measurements
of all children under five years of age and comparing these
with a set of international norms which indicated the nutritional
status of the children. Present nutrition is measured using the age
dependent weight- for- age measures: a child who falls below the
third percentile of weight-for-age on the National Center for Health
Statistics Percentiles (NCHS); or in other words, has failed to obtain
eighty per cent of his/her expected weight- for- age, is regarded as being
at risk to malnutrition. Such a child is considered to be suffering
from wasting, a process occurring because of energy deficits and
inadequate protein intake.1B, 19 Long-term nutrition is measured by
using the height- for- age measure: a child who falls below the third
percentile of height- for- age or the NCHS norm, or ninety per cent of
expected height- for- age, is regarded as being stunted. Stunt ing is a
resuit of a child growing up in an environment of food scarcity over
a long period of time.
In addition to these anthropometric measurements, a series of
questions was asked about socio-economic conditions in each
household surveyed. These included finding out whether the mothers
and fathers were permanently at home or were migrants; who
looked after the child most of the time; whether or not the child
was breast fed, and for how long in the case of those fed; and
whether clinic and hospital facilities were utilized.
In all, a total of 181 questionnaires were completed, supplying
anthropometric measurements of 225 children, of which 117 or fifty-
two per cent were male, and 108 or forty-eight per cent were female. The
socio-economic status of the households of the 181 respondents was
analyzed along with the anthropometric measurements. These
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children came from five of the thirteen villages in the Basin and
are regarded as being representative of Basin conditions as a whole.
D Nutritional Status of Children in the Amatola Basin
Tables 2 and 3 indicate the results of the assessment of the
nutritional status of the children.
Table 2: Present Nutritional Status of Surveyed Children:
Number and Percentage of Children below 3rd Percentile
Weight for Age, NCHS Norms (November 1981)
Percentile
<3
3-25
25-50
)50
TOTAL
No of Children
29
80
60
54
223
% of Children
13
36
27
24
100
31
100
% of Child.
56
10
3
< 3
Table 3: Long Term Nutritional Status of Surveyed Children:
Number and Percentage of Children below 3rd Percentile
Height for Age NCHS Norms (November 1981)
Children Aged Children Aged
o to 24 mnths 24 to 72 mnths
Percentile No. of Child. % of Child. No. of Child.
35 32 62
36 33 11
15 14 3
22 21 34
108 100 110
3-25
25-50
>50
TOTAL
The present nutritional status, as indicated in Table 2, is satisfactory
if one adopts the criteria of Brown and Brown,2 0 who suggest that
when more than fifteen per cent of children in a community fall below
the third percentile a serious problem exists. Whereas thirteen per cent
of the children are at risk to wasting, approximately one-third of
children under the age of two are stunted and the figure rises to
nearly sixty per cent for the children aged three to five years. Clearly,
the long-term nutritional conditions indicate that, overall, these Basin
children grow up in environments of food scarcity. Various factors,
such as ample subsistence foods because of adequate rains, or
household income through the sale of stock. and migrant remittances,
may account for the satisfactory present nutritional status of the
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children. Stunting, on the other hand, emphasises the problems of
poor communities, where environmental problems (drought) and
socio-economic difficulties (insufficient income through lack of
migrant remittances, for example) can quickly and radically affect
nutritional and health conditions.
It was postulated that the central village of Komkhulu may have
better nourished children SInce the clinic and other Basin
infrastructure is concentrated here. Table 4 shows the present
nutritional status of the children broken down by village. Komkhulu
does have the lowest percentage of children under the third
percentile and the greatest percentage above the 50th percentile.
These differences from the other villages are statistically significant
(p 0,5), as shown by simple chi-squared analysis. Table 4 shows that
the other villages, in order of distance from Komkhulu, have
children with similar nutrition. If the clinic has an influence on
child nutrition, it is limited to the immediate precincts of the
clinic.
Table 4: Present Nutritional Status of Children by Village (November 1981)
Village Present Nutritional Status of Children (Weight for Age)
.o::3P 3-25 25-50P >50P TOTAL
Row Row Row Row Row
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
Komkhulu 1 3 13 32 8 21 17 44 39 100
Matinese 9 16 18 33 15 27 13 24 55 100
Mdeni 6 20 12 40 8 28 4 13 30 100
Mkobeni 6 12 15 31 16 33 12 24 49 100
Dish 7 14 22 44 13 26 8 16 50 100
TOTAL 29 13 80 36 60 27 54 24 223 100
If one considers the wider role of the clinic in health care, then
one finds from the survey results that ninety-three per cent of all respon-
dents claimed that children under their care attended the clinic on
a regular basis or were seen by clinic staff who make domiciliary
calls to all villages. However, the problem of distance precludes
many clinic services permeating more remote regions of the Basin.
The clinic has facilities for the delivery of babies and these are
well used by mothers of Komkhulu and the nearby villages of Mdeni
and Matinise (less than two km. from Komkhulu); thirty-seven per
cent, twenty-nine per cent and fifty-seven per cent respectively of
all children surveyed in these villages were born at the clinic. On
the other hand, the two villages remote from the clinic, Mkhobeni
and Dish had only seven per cent and twenty per cent respectively
of . children born, delivered at the clinic. Altogether seventy-seven
(46%) of respondents stated that children under their care had been
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delivered in a hospital. The number of births at St Matthew's
hospital at Keiskammahoek (15% of all deliveries) and at the
Lovedale Hospital at Alice (30% of deliveries) point to many
mothers "leap frogging" the clinic facilities, in favour of hospitals,
for the delivery of their children. Unfortunately, it was not possible
to ascertain whether or not the survival rate of children born at
hospitals was higher than that of children born at. clinics. The
policy of the clinic staff is to transfer, if possible, potentially
difficult births to the hospitals, so that children born at the clinic
should not necessarily be worse off than hospital-born children.
The influence of the clinic may be more important in the area of
health and nutritional education. If this is so,. then attitudes towards
child health, for example, in the issue of breast feeding, may be
more positive in Komkhulu than elsewhere in the Basin. Table 5
shows the average number of months that babies are breastfed in
the different villages.
Table 5: Attitudes to Breastfeeding (November 1981)
No. of Responses Average No. of Months
Child on Breast
TOTAL
23
18
22
36
30
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Komkhulu
Mdeni
Mkhobeni
Matinise
Dish
16,2
17,2
16,1
18,7
~
Average 17,3
No significant difference exists between villages in the length of
time children are breastfed. The length of time that mothers
breastfeed, rather than reflecting the clinics' attempts to promote
breastfeeding in favour of bottlefeeding, is probably a result of
cultural attitudes to feeding and the inherent knowledge of mothers
that breastfeeding is good for their children.
In another area of clinic service, the dispensing of contraceptives to
mothers, more mothers use contraceptives in Komkhulu than do
mothers in other villages. The injection whose merits are
debatable because of the side effects reported by many users - is
the contraceptive method most widely used. Two-thirds of Komkhulu
mothers used the injection, representing eighty-seven per cent of all
contraceptive users. Few contraceptive users are found in the more
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remote villages such as Dish, where six per cent of mothers use
clinic-dispensed contraceptives. Clearly, in the area of contraception
proximity to the clinic has had an impact on a health-related issue.
E Nutritional Status and Household Socio-Economic Conditions
These features of household conditions are considered briefly in this
section to provide some insight into the types of condition which
may influence nutritional status. The first factor is that of the role
of the parents in the household - whether they are at home and
employed or not, whether they are migrants and living away from
their child(ren) and whether they have deserted the family and no
longer contribute to the affairs of the household. Second is that of
the impact that cultivating lands may have: do families that
cultivate subsistence crops have better nourished children than those
families who are landless or who do not cultivate for some reason
or other? Thirdly, the influence of family cash income and its
relation to the nutritional status of the children is examined.
Table 6 presents the nutritional status of children; according to the
roles of mothers and fathers in the households. While the majority
of children are found in homes in which the mother is home but
unemployed, the nutritional status of those children does not vary
markedly from those in which the mother is home and employed, a
migrant, has deserted the family, or "other" (e.g. has died).
Similarly, the majority of children have migrant fathers - only a
very few of whom have actually deserted their households - and. this
group of children does not seem to vary markedly in their
nutritional status from children in any of the other categories.
Whether parents are home, working away or have deserted the
household does not appear to alter dramatically the nutritional
status of children - grandparents or other community relatives step
in to look after the child as well as can be expected, given the
resources available to them.
Table 7, comparing the nutritional status of children from homes
which cultivate crops such as maize on a regular basis and those
which do not, shows that crop cultivation does not playa major role
in nutritional status. In percentage terms, as many children fall
under the critical third percentile in households which cultivate, as
they do in those which do not cultivate.
Table 8, assessing family income and nutritional status, is the most
important of the three in this section. There appears to be some
correlation between income and nutritional status, with significantly
better nutritional conditions being registered among the children who
come from higher income families. Data were available for only 103
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Table 6: Mothers' and Fathers' Status in the Home and Nutritional
Status of Children (November 1981)
Parents' Present Nutritional Status of Children (Weight for Age)
Role in
Household
<3P 3-25 25-50 >50 Row Total
No Row % No Row % No Row % No Row % No Row %
(i) Mother
Home and
employed 2 13 6 37 4 25 4 25 16 100
Home and
unemployed 17 12 49 33 45 31 35 24 146 100
Migrant/
deserted 6 14 17 40 7 16 13 30 43 100
Other 4 22 8 45 4 22 2 11 18 100
TOTAL 29 13 80 36 60 27 54 24 223
(ij) Father
Home and
employed 6 6 36 29 29 17 100
Home and
unemployed 6 6 38 31 4 25 16 100
Migrant/
deserted 23 14 55 34 47 29 37 23 162 100
Other 4 14 13 46 3 11 8 29 28 100- -
TOTAL 29 13 80 36 60 27 54 24 223
Table 7: The Cultivation of Crops and Nutritional Status of Children (November 1981)
Whether
Households
Cultivated
1980/81
Yes
No
TOTAL
Present Nut ritional Status of Children (Weight for age)
.:::3P 3-25 25-50 )50 Total
No % No % No % No % No %
18 13 57 41 35 25 30 21 140 100
10 13 22 29 24 31 21 27 77 100- - -
28 13 79 36 59 27 51 24 221 100
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children but it is sufficient to show that the children under the
third percentile are found in households with incomes of less than
RlOO per month. If one assumes that children below the third
percentile are at high risk to malnutrition and that those falling
between the third and twenty-fifth percentiles are mildly
malnourished, then almost half (47%) of children in households
earning less than RsO are inadequately nourished; fifty per cent fall
into these categories where monthly household income is between
Rsl .to RlOO; thirty-nine per cent of children from households
earning more than RlOl monthly, fall into these two lower percen-
tile categories. Thirty-nine per cent represents a significantly lower
percentage (significance level, 0,5) of cases in these two categories,
when household income exceeds RlOO per month. Family income
does, therefore; appear to be important to sound nutritional status.
Table 8: Family Cash Income and Nutritional Status of Children (November 1981)
F Pulling the Threads Together
Results
An Assessment of the Survey
In Section C, three statements were used as a basis for presenting
the survey results. The analysis of the survey results suggest:
1. The present nutritional status of the Basin children at the
time of the survey was satisfactory. Long-term nutrition was
however, much poorer indicating that children of the Basin are
brought up in an environment of food scarcity.
2. The presence of the clinic does seem to have a pOS1tIVe
impact on certain aspects of community health-related issues,
e.g. nutritional status and family planning. While the impact
is not dramatic, it does suggest that state- funded services are
a necessity in resource-poor areas.
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3. The overriding factor which dictates nutritional condition is
the level of household income. Malnutrition is a disease of
poverty and where families manage to raise the level of their
income, the level of child nutrition is also improved.
5 Conclusion : The Role of Intervention in the Amatola Basin
The glaring lack of adequate infrastructure in the Basin suggests
that it is here that intervention must concentrate, in order to
affect nutrition and health conditions positively, in the long-term.
An improved road network, for example, can help to move seriously
ill people from the Basin' to the clinic at Komkhulu and, if
necessary, to hospitals outside the Basin. The clinic itself is unable
to cover, all the needs of the Basin people and satellite clinics at
the Basin may prove beneficial. Since funds for such expansion are
likely to be extremely limited, an alternative strategy may be to
draw more fully on community resources: a village health-worker
approach could dramatically increase the penetration of health
services down to the village level.
With regard to the village health-worker concept, the fact that
mothers and community members are able to maintain satisfactory
nutritional levels amongst children can be used as a positive factor.
Women, a major community resource, can be trained to use already
hard-pressed resources even more efficiently. On visits to the Basin
one came across families who were using green vegetables, such as
cabbage~ in combination with maize to provide nutritious family
meals. Other households with similar resources were wont to cook
the maize on its own - a much less nutritious meal. The diffusion of
nutrition and hygiene information to less informed community
members can be undertaken by innovative community members
adequately motivated and brought into the ambient of the health
services.
These infrastructural improvements cannot by themselves totally
preclude malnutrition from the Basin. Institutional aid is necessary
in the form of appropriate agricultural extension services and
co-operation with communities. Agricultural potential must be more
fully realised for those who do, and under the right circumstances
would, cultivate the land. Even more fundamental than such institu-
tional intervention, is that which will see families increasing the
overall cash household income. To do so requires a serious
reappraisal of overall rural development strategies and the problems
which force family members to migrate in search of opportunities
elsewhere in order to channel money back to their Basin homes.
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7 The Ardri-Gencor Rural Development Project in
the Amatola Basin 1979-1983 - S.B. Bekker
During 1978 the General Mining Corporation of South Africa
(GENCOR) com rnissioned the Agricultural and Rural Development
Research Institute at the University of Fort Hare (ARDRI) to
undertake an extended rural development project in the Ciskei. After
an attempt to locate the project elsewherel, ARDRI launched it in
the Amatola Basin in July of 1979. At the time of writing this
chapter (1984), the GENCOR development grant had expired2 while
ARDRI project initiatives in the Basin continued. Permission to
construct a permanent ARDRI office in Komkhulu, had been
obtained though construction had yet to commence.
The aim of this chapter is to attempt a broad assessment of the
impact of project activities on members of the Amatola Basin
community. To monitor the development of such a project in a
comprehensive way is not at present possible. Not only has an
extraordinary drought ravaged the Basin during 1982 but project
initiatives continue and substantially more time is needed before a
satisfactory evaluation can be made. This general assessment will be
made on the basis of two independent criteria: first, a rural
development st rategy can fruitfully be understood and assessed as a
relationship between a government, an intervening agency and a
rural community; secondly, such a strategy's impact can be
analysed in terms of changes within a rural community of produc-
tive activities (such as cultivation and cottage industries), of public
consumption (such as health care, transport, and education), and of
organisation (such as local government and marketing arrangements).
1 The Aims of the Project
Based on available documentation and information', it would seem
that the general objective of the project was to promote rain-fed
(rather than irrigated) cultivation in the Amatola Basin. This was to
be done by way of a "people-orientated programme" that would spread
project inputs over the community at large, and would not therefore
simply identify needs for the provision of additional infrastructure.
In short, the project aimed to stimulate grass-roots development,
"frbm the bottom up".
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'::Pfi-ere'were, implicitly at least, two main justifications for this
a:ppfo~ch~ During the 1970s, the Ciskei government had adopted a
rural development policy that aimed to provide substantial capital
and managerial expertise to a carefully selected number of
promising rural areas. In these areas, the intention was that modern
large-scale agricultural practices would ensure economically viable
forms of production.4 In practice, these capital-intensive agricultural
schemes have met, at best, with moderate success with regard to
both viable production and a demonstration effect in the eyes of
rural households.5 They have also required sophisticated and costly
methods of irrigation. In view of the fact that capital for
developmental investment remains in short supply and, more
importantly, that land which is potentially irrigable amounts to a
mere two percent, whereas land that can be cultivated by using rain
amounts to fifteen percent, of the Ciskei as a whole, a project
focussed upon this latter type of land appeared necessary.6
The second justification validating the community-oriented
grass-roots approach - is accepted by many rural development
analysts/ Simply put, the argument states that planning and
managerial inputs from the outside will be viewed with distrust by
insiders and will exacerbate passive and unco-operative attitudes
unless insiders are continually involved in planning, management and
the production process as a whole. In addition, the argument
continues, insiders often have knowledge of local conditions which
outsiders may well ignore. Local conditions, moreover, are of
particular relevance to projects involving family-based units of
cultivation - in this case, individual Amatola Basin households.
The choice of the Amatola Basin as the location of the project
reflects these two justifications. Both rainfall and soil quality are
relatively high in the Basin, and ARDRI at the University of Fort
Hare is situated close to the region, thereby facilitating liaison.
It is relevant to record that from the start of the ARDRI initiative,
the objective of the project, and project aims flowing from this
objective, suffered from ambiguity and lack of specification. In
1978, GENCOR requested from ARDRI a project plan "based on
agriculture as the only meaningful industry in the area'~8 ARDRI, on
the other hand, emphasized the community participation dimension
of an integrated rural development approach.9 This lack of consensuS- 0
between commissioning and development agency led to further
ambiguity at the level of project aims. In particular, whether
ARDRI should play a research or implementation role became an
issue of salience, and led to disagreements over who should play
project management roles in the different sub-projects.ll Though
the commissioning and development agencies were represented,
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together with Ciskei state officials, on a Project Steering Committee
(PSC) which held regular meetings,l 2 these ambiguities concerning
the very nature of the project persisted.
In the light of this situation, an analysis of the strategy followed by
ARDRI becomes important. ARDRI obtained formal permission from
the Ciskei Cabinet and the Tribal Authority in the Basin to launch
the project. The agency subsequently appointed a project manager
and community worker in the Basin, and maintained a staff of three
at the University of Fort Hare. During the initial stages of the
project, moreover, a Project Management Committee (PMC) was
created. This body was constituted by, and remained answerable to,
the Tribal Authority and included one man and one woman elected
by each of the thirteen Basin villages. Its role entails assisting the
Tribal Authority to assess and to ratify project initiatives and to
recommend new initiatives.13
The formal strategy comprises. three stages. The first which has
been completed, aimed to gather and compile information about the
Amatola Basin. Eight separate research projects were commissioned.
They covered the following fields of inquiry: soils; climate; geology;
vegetation; land use; grazing and browsing; fieldcrop, animal and
horticultural production; and the socio-economic situation of
residents. The second phase, which is being implemented at present,
comprises the land use and agricultural extension programmes. The
final phase which aims to implement programmes flowing from the
first two phases, had, as of the beginning of 1984, yet to be started.14
It is worth noting that project sponsorship has effectively expired
before this third phase of the project has made much headway.
2 Project Interventions15
Since project aims were not specified at the commencement of the
project, they will be identified through an analysis of those new
sets of activities initiated by the project. These sets of activities
will be classified as interventions relating to production, public
consumption, and organisation.
Six distinct interventions have aimed at stimulating production within
the Amatola Basin. Two of the six - the development of small
cottage industries run by women and producing garments and
drapery, and the development of a communal garden. under irrigation
producing vegetables which are then sold on local markets - have
been organised and developed most clearly by Amatola residents
themselves.
The cottage industries were established after discussions between
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the project community worker and a number of the womens' groups
active in Basin villages. A major aim of these activities is to
supplement participants' household cash incomes. As a result, the
endemic problem of finding and maintaining reliable market outlets
is particularly severe since the issue of demand was only faced
after the cottage industries had been started. A recent contract to
supply local children with school uniforms has partially alleviated
this situation.
The communal garden was launched after discussions between
ARDRI, the Tribal Authority and the PMC. A weir was constructed
on the Amatola River, furrows dug, and the garden laid out and
fenced off. Three paid local employees, a supervisor and two
workers, attend to the running of the garden in which men and
women f rom surrounding villages grow vegetables. Each cultivator
has the right to retain a fixed portion of their produce and the rest
is sold Iocally~ The gross income from the sale of vegetables accrues
to a community development fund over which the Tribal Authority
exercises authority.
The capital costs of this project and, until 1983 when sponsorship
expired, the wages of the three employees were covered by ARDRI.
As of 1983, on condition that the Ciskei government ratifies this
additional item on the Tribal Authority's proposed budget, the
Authority will take over the labour costs of the communal garden.
This had not taken place at the end of 1983.
Though book-keeping problems, unsatisfactory attempts to
incorporate a school-feeding scheme, and a shortfall on the annual
current account continue to be experienced by the project, local
participants, the Tribal Authority and ARDRI all retain optimism
and enthusiasm about its beneficial role and potential viability.
Two further interventions are aimed directly at the stimulation of
rain-fed cultivation in the Basin. Both rely heavily on the
introduction of external (ARDRI) management and expertise. The
firstJ which can be viewed as an agricultural extension initiative,
comprises the laying out and management of five demonstration and
trial plots in different parts of the Basin. Both summer and winter
crops - maize, vegetables, and potatoes; and winter wheat - are
produced. Local paid labour is employed and owners of the land
used receive that part of the relatively high yields which is not
required for research purposes. Three of the plots have recently
been taken over from ARDRI by another external agency managing
similar plots in other regions of rural Ciskei.
The second intervention took shape after ARDRI approached twenty
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Komkhulu landholders who together owned a single block of arable
land measuring some fifty hectare. Fences and trees within the
block were removed; state tractors were employed to plough,
fertilize, and plant the block under maize; and individual landholders
accepted responsibility for weeding and harvesting their individual
landholdings. In 1982/83, the Tribal Authority, rather than individual
landholders, obtained from the Ciskei Agricultural Promotion Loan
Fund an annual loan, which was administered by ARDRI, to cover the
costs of seed, ploughing and fertilizer.
During the 1981/82 and 1982/83 seasons, drought conditions and
serious deficiencies in state delivery of tractors. and other
agricultural services resulted in minimal harvests. In neither year
was maize marketed in a coherent fashion; costs for the first year
were borne by ARDRI and for the second by the Ciskei drought
relief fund. As.a result, both the Tribal Authority and a number of
land-holders have expressed reservations about the continuation of
the enterprise.
The last two production interventions relate directly to ARDRI's
identification of market outlets. Basin sheepfarmers have sold wool
through the main local trading store for a number of years. ARDRI
approached the major wool trading corporation in the Eastern Cape
and thereby established an improved institutional procedure for the
sale of wool produced in the Basin.l6
The second intervention is similar. ARDRI has, over the past few
years, undertaken research into yields from, and the marketing of,
perfume-yielding .plants. One species, known as khakibos -' grows
naturally in the Amatola Basin and ARDRI organised the collection
of substantial amounts of this plant by residents who were paid on
a piece-work basis for this short-term manual task which can be
repeated, at best, seasonally.
Project interventions aimed at improving public consumption in the
Amatola Basin have focussed upon improvements in the Basin's
infrastructure. Three have taken place, each of which has improved
the delivery of Ciskei state services to the Basin.
After gammg permission from village committees, ARDRI is
implementing a comprehensive programme of fencing off arable and
grazing lands. Local workers are employed and costs of labour and
material are borne by the Ciskei Department of Agriculture and
Forestry. A dipping tank has been established in the isolated
Highland region of the Basin. Some labour was supplied free by men
of the highland villages, and capital and other labour costs were
borne by the same Department.
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The third intervention was aimed at improvements in the system of
transportation. An additional weekly bus service has been introduced,
linking the South Valley of the Basin to Middledrift and Alice. In
addition, two scooters have been provided for the agricultural
extension officers resident in the Basin. Both improvements resulted
from direct ARDRI representations to the relevant state depart-
ments in Zwelitsha.
A fourth initiative, aimed at improvements in Basin infrastructure, is
being planned. ARDRI commissioned an independent agency to
undertake a hydrological survey of the Basin and plans to introduce,
with state support, a more efficient supply of clean water to
isolated villages. Pumps, reticulation pipes, and storage dams will be
employed to this end.
Interventions aimed at an improvement of the organisational
capabilities within the Basin are more difficult to itemise. The
creation of the PMC, the involvement of women's groups in cottage
industries, and the various new or renewed linkages between state
departments and the Basin community are examples. In particular,
ARDRI persuaded the Department of Agriculture and Forestry to
appoint a second agricultural extension officer in the Basin. One
official is responsible for stock-farming activities and the other for
cultivation.
3 Assessment
This overview of the differing interventions in the Amatola Basin
community by the project agency establishes two facts. The
separate goals which emerge from these experiments are disparate,
manifesting no visible trend toward an integrated and coherent
strategy. This is due, in all probability, to continuing ambiguity over
the main objective of the intervention. The approach has remained
essentially eclectic, most goals being chosen on the basis of
uncoordinated research results and, therefore, turning out to be
short-term.
In the second place, all interventions - with the possible exception
of public transport - do seem to address, directly or indirectly, the
issue of production. The separate goals of these interventions relate
either to improvements in agricultural infrastructure or, cottage
industries aside, to improvements in agricultural production.
The only clearly visible long-term strand in this eclectic strategy is
that of an improvement in the system of agricultural extension. The
primarily technical nature of this long-term goal, moreover, is
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illustrated by the demonstration and trial plots, by the external
managerial inputs into the large-scale maize cultivation. enterprise,
and by the rationalisation of the duties of local agricultural
extension officers. Concisely stated, the Amatola Basin project, to
date, has accepted improvements in agricultural production
rain-fed cultivation in particular - as its primary task and, to this
end~ has relied upon a continuing supply of technical expertise, onto
which a number of short-term, specific and disparate goals have
been grafted.
As a result of the primary focus on agricultural production, the
project did not consider as fundamental a number of issues of public
consumption which have been identified in this book: basic needs
critical to a dependent community which is largely young and
female. The environments of nutrition, health care, and education -
understood in terms both of the state delivery of services and of
community consciousness - are arguably the most important issues
confronting most Amatola households.
The espousal by ARDRI of a rural development strategy "from the
bottom up" immediately raises the issue of maintaining adequate
management structures. In implementing this strategy in the field of
agricultural production, ARDRI found itself increasingly taking over
managerial roles without a formalised programme aimed at
transferring these roles to resident organisations. The proposed
establishment of a permanent agency office in the Basin attests to
this. This lack of a formalised management program me is apparent
in ARDRl's continual negotiations with the Tribal Authority. Not
only is this body weak and ineffective (as was shown in Chapter 4)
but the constitution of the PMC, the only ARDRI managerial
intervention, as a committee responsible to, and dependent upon,
this Authority, weakened the effect of this intervention. The fact
that the future of the PMC is under questionl7 underlines the
weakness. It would seem that the long term managerial implication
of the various project initiatives, a central issue to debates between
proponents of alternative models of agricultural production,l8 have not
been planned adequately.
It has become clear that the project strategy implicitly aimed to
improve commercial agriculture. Its identification of two specific
market outlets and of credit facilities makes this aim manifest. The
Amatola Basin however, and the whole of the rural Ciskei for that
matter, can be characterised as being lacking in agricultural markets
during the past 100 years - for more than sufficient food has been
produced commercially in the white agricultural sector - and as
largely dependent upon industrially-processed staple foodstuffs
processed in the white industrial sector. In such a situation, an
146
agricultural development strategy that is not highly sensitive to
market structures and demand for commercial products, will have
minimal influence on potential producers. It would seem that a
long-term marketing strategy for Basin producers (cultivators, in
particular), once again a central issue to proponents of alternative
models of agricultural production, could have been given more
attention.
In conclusion, the project, to date, does not seem to have paid
attention to comprehensive strategies aimed at developing managerial
expertise within the community, or to the securing of markets to
stimulate demand for agricultural commoditites. On the other hand,
the series of technical agricultural inputs, and the new and renewed
linkages between the Ciskei government and the Amatola community,
if sustainable, will probably have piece-meal beneficial consequences
in the community.
The primacy of agricultural production within the strategy derived
from the initial aim set by GENCOR, and the lack of consensus on
the project objective, coupled with lack of definition regarding
ARDRI's role as research or implementation (management) agency,
all lessened the impact of project initiatives. As a result, projects
of a productive nature, undertaken during periods of drought, were
less tha~ successful, and projects of a public consumption nature,
arguably as fundamental to the community as productive activities,
tended to be of low priority. State delivery of services, moreover,
was generally erratic and of low quality.
Finally, what of the role of the sponsoring agency itself? One
school of thought points to sponsors I self-interest in financing
development projects19, a smaller school to their enlightened
self-interest.20 It would be difficult indeed to argue that a South
African mining house would derive direct benefits - with reference
to their employees, for instance - from the Amatola Basin project.
It appears more feasible to interpret self-interest indirectly in this
case, rooted in the realisation that rural areas in the Ciskei are
deeply impoverished and, if they remain so, may well become
increasingly serious threats to the stability and credibility of the
South African political economy.
To assess the extent to which this self-interest is enlightened would be
premature since the project is barely five years of age. This
assessment does , however, suggest that agencies that undertake
sponsorship of such projects should commit themselves to periods of
longer than five years, and should refrain from suggesting or
insisting upon simple indicators of production in the highly complex
field of development in rural communities.
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Conclusion
The 'residents of the Amatola Basin are not able to .derive a
livelihood from the present distribution of resources and opportuni-
ties available in the Basin. Yields and sales from agriculture do not
remotely approach subsistence level, infrast ructural development and
income opportunities allow for limited employment in the Basin;
most able-bodied adults live and work elsewhere. Dependence upon
participation in the wider South African economy is pervasive and
deep. Basin residents are unable to exercise meaningful cont rol over
their socio-economic environment.
In fact, as shown in this monograph, constraints upon processes that
would lead to improved lIfe chances and living conditions are
widespread, both internal and external to the community and
cumulative in their effect. They manifest themselves at all levels of
administration and government, within the commissioning and
implementing project agencies themselves and, as portrayed in the
history of the Basin, in the consciousness of the residents. The
present structural situation in the Amatola Basin can best be
described as a low-level equilibrium trap.l
Opportunities available within the community, as illustrated by
voluntary women's groups, a measure of supplementary subsistence
agriculture and informal sector activities, are contained within this
structural equilibrium. Of themselves, they will not change the
process of increasing dependence and decreasing local production.
Except by outmigration, residents do not seem able to improve their
circumstances by themselves.
During the last 130 years there have been several interventions
designed to influence the local economy of the Amatola Basin; and
to meet identified basic needs of residents. These interventions were
initiated by state departments and culminated in the implementation
of the South African Government's betterment policy in the 1960s.
In the 19805 a new intervention was launched for the first time by
a private sector corporation employing a development agency at the
University of Fort Hare. The involvement of outsiders and their
development strategies in the affairs of Basin residents is a common
occurrence, viewed by many of the residents as being of doubtful
worth.
Is it therefore feasible to propose once again that an external
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agency should intervene in areas such as the Amatola Basin? The
structural conditions pertaining in the Amatola Basin seem
effectively to prevent escape from the equilibrium trap discussed
above. These conditions apply in most of rural Ciskei and, in all
probability, in all other homelands. Unless it is able to overcome
these structural conditions, a new intervention is unlikely to be any
more successful than its predecessors.
On the other hand, the necessity of meeting the basic needs of
health and nutrition, education and welfare in rural areas remains a
matter of priority if people's life-chances are not to deteriorate
markedly. A new st rategy of intervention must take account of
these needs, as well as of the structural limitations within which it
will have to operate.
In the short term, within the confines of the equilibrium trap, rural
residents' needs have to be met largely from Ciskei resources and
capital. Services should be aimed at enabling households to satisfy
their basic needs more adequately, to obtain cash through
employment, and to produce at least some food for themselves. In
this regard, the improvement of the life chances of the young in
rural areas, particularly with regard to health and education, should
rank as a priority. Such a strategy should, wherever possible, allow
for community participation and initiative.
The potential of such a strategy to realise its aims is, however,
critically limited by the Ciskei's lack of independent or adequate
funding and of trained personnel, as well as by its inability to
generate sufficient industrial growth to attract people away from
the heavily populated rural areas. -A basic needs strategy, while
essential, -is likely to achieve only limited success as long as the
Ciskei's economic dependence on South Africa is not substantially
diminished or until South Africa pours substantially more money into
Ciskei coffers. Under present economic conditions, neither
alternative seems very likely to materialize.
In the longer term, breaking out of the equilibrium trap requires
the development of successful commercial farming, as well as other
forms of production. This could be done by a parallel strategy of
large-scale commercial farming and peasant farming, whereby the
former, through nucleus-outgrower projects, could act as a catalyst
for the latter. The intention would be (as e.g. at Tyhefu) to create
a successful peasant class that becomes increasingly self-sufficient,
thereby lessening the Ciskei government's financial burden of
subsidizing rural areas.
The unlikelihood of successful private commercial farming in the
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Ciskei under present conditions has been argued in Chapter Five. This
unlikelihood derives from the Ciskei's inability to achieve sufficient
industrial development to generate the financial and infrastructural'
resources needed to support successful agriculture, and to attract
sufficient numbers of people away from the rural areas so as to
enable viable consolidation of arable holdings.
Such successful commercial agriculture as currently takes place in
the Ciskei does so under external management, with Ciskei funding,
and with privileged access to markets and services. Successful
commercial agriculture, and its ability to generate successful
peasant farming through nucleus-out grower projects will thus be
possible only to the extent that the Ciskei is able to afford and
sustain such intervention. In the long run, the viability of
commercial agriculture is dependent on the Ciskei's ability to
generate industrial development and employment within its own
borders.
In the meantime, what remains for homelands such as the Ciskei is
to use what limited resources they have as effectively as possible to
meet basic needs, to general industrial growth and to develop
commercial agriculture as best they can. This requires an
improvement in the efficiency of such a homeland's institutions at
both central and local levels. This can be achieved through a greater
devolution of authority to the local level, and through the provision
of training for officials in the development of managerial and
administrative skills. In the short- term, such training may have to be
p'rovided by outside agencies.
The Amatola Basin Rural Development Project which began in 1979
can be seen as one strand in the process proposed above. The
project embodies goals and activities compatible with both the short.
and longer- term strategies. In terms of its achievements, it is in a
position to continue negotiating with the Ciskei government and its
depart ments. The achievements flowing from the project can,
moreover, be diffused through appropriate agencies so that some
impact can be made on the scale of the development problem in
other black rural areas.
The identification and analysis of constraints and resources discussed
in this monograph will, hopefully, serve as an input into the rural
development enterprise. The Amatola Basin community's experiences
of rural development may provide governments and development
agencies with the sort of information that may help them to learn
from previous mistakes, and so to provide more enabling circum-
stances for people to improve themselves. One of mankind's saving
graces is the capacity to learn from experience, and is to the
benefit of the powerful, as well as of the poor.
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Postscript
Almost one year has elapsed between the completion of this work
and its presentation for publication (in June 1985). During this
period a number of changes have taken place, which, either directly
or indirectly, may have an effect upon the lives of the people of the
Amatola Basin. They are simply listed for the benefit of the reader:
1) The Ciskei Government's modification of income tax laws
operating in the Ciskei.
2) The Ciskei Government's InItIation of a land reform
programme, intended to make for an increasing commercia-
lisation of land.
3) The Ciskei Government's announcement of a budget of R592
million for the financial year 1985/86.
4) The Ciskei Government's construction of the multi-million
rand Gida Hospital at Keiskammahoek, which will replace St
Matthew's Hospital as the hospital which will serve patients
from the Amatola Basin.
5) Continuation of the Amatola Basin Development Project.
Although the project's source of private funding has
effectively been terminated, it has recently opened a
training centre at Komkhulu in the Amatola Basin, at which
people are trained in farming, carpentry, metalwork, broiler
keeping and sewing, and has also built a spring to make
water more readily available to people in the higher-lying
villages.
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This multi-disciplinary case-study considers the opportunities
and constraints confronting the members of a rural Ciskeian
community in their attempts to improve their economic and
social conditions. The possibility of such improvement is seen to
be tied up with the community's relationship with its wider
administrative, political and economic setting, viz. the Ciskei and
South Africa.
The relative poverty of the Amatola Basin community reflects its
position of political and economic dependency. This dependency
is compounded by the fact that the Ciskei is itself dependent on
South Africa for a substantial portion of its budget, as well as for
much of its administrative capacity. The economic,
infrastructural and political poverty of the Amatola Basin
community is thus duplicated at the level of the Ciskei
government.
This study considers the circumstances of the Amatola Basin
community through a detailed examination of its history,
current socio-economic situation, educational institutions, form
of local government, agricultural practices, health and health
services, as well as through an evaluation of a development
project implemented in the community. In the conclusion, the
findings of the case-study are applied to a discussion of the
problems and prospects of rural development in the Ciskei,
although the issues raised are also applicable to other homelands.
This detailed case-study of a black rural community incorporates
perspectlv~Jrom the disciplines of anthropology, development
studies, eduditi~n, geography and history. It will be of value to
social scientists interested in South Africa, as well as those
concerned with issues of development. Its unity as a case-study
should make it a useful teaching text at undergraduate level at
universities.
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